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PREFACE 
This work is an output of the collaborative project between the Sokoine University of Agriculture 
(SUA), the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NINA) and the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU). The goal of the project, funded by Norwegian Council for 
Higher Education’s Programme for Development Research and Education (NUFU), was to build 
capacity for the newly established Department of Wildlife Management at the Faculty of Forestry 
and Nature Conservation at SUA. Besides, financial support from NUFU several individuals and 
institutions have contributed immensely to the completion of this work. My sincere thanks are 
extended to SUA Administration for granting me a four years study leave; the Department of 
Wildlife Management and Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation at SUA for support in 
logistics and; the Department of Biology at NTNU for effective training and hosting me in 
Norway. I wish to recognise an outstanding support from my supervisors, Professor Eivin 
Røskaft and Dr Bjørn P. Kalternborn, who tirelessly and earnestly guided me throughout the 
work, both in Norway and in Serengeti. My local supervisors, Professor Samwel L. Maganga and 
Dr Alexander N. Songorwa, gave similar support in Tanzania. Ahsanteni Sana! 
       Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute (TAWIRI) granted permission to conduct research in 
Western Serengeti while Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and Ngorongoro Conservation 
Area Authority (NCAA) granted me entry permission to Serengeti National Park and Ngorongoro 
Conservation Area, respectively. I wish to recognize support received from the management and 
staff of  the three organizations during the entire period of my study. I am also grateful to Mr 
John Muya, the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) Manager, and his colleagues for 
hosting me and sharing with me their ’wealth’ of field experience during the entire study period. I 
also wish to recognise the local people in Western Serengeti, who besides responding to 
questionnaires, they voluntarily spared their precious time to share with me their experience, 
knowledge and grievances about wildlife conservation issues.  
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       Lastly, but not least, my beloved wife, Raskina, had to forgo some of the family 
responsibilities and miss our children in Morogoro and join me in Serengeti for data collection. 
Morally I felt privileged. My children Bariki, Bahati, Rama and Abdulazim (J4) understood the 
work which was ahead of me and, therefore, willingly endorsed our absence from home. My 
mother, sisters, and brothers supported me through prayers.  Tusen takk – Ahsanteni sana - 
Nahavachenyi mnu. 
 
 
Trondheim 12.09.2006   Jafari Ramadhani Kideghesho 
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SUMMARY 
The pre-colonial traditional societies in Western Serengeti were physically and spiritually 
connected to animal species and plants in their surrounding environments. This link contributed 
to sustainable use and harmonious coexistence. The religious affiliation and local management 
structures sanctioned some destructive behaviours and designated some species and habitats as 
sacred. Additionally, low human population and primitive technology posed low pressure on 
resources. Colonial regime interrupted the coexistence through introduction of new management 
structures. The exclusive, prohibitive and punitive actions perpetrated by colonial regime under 
‘fences and fines’ conservation approach fomented conflicts and local resentment towards 
conservation policies. However, despite local resentment and conflicts, the economic and 
political reasons forced the post-colonial government to inherit these policies uncritically. 
       While the idiom ‘Serengeti shall not die’ has been a popular motto and ambition for decades, 
some forces had been working against it. These forces include: inefficient state-led enforcementn 
(due to shrinkage of government budgets in 1970s and 1980s); human population growth; rural 
poverty; globalisation of markets in animal products (e.g. rhino horns and ivory) and; local 
resentment towards the conservation policies. The reduction of the wildlife populations and 
habitats as a result of these forces, ruled out the efficacy of “fences and fines” approach in 
conserving wildlife. This prompted a need to search for alternative approach that would end this 
crisis.  
       The community conservation (CC) initiative, which emerged as a major paradigm of 
conservation work in late 1980s, was the most appealing option. Through provision of tangible 
economic benefits, CC sought to motivate local people to align their behaviours with 
conservation goals. This prescription was applied to Serengeti where two CC initiatives, 
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) and Community Conservation Service (CCS) 
were launched. Findings from this study indicate that the benefit based approaches implemented 
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under these initiatives are fundamentally flawed, a scenario that precludes their possibility to 
contribute significantly to conservation objectives. 
       Although attitudinal survey indicated that the benefit-based strategy increase acceptability 
towards conservation, this may not necessarily imply a change in behaviour. Poaching was still 
rampant in the villages under the projects. However, even if the strategy could lead to a change of 
behaviour among the beneficiaries, its impact to conservation would still be insignificant since 
only a small fraction of the communities benefit (i.e. 14 out of 126 villages). Furthermore, even 
within the project villages the minimal benefits granted are inequitably distributed and 
monopolised by local elites. The poorest members of the society are unable to enjoy these 
benefits because cash is required to access them (e.g. game meat, medical services). 
       Along with the benefits, the results indicated that the costs inflicted by wildlife to local 
people and some socio-demographic factors (education, wealth) have potential role in shaping 
conservation attitudes. Local communities experiencing fewer costs from wildlife conservation 
and those most educated were less likely to support protected areas. Those with more livestock 
were more negative, probably because the costs of prohibition from access to water and pasture in 
protected areas were more obvious to them. Conservation attitudes were more positive to 
Serengeti National Park than to the adjacent Game Reserves, a scenario that can be attributed to 
history and the age of the park. It was created some 50 years when population was low and land 
was still available. Furthermore, the majority of the villagers were, either too young, or were not 
even born when the Park came to existence. Therefore, they did not feel the pain of eviction, if 
there was any. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Global conservation efforts, threats and status of wildlife species  
Throughout history, human factors have been the major drivers for loss of biodiversity. These 
factors include species habitat destruction, species overexploitation, introduction of exotic species 
and pollution (IUCN 2006; Soule et al. 1979; WCMC 1992). Ninety-nine percent of the IUCN 
Red List1 species are threatened by these factors (IUCN 2006). Conservation efforts aiming at 
halting these threats have historically focused on creation of the protected areas (PAs). Currently 
104,791 protected areas covering a total area of about 20 million km2 or 12.7% of the earth’s 
surface  have been created (Chape et al. 2005). This is an increase of 100% of the area under 
protection compared to the last decade when 9,869 protected areas covering about 9.3 million 
km2 (equivalent to 6.3% of the earth’s surface) existed (WCMC 1996 in Pullin 2002). Since the 
pronounced impact on species occur in the tropics, where the highest level of biodiversity is 
located, most of the conservation efforts are targeting these areas.  
       However, despite committing more areas under legal protection, pressures on wildlife 
habitats and species are still growing. Species are increasingly being threatened, endangered, and 
becoming locally extinct.  The 2006 IUCN Red List indicates that of 5,205 species evaluated in 
1996, 25% of all mammals and 11% of all birds were threatened (IUCN 2006). Recently, some 
162 species of mammals and 181 of birds are critically endangered i.e. they are facing an 
extremely high risk of extinction in the wild (IUCN 2006). 
       Habitat loss is universally the greatest threat, impacting 86% of threatened birds, 86% of 
threatened mammals and 88% of threatened amphibians (IUCN 2006). Earth Policy Institute (EPI 
2006) reports that, 50% of the collective geographical ranges of 173 species of mammals from 
around the world have diminished by 50%. This signifies a huge loss of breeding and foraging 
grounds for these species. The IUCN 2006 Red list indicates that other threats have relatively low 
impact on species. For instance, overexploitation affects only 30% of threatened birds, 33% 
                                                          
1 IUCN Red List is the world’s most comprehensive inventory of the global conservation status of plant and animal 
species  
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mammals and 6% amphibians while introduction of alien species affects 30% and 11% of 
threatened birds and amphibians, respectively. Pollution affects 29% while diseases affect 17% of 
threatened species of amphibians.  
       Even if the habitats in the core PAs are fully protected, the long-term survival of flora and 
fauna cannot be guaranteed. Anthropogenic pressures on adjacent lands and wildlife migratory 
corridors progressively transform the PAs into ‘ecological islands’ and, therefore, rendering the 
environment becomes to wildlife species. Reduction and fragmentation of the natural ranges of 
many game animals jeopardize their survival (Mwalyosi 1991; Newmark 1996; Ottichilo et al. 
2001). Bennet (1997) outlines four deficiencies that disqualify the PAs as self-sustaining entities: 
(1) PAs do not represent all natural communities (2) most PAs are too small to maintain viable 
populations of all species and to maintain natural ecological processes (3) movement patterns of 
many protected wildlife species regularly cross PAs boundaries (4) PAs are not protected from 
adjacent land uses and may be degraded by processes arising in the surrounding landscapes.  
       Some scientific predictions and generalizations have attempted to estimate the negative 
impacts of ecological isolation. For example, Soule et al (1979) predicted that small reserves in 
East Africa were likely to lose 23%, 65% and 88% of their large mammals if they were isolated 
without intervention of scientific management for 50, 500 and 5,000 years, respectively. The risk 
is much less to large reserves. The loss was estimated at 6%, 35% and 73% in the respective 
intervals of periods. Likewise, extrapolations from estimates for habitat loss have led to the most 
widely quoted generalizations that, loss of 90% of habitat results in loss of half of the available 
species (WCMC 1992: Meffe & Carrroll 1997). 
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A brief history of wildlife conservation in Africa 
Conventional Conservation Policies 
The American Yellowstone model (popular as ‘fences and fines’ or ‘fortress conservation’ 
approach) through which colonial wildlife conservation policies in Africa were derived - 
conceptualised natives as a conservation problem. Hunting practices by natives were presented as 
cruel, barbarous and wasteful (Adams & McShane 1996; Lewis et al. 1990; Neumann 1998). This 
justified the prohibitive action against access to wildlife species of social and economic 
importance. Showing the ulterior motive behind these accusations, Neumann (1998) argues 
convincingly that, hunting of wild animals in Africa offered Europeans a symbolic dominance of 
the continent and important marker of social class within settler society. Therefore, pursuing it 
along with traditional hunting was undesirable, as it would imply putting African culture and 
resource management practices on equal footing with those of Europeans.  
       Essentially, the wildlife policies were designed to protect the interests of the whites, while 
grossly undermining those of the natives. The suitability of an area for a protected area depended 
on its unsuitability for alternative uses by Europeans. For instance, a report to the London-based 
Society for Preservation of Fauna and Flora (SPFF) of the Empire, rated Serengeti as an ideal 
place for a national park because it was unattractive to European miners and farmers due to 
insignificant mineral deposits, infestation of tsetse flies (Glossina spp) and erratic rainfall 
(Bonner 1993). In Zimbabwe, game laws were suspended to allow game eradication as a control 
measure against Trypanosomiasis, the livestock disease that interfered with settler economy 
(Murombedzi 2003). Despite this bias, clear evidence abounds that Europeans themselves were 
responsible for habitat degradation and decimation of wildlife species. In South Africa, for 
example, white hunters and the rapid expansion of white ranchers exterminated Quagga (Equus 
quagga) and blaubok (Hippotragus leucophaea ) (Adams & McShane 1996; Bonner 1993). 
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      The post-colonial African countries maintained the colonial conservation policies and 
ideologies contrary to native expectations2. More protected areas were created at the expense of 
local livelihoods. Law enforcement was observed with more vigilance. For example, some 
countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe went further by instituting a “shoot-to-kill” policy 
against the poachers (Bonner 1993). Two reasons made the choice of maintaining colonial 
policies inevitable: (1) wildlife resource was contemplated as important source of economic base 
for political power and resource for promised socio-economic development (Gibson 1999; Levine 
2002) and, (2) the continuation of the flow of foreign aid packages depended on deep respect for 
the wishes of Europeans and Americans, including prominently international environmental 
organisations and their constituencies (Nelson 2003). This uncritical inheritance of colonial 
conservation policies endorsed continuation of local resentment toward the policies and conflicts 
between local people and conservation agencies.   
 
Failure of fences and fines approach 
Failure of fences and fines approach in conserving wildlife can be manifested by increasing 
human resentment towards wildlife policies and escalating negative impacts caused by human 
activities on wildlife areas and species. Surveys in the last two decades suggested that agricultural 
expansion, deforestation, and overgrazing had reduced the original wildlife habitats in Africa by 
over 65% (Kiss 1990 in Newmark & Hough 2000). Deforestation and hunting have left some 
species critically endangered or extinct. For example, once inhabited in 25 African countries, 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) is now extinct in four and nearing extinct in many others 
(http://www.panda.org/wwf /species/problems/habitat_loss). Activities of the refugees from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi have reduced the population of 13 large 
herbivores3 by 90% in Western Tanzania’s Burigi-Biharamulo Game Reserves (TWCM 1991, 
                                                          
2Nationalist/freedom movements recognised colonial conservation policies as injustice and, therefore, pledged to remedy the situation after 
independence   
3These herbivores are: Bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus), Eland (Tragelaphus oryx), Impala (Aepyceros melampus), Lichtenstein’s Hartebeest 
(Alcelaphus lichtensteini), Reedbuck (Redunca redunca), Roan Antelope (Hippotragus equinus), Sable Antelope (Hippotragus niger), Sitatunga 
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1998). Local extinction of some large mammal species in Tanzania’s major wildlife areas is 
attributed to increase of human activities (Miller & Harris 1977; Newmark 1996; Newmark et al. 
1991). 
       Africa had bitter experience on poaching between 1970s and 1980s, when two of its 
charismatic species - black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis) and elephant (Loxodonta africana) -
faced a dramatic decline. The number of black rhinos in the continent dropped from 65,000 in 
1970 to 2,400 in 1995 while that of elephants was reduced from 1.3 million in 1979 to 625,000 in 
1989 (Adams & McShane 1996). Africa’s lion (Panthera leo) population has also suffered from 
human impacts. It dropped from about a million in the pre-colonial era to 500,000 by 1950, then 
to 200,000 by 1975 (Myers in Frank et al 2006) and to less than 100,000 in early 1990s (Nowell 
& Jackson in Frank et al 2006).  The most recent estimate is below 28,000 (Frank et al. 2006). 
 
The contributing factors to failure of fences and fines approach 
Local resentment 
The political, social and economic costs of wildlife conservation fomented resentment toward 
conservation policies. Illegal activities, physical violence and/or vandalism (see Table 1) have 
been pursued deliberately to retaliate against conservation authorities, thus threatening the 
survival of wildlife. Makombe (1993:online) phrases this scenario succinctly: “People prevented 
from using their wildlife legally will tend to ignore it, eliminate it, or use it illegally, to the 
disadvantage of the resource and those who might develop and use it legally.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(Tragelaphus spekei), Topi (Damaliscus korrigum), Waterbuck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus), Warthog (Phacochaerus aethiopicus) and Zebra (Equus 
burchelli 
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Table 1: Some examples on local resentment toward conservation policies in Africa 
Area Event Local communities’ response Source 
Simien N.P. 
(Ethiopia) 
Imposed restrictions over access to 
firewood  
Physical violence IIED (1994) 
Virunga N.P. 
(DRC) 
Attempts to evict the local 
communities 
Killing of 36 wardens Machlis (1989) 
Serengeti N.P. 
(Tanzania) 
Eviction of Maasai pastoralists in 
1940s 
Physical violence; spearing of 
rhinos and setting fires with 
malicious intent 
Neumann 
(1992) 
Amboseli N.P. 
(Kenya) 
Eviction of Maasai pastoralists in 
1970s 
Spearing of rhinos   Western (1984) 
Etosha N.P. 
(Namibia) 
Restriction of  hunting imposed to 
Ovambo tribesmen during the 
colonial time 
Marked freedom celebration  in 
1990 by cutting game fences and 
driving into the park armed with 
guns to hunt for meat  
New Scientist 
1991 (In IIED 
1994) 
Benoue N.P. 
(Cameroon) 
 
Imposed restriction on land use and 
property damage 
Encroachment and illegal hunting Weladji & 
Tchamba 
(2003) 
Maasailand 
(Kenya) 
Livestock predation by lions  Poisoning and spearing of lions  (Frank et al. 
2006) 
  
 
 Poverty 
Even if the law that prohibits certain practices and activities exists, a need to survive may prompt 
violation of this law. Poor people are compelled to adopt the coping strategies, set priorities and 
make economic choices that are ecologically destructive. Illegal hunting in Serengeti National 
Park, for example, is linked to income poverty (Loibooki et al. 2002). Inability to afford modern 
technologies and inputs required for more agricultural output leaves people with no option, but to 
open new farms in the wildlife sensitive areas such as protected areas, migratory corridors and 
dispersal areas.  
 
Human population growth 
Growth of human population raises demand for natural resources. Since these resources are 
prohibited, people obtain them illegally. Campbell and Hofer (1995) and Loibooki et al (2002) 
showed that there was a positive correlation between illegal hunting in Serengeti National Park 
and human population growth around the park. Hackel (1999:728) identifies three conservation 
problems associated with people settling or using new areas as a result of human population 
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growth: (1) disruption of ecological processes essential to maintain long-term biodiversity (for 
example, dispersal and colonisation might become more difficult as habitat is transformed to 
human use); increased hunting for home or market; and (3) increased pressure from local people 
to open protected lands for community use. 
 
Inadequate government budgets 
 Besides resentments, poverty and demographic factors, the economic condition in many African 
countries constrains conservation efforts even further. The economic situation of many 
developing countries along with other overriding national priorities have often rendered the 
natural resources the least funded sector. For example, in Tanzania, only 1.2% (some US$52 
million) of the national development budget was allocated from 1976 to 1981 for the entire sector 
i.e. wildlife, forestry and fisheries (Yeager 1986). The budget had continued to decrease 
gradually since then (See e.g. Table 2). In 1987 Selous Game Reserve, which is Tanzania’s 
largest protected area, received only US$3/km2  (Baldus et al. 2003). This is far low compared to 
amount required for effective control of commercial poaching. In 1980s the adequate amount was 
estimated to range between US$200 and 400/km2  per annum4 (Bonner 1993; Leader-Williams et 
al. 1990). 
 
Table 2: Budget allocation to Department of Wildlife in Tanzania (US$000s) 
 1982-85 1985-86 1986-93 1993-96 1996 
Recurrent  12,989 5,630 2,178 190 320 
Development  1,047 1,185 710 39 710 
Total  14,036 6,815 2,888 229 1,021 
Source: URT 1995 
 
                                                          
4 Perhaps this figure is an overestimate. Jachman and Billiouw (1997) reported that US$82.2/km2  per annum was required for law enforcement 
in the Central Luangwa Valley, Zambia. 
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The meagre financial resources allocated for wildlife sector have, therefore, been insufficient to 
cater for adequate staff, remuneration and equipment. For example, in Tanzania, while the ideal 
staffing ratio for game reserves is estimated at 1:25 (persons:km2) (Severre 2000), the ratio has 
been 1:130 – i.e. 1438 staff patrolling 186,000 km2 (Masilingi 1994; Severre 2000). According to 
Masilingi (1994), the wildlife Department in each administrative region of Tanzania was served 
by only one vehicle despite the poor roads and the big size of the regions5. Occasionally, lack of 
spare parts and fuel left these vehicles grounded. Other countries experience more or less similar 
situation. In Cameroon, for example, the staff area ratios for two protected areas viz. Dja Wildlife 
Reserve and Lobeke National Park were 1:84 and 1:200, respectively (Koulagna Koutou 2001). 
Moreover, in many countries, the wildlife personnel went without salaries for months, lacked 
uniforms and had inferior firearms compared to poachers (Bonner 1980).  
        
Searching for an alternative conservation approach 
The negative human impact on wildlife populations had prompted the perception that ‘fences and 
fines’ approach had failed to conserve wildlife. Over the last two decades, community 
conservation (CC) approach emerged as the most appealing strategy to address this problem (see 
e.g. Barrett & Arcese 1995; Berkes 2003; Gibson & Marks 1995; Songorwa et al. 2000). The 
approach is based on the premise(s) that “if conservation and development could be 
simultaneously achieved, then the interests of both could be served” (Berkes 2003:621) and 
“when wildlife pays, wildlife stays”  (Pearce 1997:4). These catchphrases commensurate with the 
“use it or lose it” philosophy (Baskin 1994) underscoring that, the conservation efforts investing 
on biological solutions or repressive legislation whilst ignoring the socio-economic conditions of 
the people are doomed to failure. Barrow and Fabricius (2002:77) express this succinctly by 
stating that “ultimately, conservation and protected areas in contemporary Africa must either 
contribute to national and local livelihoods, or fail in their biodiversity goals.”  Central to many 
                                                          
5 For example, Arusha region spanned some 80,168 km2 , Tabora - 76,151 km2, Rukwa -75,240 km2, Shinyanga - 50,781 km2 (Source: 
http://www.nbs.go.tz/abstract2002/landandclimate.pdf).  
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CC approaches, provision of benefits is seen as a pragmatic way of motivating local people to 
align their behaviours with conservation goals (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2002; Emerton 2001; 
Makombe 1993; Western 2001). Essentially, the strategy seeks to induce local people to 
“surrender access to, or curtail illegal offtake of, native species and their habitats” (Barrett & 
Arcese 1995:1074).  
       Despite being ambitious, the growing consensus in the academic literature reveals 
disappointing outcomes for most CC initiatives. Some of the reasons for this failure include 
wrong assumptions underlying these programmes (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Gibson & Marks 
1995; Hackel 1999; Songorwa 1999); and limited budgets that make the initiatives too small to 
exert a reasonable influence over the forces threatening protected ecosystems (Wells & Brandon 
1992). Other reasons are missing balance/link between the benefits and costs (Madzudzo 1997); 
lack of interests among the communities (Songorwa 1999); incompatibility between community 
development objectives and those of conservation (Berkes 2003); and gender insensitivity (IIED 
1994; Songorwa 1999). 
    Sustainability of these programmes has also been questioned. Most of the programmes are 
donor-initiated and funded and lack sound strategies to survive in case of donor-pull-out 
(Songorwa 2004b; URT 1994). The benefits from the initiatives are also likely to be reduced or 
terminated in an event of population increase and low tourism earnings - due to ecological, 
political, policy and security factors (Barrett & Arcese 1995; ZimConservation 2004). Reduction 
or termination of the conservation benefits will likely undermine the conservation objectives on 
the basis of ‘no benefits, no conservation.’  Furthermore, use of conservation benefits as a basis 
for local support to conservation may risk the conservation objectives in case more profitable 
economic options emerge (Hackel 1999).  
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Human-wildlife conflicts 
The historical account of wildlife conservation given above presents conflicts over natural 
resources as the important recurring features in conservation areas. These conflicts are inevitable 
due to multiple, and very often incompatible interests held by various actors. Natural resources 
are subject to competition among the actors and among different land uses. According to Barlowe 
(in Kajembe et al 2003) this competition has impact among land resource supplies. He argues 
that, in the competition that takes place between individual operators and between uses, resources 
normally go to those operators and uses that offer the highest prices and enjoy the greatest 
prospects for their remunerative use. Incompatibility of land uses, and different combinations of 
interests and objectives of different stakeholders render this tendency operative, but not  as 
smoothly and perfectly as it might The operators tend to assign different  weights to the private 
and social benefits associated with alternative land uses, the tendency that generates the conflicts 
of interest (Kajembe et al. 2003). 
       The reasons for conflicts associated with the use of natural resources are soundly summarised 
by Kajembe et al (2003:334) as follows:  
1. Natural resources are embedded in an environment or interconnected space where actions by 
one individual or group may generate effect far-site. 
2. Natural resources are also embedded in a shared social space where complex and unequal 
relations are established among a wide range of social actors. As in other fields with political 
dimensions, those actors with greatest access to power are also able to control and influence 
natural resources decisions in their favour. 
3. Natural resources are subject to increased scarcity due to rapid environmental change, 
increasing demand and their unequal distribution. Environmental change may involve 
resource degradation, overexploitation of resources, extensive land clearing or climate 
change. Increasing demand over resources  have multiple social and economic dimensions, 
including population growth, changing consumption patterns, trade liberalisation, rural 
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enterprise development and changes in technology and land use. Resource scarcity may also 
result from unequal distribution of the resources among individuals and social groups or 
ambiguities in the definition of rights to common property resources.  Homer-Dixon and Blitt 
(in Kajembe 2003:334) observes that “the effects of environmental scarcity such as 
‘constrained agricultural output, constrained economic production, migration, and disrupted 
institutions, can either singly or in combination, produce or exacerbate conflict among groups   
4. Natural resources are used by people in ways that are defined symbolically. The forests, 
wildlife and water are not just material that people compete over, but are also part of a 
particular way of life (e.g. for a farmer, hunter, or pastoralist), an ethnic identity, and a set of 
gender and age roles. These symbolic dimensions of natural resources render themselves to 
ideological, social, and political struggles that have enormous practical significance   . 
 
Ingredients of Conflicts  
Conflicts comprise of several ingredients. The major ones, often the most common in human –
wildlife, are needs, perceptions, power and values. Table 2 below summarises these ingredients. 
 
Table 2: Ingredients of Conflicts  
INGREDIENT DESCRIPTION 
NEEDS Needs are things that are essential to our well-being. Needs are different from desires. The latter 
are things which we would like, but are not essential. Conflicts occur when one party believes 
that in order to satisfy his/her needs, those of an opponent must be sacrificed.  Interest-based 
conflicts occur over substantive issues (e.g. money, natural resources, time); procedural issues 
(the way the dispute is to be resolved) and; psychological issues (perceptions of trust, fairness, 
desire for participation, respect).  
PERCEPTIONS People interpret reality differently. They perceive differences in the severity, causes and 
consequences of problems. Misperceptions or differing perceptions may come from: self-
perceptions, others' perceptions, differing perceptions of situations and perceptions of threat. 
Perceptions on values, threats, causes and consequences may lead to decisions and actions that 
may undermine the interests and needs of other stakeholders. For instance, perception about 
local people’s impact on resources may result into decision to gazette an area, evict people 
and/or prohibit access to resources. Likewise, local people may perceive conservation 
programme or other stakeholders as a threat to their current or future livelihoods and, therefore, 
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seek some provocative means to mitigate their impacts.  
POWER How people define and use power is an important influence on the number and types of 
conflicts that occur. This also influences how conflict is managed. Conflicts can arise when 
people try to make others change their actions or to gain an unfair advantage. For instance, use 
of political, military, legal or economic power to deny local people access to land and other 
resources for advantage of elite class may result into conflicts. Power imbalance leads to 
unequal distribution of benefits and costs of conservation and, therefore results in conflicts. 
VALUES Values are beliefs or principles we consider to be very important. Values explain what is good 
or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust. Serious conflicts arise when people hold perceived or 
actual incompatible values or when values are not clear. Value disputes arise when one party 
refuses to accept the fact that the other party holds something as a value rather than a preference 
and, therefore, attempt to force one set of values on another one.  
 
 
Conflict management 
As the negative impacts of conflicts over natural resources are increasingly becoming apparent, 
conflict management is being adopted as the most important component of conservation work. 
Failure or success in achieving effective conflict management relies on observance of the key 
principles for conflict management. Four general principles are applicable in addressing the 
conflicts prevailing in natural resources sector (Lewis in DSE 1998). 
 
1. Focus of underlying interests rather than positions 
Interests are people/institutions fundamental needs and concerns while positions are just 
proposals that are put forward to try to satisfy the interests. Worked on positions rather than 
interests     
2. Address both the substantive and procedural dimensions 
Most conflicts have substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantive dimension involve the 
interests that relate to tangible needs such as firewood, wildlife, non-timber forest products, game 
meat, grazing areas, arable land and security from problem animals. Procedural issues consist of 
such needs as being included in decision making when substantive issues are at stake, having 
their ideas and opinion heard and valued and being respected as a group. 
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3. Involve all significantly affected stakeholders 
Failure to involve all significantly affected stakeholders in the establishment and design of 
protected areas, in decisions affecting the management of the area or, in developing solutions to 
conservation problems may lead to conflicts or limit the conflict resolution process. Failure to 
involve the key stakeholders reduces the likelihood of their interests and concerns to be known 
and considered. Conflicts are, therefore, likely since the stakeholders may not have an ownership 
of the outcome. 
4. Understand the power that various stakeholders have  
Power is critical element in conflict management. A group which feels powerless to influence the 
outcome through bureaucratic decision making process may choose to use illegal activity to meet 
their interests or leave the forum. Some power is real while some is perceived. Kinds of power 
which should be understood in addressing conflicts entail: power of position (authority, 
leadership), power of knowledge (having information); personal power (being personally 
forceful, persuasive); economic power (having financial resources); political power (having 
supportive constituency or access to leadership); legal power (having a good legal case, expert 
legal council, access to courts); coercive physical power (having police or military backing, 
weaponry) and; family power (being from a well connected family).    
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK APPROACH 
This study employs three scientific/academic approaches viz. conservation biology, 
environmental history and political ecology to understand the complex realities underpinning 
human-wildlife interactions in Africa. The three approaches offer a deep understanding on the 
way human species is connected to wildlife resource; the impact human inflicts on wildlife 
resource and vice versa. The study also seeks to understand the historical relationship between 
different actors and how this relationship has been shaped by the way the resource is accessed, 
controlled, managed and distributed. 
 
Conservation biology 
As human impact on species and ecosystems increases, loss of biodiversity is becoming an 
apparent challenge to conservation community. The desire to face this challenge has given rise to 
development of conservation biology. Conservation biology is an interdisciplinary field that 
merges traditional fields of natural sciences (e.g. population biology and ecology) and social 
sciences (e.g. sociology, anthropology, economics, law) with a view of meeting three goals: to 
document the full range of biological diversity on earth; to investigate human impact on species, 
communities and ecosystems and; to develop practical approaches to prevent extinction of 
species, maintain genetic variation within the species, and to protect and restore the biological 
communities and their associated ecosystems (Primack 2002). The field is regarded as a crisis 
field, as it calls for immediate intervention in dealing with conservation problems even when the 
knowledge is insufficient (Meffe and Carroll 1997: Primack 2002). This is important as waiting 
for such knowledge may be worsen the situation..    
       Unlike the traditional resource conservation which was motivated by utilitarian, single-
species issues, conservation biology targets the entire systems and all their biological components 
and processes. The field recognises the contribution that nonbiologists can offer to biodiversity 
conservation. The need to incorporate ideas and expertise from broad ranges of other fields is 
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prompted by the fact that much of the biodiversity crisis arises from human pressures. Meffe and 
Carroll (1997) argue convincingly that, because the need for conservation in the first place is the 
direct human intervention in natural systems, an understanding of humanistic viewpoints is vital 
for reducing present and future confrontations between human expansion and the natural world.   
 
Environmental history 
Beinart (2000) defines environmental history as the study of environment in a historical 
framework aiming at exploring the reciprocal relationship between human and natural forces in 
the examination of the human impact on the natural world. It, therefore, deepens our 
understanding of how humans have been affected by their natural environment through time and, 
conversely, how they have affected that environment and with what results (Oosthoek 2005).. 
       Historically, landscapes and natural resources have been subjected to changes due to a 
plethora of factors. These factors, among others, include human population growth, technological 
changes, market forces and policies.  The impact of these factors have either been beneficial or 
detrimental to landscape and resources.  Humans, on the other hand, have been affected by the 
changes and the way the landscapes and resources are managed. Past experience, gathered 
through historical analysis of these changes and impacts is essential in devising the effective 
management interventions.   
  
Political ecology  
Political ecology combines the concerns of ecology and political economy that together represent 
an ever-changing dynamic tension between ecological and human change, and between diverse 
groups within society at scales from the local individual to the Earth as a whole (Peterson 2000). 
It  seeks to “understand the complex relationship between nature and society through a careful 
analysis of what one might call forms of access and control over resources and their implications 
for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” (Watts (2000:257). The field offers 
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explanation on how exploitation, distribution and control of natural resources are mediated by 
differential relations of power within and amongst societies (Sheridan 1995). Many realities 
about human-environment interactions exist. The fact that these realities need to be questioned to 
encourage new thinking and practice has prompted adoption of this approach. This study uses 
political ecology as an analytical and theoretical tool to assess how nature is valued by different 
groups of actors.  
       Wildlife resource is contested by different actors having different interests, different values, 
perceptions and powers. Often the powerful actors have influence over the discourses on 
conservation and environment and development. Discourses are defined as a shared meaning of a 
phenomenon by a small or large group of people.  The conservation discipline has two globally 
leading discourses viz. fortress conservation and community conservation.  
       The fortress conservation discourse (also called fences and fines approach), is based on the 
premise that wild species must be preserved by reserving areas and barring people from living 
within and using the resources from these areas. The needs and interests of local people are, 
therefore, ignored. The discourse conceptualises local people as threats and causes of land 
degradation and species extinction through encroachment and poaching.  Africa is seen as the 
Garden of Eden and human species as its destroyer while preservation is seen as salvation 
(Nelson 2003; Svarstad 2006). 
        Unlike fortress conservation discourse, Community-based Conservation discourse focuses 
on achieving conservation objective by allowing local people to participate in the management of, 
and benefit from natural resources. The discourse, emerged after the perceived failure of fences 
and fines approach, works on the premise that successful long-term management of the protected 
areas can potentially be secured if local people participate fully in their conservation and derive 
tangible benefits from the resources therein. As Songorwa (1999, p. 2061) puts it succinctly, the 
focus of the discourse is “to change rural people’s behaviours and practices and use those people 
and their new behaviours as a vehicle for achieving a conservation goal.”  
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Human-wildlife interactions 
The schematic model below (Figure 1) describes coexistence between actors and wildlife, 
development of conservation policies and protected areas, costs and benefits of conservation and 
influence they have on attitudes and behaviours of the actors toward wildlife. The major 
components of this schematic model and their linkages are discussed below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A schematic model showing the coexistence between actors and wildlife and 
how subsequent policies influence the attitude of some actors. 
 
Linkages and flows in the model 
 Actors  
Different actors utilise wildlife to satisfy their needs and sustain their values. Attitudes, 
behaviours and actions of different actors over resources are governed by a number of factors. 
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These factors also influence the relationship between the actors. Exponential growth of human 
population is one of these factors. This factor creates high demand and competition for arable and 
grazing land, medicinal plants, firewood, water resources, building poles and other resources. 
Meeting these demands leads to transformation and degradation of wildlife habitats, migratory 
corridors, foraging grounds and dispersal areas. This in turn disrupts the ecological processes that 
are essential in maintaining the long-term biodiversity. Population growth also increases demand 
for game meat and other animal products, a situation that may lead to resource depletion. 
Sometimes increased pressure from local people may force the government to open protected 
lands for community use at the expense of wildlife species.  
      Another critical factor influencing the behaviour, relationship and impact of actors on wildlife 
resources is poverty. Poverty may induce the actors to adopt the coping strategies, set priorities 
and make economic choices that are ecologically destructive. For example, illegal hunting and 
charcoal burning may be pursued for subsistence and a way of earning income. Opening new 
farms in the wildlife sensitive areas such as protected areas, migratory corridors and dispersal 
areas becomes the most feasible option for people who cannot afford modern technologies and 
inputs required for more agricultural outputs. 
       Perceptions and power also affect actors’ behaviours towards other actors and natural 
resources. People interpret reality differently. They perceive differences in the values, threats, 
severity, causes and consequences of problems. These differences may come from self-
perceptions and others' perceptions and may lead to decisions and actions that may undermine the 
interests and needs of other actors over resources. Power is also a crucial factor. The way people 
define and use power has influence on the number, types and management of the conflicts that 
occur. Conflicts emerge when people try to make others change their actions or to gain an unfair 
advantage. For instance, use of political, military, legal or economic power to deny local people 
access to land and other resources for advantage of elite class generate conflicts. Power 
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imbalance leads to unequal distribution of benefits and costs of conservation and, therefore, 
results in conflicts. 
       Behaviour and impact of actors over resources may change as a result of technology change, 
market forces and policies. Superior technology and availability of market may encourage 
overexploitation of wildlife species and habitats. A typical example is a dramatic decline of rhino 
and African elephants that occurred between 1970s and 1980s. Likewise, lenient and 
inappropriate policies may encourage overexploitation and resource degradation. For example, 
some policies may favour the economically profitable land uses that are ecologically destructive 
and, therefore, undermine conservation objectives.  
 
Wildlife   
Wildlife is a resource contested by several actors. The resource is renewable i.e. it is available for 
use on a continuing basis. However, this renewability depends on the intensity of use. High 
intensity of use (due to population increase, market forces, improved technology of harvesting 
and policy changes) may render it scarce. Scarcity leads to competition. A resource may be 
overexploited or depleted when the rate of harvesting exceeds the rate of regeneration. Likewise, 
wildlife species and populations are subjected to threats due to habitat destructions. Habitat 
destruction reduces their potential utility as shelter, refuge, dispersal and breeding grounds for 
wildlife. Hunter (2002:193) defines three forms of habitat destruction (viz. degradation, 
fragmentation and outright loss). While habitat degradation is “the process by which habitat 
quality for a given species is diminished”, fragmentation “is the process by which a natural 
landscape is broken up into small parcels of natural ecosystems, isolated from one another in a 
matrix of lands dominated by human activities”. Outright loss of habitats occurs when habitat 
quality is so low such that the environment is no longer usable by a given species. Traditional 
conservation practices have involved enactment of policies and laws aiming at halting the threats 
facing biodiversity. 
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Needs and Values 
Coexistence between actors and wildlife is derived through utilisation of the resource by the 
actors to satisfy their needs and the specific values they attach to this resource. Needs are things 
that are essential to our well-being. Needs are different from desires. Conflicts over needs arise 
when some actors disregard others' needs. In conservation, conflicts emerge when conservation is 
pursued against the needs and values of certain actors. Incompatible or unclear values generate 
conflicts. Conflicts also arise when one party refuses to accept the fact that the other party holds 
something as a value rather than a preference. Different actors value wildlife differently. A rural 
African may value a wild animal as a source of protein and for spiritual reasons. An American or 
European may value it for aesthetic reasons. A national government may see it as a source of 
foreign exchange. Yet, regardless of the values held by different actors, others may consider the 
animals as vermin which need to be eliminated. An attempt by the politically and economically 
powerful actors to win their interests at the expense of the weak foments conflicts. The weak 
often resist conservation policies through violation of law, sabotage and violence (IIED 1994; 
Machlis 1989; Neumann 1992; Western 1984; Frank et al 2006; Weladji & Tchamba 2003). 
 
Conservation policies, laws and protected areas  
Although conservation is traditionally justified by ecological threats, sometimes these threats are 
not real. They emanate from the mere perceptions of the powerful actors (State, conservationists) 
and the intent of these actors to suppress the values of the weak in order to ensure that their 
values and needs are enhanced. These actors, by virtue of their powers influence the conservation 
policies and laws. Along with prohibiting local people from hunting, these policies have 
prescribed creation of wildlife protected areas as the most feasible strategy of conserving wildlife.      
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Protected areas  
Protected areas are the main focus of conservation action. They fall under different categories 
depending on accessibility by the people. According to IUCN classification, the most restricted 
category is strict nature reserve followed by national park. The strict nature reserves allow the 
scientific studies only, while scientific studies and non-consumptive tourism such as game 
viewing are allowed in the national parks. In the Serengeti ecosystem, tourist and resident hunting 
is allowed in the game reserves, game controlled areas and open areas. However, the game 
reserves are more restrictive unlike the latter two categories, where in addition to licensed 
hunting other land uses such as settlements, cultivation; livestock grazing and beekeeping are 
allowed.  Entry into game reserves without permission is prohibited by law (URT 1974).  The 
Ngorongoro Conservation Area is a multiple use area where non-consumptive tourism is 
conducted along with pastoralism. Despite their ecological and economic importance, protected 
areas inflict social and economic costs to adjacent local communities.  
 
The costs and benefits of protected areas 
Creation of wildlife protected areas leads to two outcomes, costs and benefits. The major 
question, and often the source of many conflicts in conservation has been – ‘who pays for 
wildlife conservation and who benefits from it’. The costs induced by wildlife conservation 
include opportunity cost of land and other resources (e.g. medicinal plants, water, firewood etc) 
and direct social and economic costs such as crop damage, livestock depredation, wildlife related 
accidents. The benefits include consumptive and non-consumptive forms of utilisation. Often, the 
costs and benefits of conservation are unevenly distributed among the actors. This may lead to 
conflicts or limit the effective conflict resolution.  The magnitude of the costs and benefits of 
protected areas and, therefore, conflicts depends on the category of protected area (see 
classification above). The costs tend to be more significant in the most restricted protected areas. 
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Attitudes and behaviours towards conservation 
Both the costs and benefits influence the attitude and behaviours of the actors toward 
conservation and the level of conflicts and their management. The attitude concept, when 
properly defined, has three components: one dealing with behaviour – or rather the intentions to 
carry out a specific behaviour (such as supporting or resisting an action); a cognitive or 
knowledge component; and an affective component dealing with normative beliefs and emotions. 
Increasingly, understanding of  the attitudes of different actors is regarded as essential means of 
evaluating public understanding, acceptance and the impact of conservation interventions (see 
e.g. Gillingham and Lee 1999; Holmern 2002; Holmes 2003; Infield 1988; Infield and Namara 
2001; Kalternborn and Bjerke 2002; Kalternborn et al 1999.  
      Positive attitudes are likely when the wildlife-related benefits are high and the wildlife-
induced costs are low and vice versa. When the attitude of the actors result in behaviours that 
undermine the conservation objective, amendment of the existing laws and policies or enactment 
of the new ones may be necessary. A general rule in the contemporary conservation policies is 
that an incentive to conserve, and to tolerate wildlife-related costs, among the local communities 
is a function of economic gain – short of that may lead to illegal use and/or active destruction of 
the resource (See e.g. Emerton, 2001; Neumann, 1992; Wells and Brandon, 1993; Western, 
1994).   
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THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
Rationale  
The increase of human demands on natural resources, attributed mainly to population growth and 
poverty, prompts more conservation efforts to mitigate the problems of overexploitation and 
habitat loss. Traditionally, these efforts have entailed creation of protected areas and guarding 
them through a militaristic strategy. Unpopularity of this strategy among the local communities 
and further deterioration of natural resource base had inspired a new paradigm in conservation 
work. This paradigm advocates use of the benefit-based approaches as a strategy of achieving a 
win-win scenario. However, earlier evaluation of this paradigm had indicated some disappointing 
outcomes. Putting these problems and issues in proper perspective calls for tracing of the 
historical and political evolution of the wildlife conservation policies. While the growing 
pressures in natural resources and ecosystem could be a function of plethora of environmental, 
socio-economic and political factors, only scant information is available in the western part of 
Serengeti. This thesis, comprised of five papers, seeks to address the current information gaps. 
This information may be useful in improving the conservation policies and strategies in Tanzania 
and other developing countries. 
 
Study area and communities 
Study Area 
Serengeti Ecosystem, situated between latitudes 10 28’ and 30 17’ S and longitudes 330 50’ and 
350 20’ E, spans a total area of about 30,000 km2 in northern Tanzania (Figure 2).  It is a highland 
savannah region with thorn tree woodlands and plains ranging from approximately 900 to 1,500 
metres above the sea level. Average annual rainfall ranges between 500 and 1200 mm declining 
towards the Park boundary and increasing towards Lake Victoria (Campbell & Hofer 1995). 
Thirty species of ungulates and 13 species of large carnivores have been recorded in the area 
while avifauna exceeds 500 species (Emerton & Mfunda 1999). 
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Figure 2: Serengeti National Park, adjacent protected areas and districts 
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 The ecosystem is composed of a network of protected areas (Figure 2) falling under different 
management regimes. Serengeti National Park (14,763 km2) falls under the jurisdiction of 
Tanzania National Park while the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (8,288 km2) is managed by 
NCA Authority. Ikorongo (563 km2), Grumeti   (416 km2), Maswa (2,200 km2) and Kijereshi 
Game Reserves (65.7 km2) along with Loliondo Game Controlled Area (4,000 km2) and Ikoma 
Open Area are under the Department of Wildlife of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Tourism. Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve (1,368 km2) is managed by Narok County 
Council. UNESCO designated Serengeti, both as a Natural World Heritage Site and a Biosphere 
Reserve in 1981 (UNESCO 2003).  
       The Western part of Serengeti is ecologically significant as a buffer zone for SNP and a corridor 
for wildlife species migrating between Serengeti and Maasai Mara in Kenya. These species include 
some 1.4 million wildebeest (Connocahetes taurinus), 0.2 million zebra (Equus burchelli) and 0.7 
million Thompson’s gazelle (Gazella thompson) (Norton-Griffiths 1995). 
 
Study Communities 
The western Serengeti is highly diverse in terms of ethnicity. Over 20 tribes live in the area, the 
major ones being Ikoma, Sukuma, Kurya, Ikizu, Natta, Isenye, Zanaki, Zizaki, Ngoreme, Taturu 
and Jita. Agropastoralism plays a major role in the livelihoods of these tribes. The major crops 
are maize, cassava, millet and sorghum as food crops and cotton as a cash crop. Livestock include 
cattle, goats and sheep.  
       Generally, people are poor with average annual income earned through agropastoralism 
ranging from US$150-200 (Johannesen 2002). This amount is far below the Tanzania’s per capita 
income of US$280 (WB 2003). In order to supplement this meagre income, communities pursue 
off-farm activities such as illegal hunting and charcoal burning. The impacts of these activities on 
the ecosystem and natural resources are positively correlated with human and livestock 
population growth (Campbell & Hofer 1995; Kauzeni 1995; Loibooki et al. 2002). The combined 
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human population for six districts in western part of Serengeti is 2.01 million (87.1/km2) and 
annual growth rate is beyond average national rate of 2.9% (URT 2002). 
       Wildlife conservation imposes huge economic and social costs to people living in western 
Serengeti. Further to opportunity costs of land, wildlife inflict losses on crops (Emerton & 
Mfunda 1999; Walpole 2004), and occasionally kill/wound livestock and humans (Kideghesho, 
unpublished data, 2004).  
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Paper I: Co-existence between the pre-colonial traditional societies and wildlife in western 
Serengeti, Tanzania: Its relevancy in the contemporary wildlife conservation efforts  
 
The pre-colonial traditional societies in Western Serengeti were physically and spiritually 
connected to the plants and animals in their surroundings. Wildlife species were utilised to cater 
for subsistence, trade and various non-food use needs. The rational use of these resources was 
guaranteed through tribal rules and laws. For instance, observance of the condition, sex and age 
of the animal, locality and season was obligatory for all hunters. The beliefs and taboos served to 
regulate behaviours of the hunters. For example, a belief that a person who kills animals 
indiscriminately would remain poor foreclosed this habit. The bush meat was also restricted in 
important social events like wedding, rituals and by mothering women. The council of elders 
called ‘Ritongo’ supervised the functioning and enforcement of all rules, including those 
governing hunting and daily life.  
       Ritualistic and religious affiliation with certain wildlife species (totemic species) and their 
habitats symbolised a clan or a tribe. This species offered the species and habitats protection 
against wanton destruction.  Examples of totemic animals among the clans of Ikoma and Natta 
tribes were: elephant (Loxodonta africana), lion (Panthera leo), spoted hyena (Crocuta crocuta), 
leopard (Panthera pardus and bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus). Others were Ostrich (Struthio 
camelus), leopard tortoise (Geochelone pardalis), cobra (Naja haje), green mamba (Dendroaspis 
angusticeps), python (Python spp), and puffadder (Bitis arietans). Further to animals, the cultural 
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events provided an incentive for protection of particular plant species and sites. Trees like desert 
date (Balanites aegyptiaca), Bastard or false marula (Lannea schuenfurthii) and cape ash 
(Ekebergia capensis) were protected because in Ikoma tribe circumcision (‘ghusara’) was done 
under these trees. Some sites were designated for rituals and, therefore, unauthorised human 
activities were sanctioned in these sites.  
 
Paper II: The environmental history and political ecology of wildlife conservation in     
                 Western Serengeti, Tanzania  
 
The paper uses the environmental history and political ecology approach to understand the 
wildlife conservation issues in Western Serengeti during the colonial and post-colonial regimes. 
It presents the history and impacts of human activities on wildlife species and habitats and 
analyses the political economy, actors and their politics and conflicting representations of the 
resource. 
       The paper shows a clear power imbalance and, therefore, unequal access to wildlife benefits, 
that existed during the colonial and post-colonial regimes. It shows the role of propaganda in 
promoting the interests of the powerful actors (state, conservationists) and suppressing those of 
the weak (local inhabitants). For example, the local people were falsely accused of barbaric 
slaughter of wildlife. This imbalance had prompted resistance against conventional conservation 
policies from local people. This resistance persisted even after political independence, since no 
radical changes were adopted to address the native rights that were obliterated by the colonial 
conservation policies. This resistance and the inefficient state-led enforcement due to country’s 
economic crisis of 1970s and 1980s inspired adoption of community conservation initiatives. 
However, these initiatives have been fundamentally flawed, due to a number of reasons. The 
outcomes have rather been contradictory and disappointing.   
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Paper III: Serengeti shall not die: Can the ambition be sustained?  
The paper appraises the validity of the ambition carried in a popular book “Serengeti shall not 
die” (Grzimek & Grzimek 1960) by discussing the factors (or forces) threatening the ecological 
integrity and conservation objectives of Serengeti ecosystem. These factors are population growth 
(human and livestock), poverty, illegal hunting, habitat destruction and diseases. Measures to 
mitigate these threats, and therefore sustaining the ambition, had included provision of adequate 
conservation status (e.g upgrading of protected areas from lower to higher categories), law 
enforcement, community conservation and benefit based approaches. The flaws exhibited by 
these strategies are pointed out.   
 
 
Paper IV: The dilemmas of benefit-based approaches in Serengeti Ecosystem, Tanzania  
The seeks to contribute to conservation literature and enrich understanding on efficacy of the 
community conservation (CC) approaches - a strategy adopted in response to perception that the 
“fences and fines” approach had failed to conserve wildlife. The study uncovered the following 
flaws exhibited by the current benefit-based approaches: 
  There is inadequate commitment to CC: Law enforcement received higher priority than CC 
in terms of budget allocation. Furthermore, some wildlife managers were pessimistic about 
the ability of CC strategy to achieve conservation goals. 
  Amount of the benefits is too minimal: Communities received too minimal benefits which 
could neither offset the direct costs inflicted by wildlife nor outweigh the returns from the 
ecologically damaging land/resource uses.  
  The forms of the benefits are inappropriate: The benefits did not focus on the 
immediate/felt/non-pecuniary needs of the people. Further the non-rivalrous and non-
excludable nature exhibited by communal benefits, could not reward the individual 
behaviours i.e. they encourage the problem of free riders or cheaters. The criminals (e.g. 
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poachers) and non-victims of conservation-induced costs enjoy the benefits just like those 
paying the price of conservation 
  Powerful actors interfere with benefit sharing programmes: by virtue of their financial 
power, some actors interfere with the mechanisms set to enable the local people to access the 
resources legally. By suppressing the interests of local people those of the  powerful actors 
are enhanced. For instance, an investor - Grumeti Reserve Funds - made several attempts to 
frustrate community hunting, a move that was interpreted as a strategy of ensuring that more 
wildlife population was available for non-consumptive tourism close to his five star hotel.  
  Accessibility to benefits are limited by poverty and exclusion from the projects: Poor people 
could not access the benefits that required some cash. For instance, lack of money made some 
people to forgo the low priced game meat and healthy services from the dispensary donated 
by conservation authorities. Furthermore, the approaches were operating in a few villages, 
thus excluding the majority from the benefits. 
 
 Paper V: The factors influencing conservation attitudes in western Serengeti, Tanzania  
The results indicated that the level of conflicts, participation in community conservation project+, 
inadequate pasture, lack of water, diseases, wealth and  education were important in shaping 
peoples’ conservation attitudes. Basing on the tested hypotheses it was found that: (1) local 
communities experiencing more costs from wildlife conservation are less likely to support 
protected areas; (2) local communities who receive the benefits from conservation initiatives are 
more positive to protected areas (2) conservation attitudes are more positive to Serengeti National 
Park than to the adjacent Game Reserves.  
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DISCUSSION 
Wildlife conservation in Serengeti, like in other parts of the world, has often depicted a 
conflictual relationship among various actors seeking to satisfy their interests. The more visible 
conflict has often involved powerful actors (e.g. state, conservation agencies etc.) and weak 
actors (e.g. natives/local people). For convenience, this discussion is framed on three phases: pre-
conflict phase (Paper I), conflict phase (Papers II & III) and conflict resolution phase (Papers IV 
& V).   
 
Pre-conflict phase 
This can be described as the phase of harmonious coexistence between the pre-colonial 
traditional societies and wildlife. As results reveal, consumptive utilisation and religious 
affiliation were important markers of human-wildlife coexistence. Religious and traditional 
knowledge (in form of beliefs, taboos and practices) reduced vulnerability of wildlife species and 
habitats against human-induced threats. Some of the positive effects of this knowledge and 
beliefs are still obvious in western Serengeti to date. For example, previous studies have indicated 
that elephant and bushbuck are less targeted by illegal hunters (e.g. see Campbell & Hofer 1995). 
Therefore, although these practices and behaviours were not consensual conservation practices, 
as they neither existed because of their conservation effects nor did they evolve as an adaptive 
strategy (Alvard 1998; Berkes et al. 2000) they had proved to be beneficial to conservation.  
       The minimal conflicts in the pre-colonial traditional society can be attributed to four factors. 
One, the traditionally enacted rules and regulations that governed the sustainable utilisation of 
wildlife were socially acceptable by all members. Two, people paid much allegiance to local 
institutions (such as Ritongo) which enforced these rules and regulations.  Three, supply of 
resources was higher than demand and, therefore, precluded the need for competition, and lastly, 
low human population and inferior technology had less impact on wildlife populations and 
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habitats. Introduction of new management structures and institutions under colonial regime ended 
this phase.  
 
Conflict phase 
This phase commenced following centralisation of wildlife by colonial regime, introduction of 
alternative values/uses and new social structures for controlling access to natural resources. By 
ending the traditional customary rights (over wildlife) and disrupting the traditional management 
systems, wildlife became a liability among the local people. Because of the incompatibility of the 
interests and values, the whites (powerful actors) could only meet their interests through 
obliteration of the native rights. Conservation was, therefore, pursued at the expense of native 
interests. A militaristic strategy was employed to ensure implementation of prohibitive and 
punitive policies against the natives. These policies, popular as ‘Fortress Conservation’ or 
‘Fences and Fines’ approach, suffocated the traditional economies and skills of the previously 
self-sufficient rural residents.  
       The choice of the Tanganyika government to maintain the colonial conservation policies 
after independence can be attributed to political ideology and direction of the economy that was 
adopted. The government embraced socialism (ujamaa) policy and believed in public ownership 
and control of potentially productive resources as the way to prosperity. The wildlife-based 
tourism, as a promising economic sector, paved the way to achieving the government ambition of 
providing social services (education, health and water) for the entire nation free of charge. The 
notion that wildlife had to benefit the entire nation overlooked the huge costs borne by local 
people living adjacent to protected areas. This situation results into “Olsonian commons” in 
which the benefits are dispersed (flow to majority) while the costs are concentrated (affect only 
few people) (Low 1997). It differs from Garrett Hardin’s “Stiglerian commons” where the 
benefits are concentrated while the costs are dispersed (Hardin 1968).  
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       Local resentment that characterised the colonial and postcolonial regimes cannot be 
surprising for people who were forcefully evicted and locked out from resources they considered 
to be their historical birthrights. Furthermore, habitat improvement perpetuated by creation of 
protected areas, and consequently an increase of wildlife populations may have furthered local 
intolerance following exacerbated property damage and risk to human life, the losses that are 
rarely compensated. While local resentment was traditionally dealt with by law enforcement, the 
strategy had proved to be inadequate. The economic downturn between 1970s and 1980s that 
rendered the natural resources sector seriously under-funded (see e.g. Baldus 2003; Yeager 
1986), and therefore inefficient-state led enforcement, was the main impetus for a change of 
conservation policies or paradigm shift. Escalating pressures on wildlife species and habitats was 
interpreted as failure of ‘fortress conservation’ or ‘fences and fines’ approach to conserve 
wildlife.  
       Even if the sector could adequately be funded, the paradigm shift was indispensable since it 
was unlikely that conservation would prosper under chronic poverty and rapid human population 
growth. Poverty tempts violation of law in order to survive and/or adopting economic options that 
are incompatible with conservation. In western Serengeti, most of the illegal hunters came from 
the poor households with few livestock (see also Loibooki et al. 2002). Human population 
growth, on the other hand, implies more demand for land and other resources. For example, 
Previous studies in Serengeti have indicated a positive correlation between population growth and 
increase of illegal hunters within 45 km zone in the west of Serengeti National Park (Campbell & 
Hofer 1995; Loibooki et al. 2002). 
 
Conflict resolution phase 
This phase emerged in response to perceived failure of ‘fences and fines’ approach. It is a phase 
where the human factor was recognised as an integral component for success of wildlife 
conservation. This recognition, which commanded popularity as important international agenda 
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in 1980s (Brundtland 1987; IIED 1994; IUCN 1980; McNeely 1984; UNEP/CBD 1992; Wells & 
Brandon 1992), was adopted to address the crisis situation in Serengeti. The establishment of 
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) and Community Conservation Service (CCS) 
was a milestone to this end. The initiatives aimed at motivating people to align their behaviours 
with conservation goals. 
       Results of this study indicate that the two Community Conservation (CC) initiatives were 
fundamentally flawed. Failure of conservation benefits to offset the direct costs of conservation 
and opportunity costs of alternative uses along with failure to address people’s felt and immediate 
needs may diminish the value of wildlife resource to recipients and, therefore, weaken the 
incentive for conservation. Low commitment to CC strategy among the wildlife managers in 
achieving the conservation objectives may have contributed to this situation. Furthermore, lack or 
inadequacy of certain ecological, social and economic conditions limited the possibility of CC 
benefits to outweigh the returns from alternative land uses (Child 1996; Little 1994; Murphree 
1996; Songorwa et al. 2000) 
       Inequitable distribution of the CC benefits caused by the nature of the benefits granted, the 
political, and socio-economic situations may diminish the intended local support to conservation. 
For instance, by failure to reward individual behaviours, where culprits and non-victims benefit 
from CC initiatives, there will be no incentive to support conservation. Similarly, the people who 
cannot access the benefits due to poverty or any other reasons may not see the logic of supporting 
conservation. Instead, this may lead to sabotage and inter-community conflicts as happened in 
some villages of western Serengeti. 
       The recent conservation interventions in Serengeti and prevailing political and economic 
conditions may contradict the CC initiatives and, therefore, prompt scepticism among the local 
people regarding the future access and control of the benefits. For example, forceful eviction 
implemented in the year 2000 following government decision to upgrade the previously Game 
Controlled Areas to Game Reserves as a measure of according adequate conservation status to the 
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areas was interpreted as returning to unpopular ‘fences and fines’ approach. The intervention had 
therefore exacerbated rather than reducing hostility toward government and its conservation 
agencies. These dilemmas may be interpreted as failure of CC initiatives in meeting conservation 
objectives. 
       The attitude survey indicated that the benefit provision had impact on conservation attitude 
among the local people in Western Serengeti. However, available data on illegal activities 
suggest that change of attitude may not necessarily lead to behaviour change. The villages, which 
were participating in SRCP, had also a higher number of illegal hunters (TANAPA reports on 
law-enforcement). Furthermore, even if the current benefits could instil the positive conservation 
behaviour, success of conservation would still be unsound given the small portion of 
communities receiving the benefits (only 11% of the villages). It is unrealistic to expect a 
reasonable local support by changing the behaviour of this small fraction.  
 
 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The reasons for failure of the exclusive, prohibitive and punitive policies implemented under the 
‘fences and fines’ conservation approach are obvious in a situation where people are denied their 
legitimate traditional rights over land and resources from which they derive their livelihoods. 
Local resentment and violation of law in order to survive are more likely in such a situation. 
Adoption of the benefit based strategy, as a response to this failure, has worked against the 
desired outcome i.e. motivating people to align their behaviours with conservation goals and 
improving the relationship between conservation authorities and local communities. Inadequacy 
of the benefits and inequitable distribution reduce incentives to observe sustainable behaviour. 
Furthermore, the ecological, social and economic factors of the area forestall the possibility for 
current wildlife-related benefits to outweigh the returns from the profitable land uses, which are 
ecologically destructive. Sustainability of the current benefits is also questionable due to heavy 
dependence on donors and tourism – the sources that are unpredictable. 
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       The choice of government and its conservation agencies to revert to redundant ‘fences and 
fines’ approach through eviction and heavy investment in law enforcement prompts a scepticism 
about plausibility of benefit based strategy. This also challenges the government/conservation 
agencies commitment over ‘the principle of local support’ - stating that “protected areas cannot 
survive without support of their neighbours” (Brockington 2002:411). If the conservation 
agencies still believe in benefit based strategy, as a key to achieving this principle, the flaws 
identified in this study should be adequately addressed. The solutions should seek to meet three 
criteria considered to be important drivers for local people to support conservation: (1) the 
resource must have a sufficient value (2) the proceeds must be well enough distributed and (3) 
future access and control must sufficiently be guaranteed (De Merode et al. 2003; Gillingham & 
Lee 1999; Madzudzo 1997).  
       It is worth admitting that a recent eviction from the Game Reserves was a step backward in 
achieving the objectives of Community Conservation. This has somehow tarnished the image and 
credibility of the government and its agencies and, therefore, exacerbated negative attitudes and 
hostility towards protected areas. Deliberate efforts are, therefore, necessary to convince the 
victims and other local people that the government and conservation agencies are trustful, 
committed and have genuine plans for them. However, restoring credibility alone may not be 
adequate in guaranteeing the quality habitats and healthy wildlife populations. So long the 
adjacent communities are characterised by abject poverty and their population is growing swiftly, 
destruction of wildlife will continue regardless of law enforcement efforts. Tackling these 
problems is, therefore, a more realistic way of addressing the ecological problems facing the 
ecosystem. While rigorous population control policies in these areas are imperative, poverty 
reduction strategies seeking to create more opportunities that will divert human pressures away 
from wildlife species and habitats should be developed. The current benefit-based strategies are 
flawed in meeting these challenges. 
 43
       The solutions for above problems should be sustainable enough (rather than short-term) to 
accommodate more challenges likely to emerge as a result of wildlife population growth. 
Improved habitat conditions following creation of Game Reserves in western Serengeti is 
ecologically positive, but socially costly. This is because more wildlife implies increased crop 
damage, livestock depredation, wildlife-related accidents and opportunity costs (when problem 
animals force people to forgo their social and economic activities). This presents a challenge to 
protected areas management. 
       As a part of the solution, it may be worth to trace some potentials that indigenous (or pre-
colonial) management structures can offer to contemporary conservation efforts. Although 
conventional conservation policies had weakened most of these structures, not all hope is lost. 
Some positive effects from these structures (in form of beliefs, taboos and practices) can still be 
traced to date and contribute substantially in regulating overexploitation of species and habitats. 
Encouraging such structures, as long as they do not cause habitat degradation and species 
depletion, may provide an incentive for conservation and complement the current management 
strategies in minimising the conservation-induced conflicts. Unlike economic-incentives, which 
are often costly, too minimal and sometimes unreliable, cultural benefits may be more affordable, 
reliable and sustainable forms of incentives. No donor support is required to sustain them. 
       The loyalty that people pay to traditional institutions like Ritongo can be employed to 
minimise the problem of illegal hunting and encroachment to protected areas. However, the 
practicality of this will require incentive in form of local empowerment economically, politically 
and legally. If effectively implemented, this strategy may be cost-affective and since it is likely to 
command more social acceptability, it can minimise the existing conflicts over resources. A 
combination of scientific and traditional monitoring methods may provide important political 
incentive (empowerment) for strengthening community conservation approaches. However, it is 
worth noting that, not all pre-colonial practices are useful. Some may be destructive to resources. 
If cultural incentives are to be provided vigilance is essential to regulate some people who may 
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abuse this provision to meet their ulterior motives. Trips to protected areas should be regulated 
along with monitoring the activities. If laxity is allowed, some people may take advantage of the 
provisions to conduct illegal activities such as hunting.  
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Abstract  
This paper seeks to show how the pre-colonial traditional societies in western Serengeti coexisted 
with wildlife and whether this coexistence can still be of relevancy to contemporary conservation 
efforts. The following questions are examined: (1) How did traditional societies in Western 
Serengeti relate to their environment? (2) What motivations inspired this relationship? (2) How 
effective were traditional institutions in ensuring continuity of this relationship? (3) Which 
factors were responsible for erosion of this relationship? (4) What are the potentials and 
limitations of adopting the traditional practices as a way of furthering the contemporary 
conservation efforts?  The relevancy of the traditional practices in the contemporary conservation 
efforts can be realised through their contribution in regulating the overexploitation of resources; 
complementing the current incentives  aiming at diffusing prevailing conflicts between 
conservation authorities and communities; minimising the costs of law enforcement and; 
complementing the modern scientific knowledge in monitoring and responding to ecosystem 
processes and functions. The practical constraints in adopting the practices may include 
methodological complications of acquiring indigenous knowledge; prevailing historical conflicts; 
human population growth; poverty and lack of appreciation among the conservation planners and 
managers. The paper concludes by emphasising the need to address the current constraints in 
order  to achieve effective taping of the existing potentials.   
 
Key words: Western Serengeti, Tanzania, pre-colonial traditional societies, wildlife 
conservation, totemic or sacred species, taboos, indigenous knowledge, sustainable utilisation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether the pre-colonial traditional societies conserved and managed resources 
sustainably is often contested. The proponents attribute conservation among these pre-colonial 
societies to the previously existed structures in form of beliefs, ceremonies, customs and taboos 
(Akama 1998; Colding & Folke 2001; Murombedzi 2003; Simbotwe 1993; Wamalwa 1991). 
Colding and Folke (2001, p. 584) describe social taboos as the ”invisible systems of local 
resource management and biological conservation.” They feel that these institutions, however, 
receive minimal recognition despite their central role in guiding human conduct toward the 
natural environment. Murombedzi (2003) argues that much evidence of pre-colonial conservation 
practice has been obliterated by colonial conservation practices. He cites Kalahari and Moremi 
Game Reserves (Botswana), Mavhuradonha, Matopos and Gonarezhou National Parks 
(Zimbabwe), Mamili National Park (Namibia) and Hluhluwe and Umfolozi National Parks 
(South Africa) as examples of areas in Southern Africa, which were protected under different pre-
colonial regimes. Some authors have argued that local land users were forced to adopt economic 
priorities and choices that were ecologically damaging because colonialists sidelined their 
indigenous environmental knowledge and long histories of successful adaptation to sometimes 
harsh and unpredictable environments (Walter 2005; Wamalwa 1991).  
       Despite their contribution in enhancing conservation, examples abound showing that not all 
mythical values are beneficial to conservation. Some may lead to extinction of species. Becker 
and Ghimire (2003) cite example from Guatemala where mythical values have promoted the 
survival of Resplendent  Quetzal (Pharomachrus mocinno) while in Madagascar Aye aye 
(Daubentonia madagascarensis) has been driven to the verge of extinction because local people 
believe that they are evil creatures. Examples like these abound in African cultures. In Tanzania, 
for instance, many tribes associate spotted eagle owl (Bubo africanus) with superstition. Along 
with retaliation for livestock depredation in Kenyan Maasailand, ritual killing pursued by young 
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Maasai (Morans) for the purpose of proving their manhood (Olamayio) has also been cited as a 
contributing factor to a recent precipitous drop of lion populations (Frank et al. 2006). 
       Further, even those mythical values encouraging sustainable behaviours and practises that 
promote survival of species, may not necessarily be conservation-oriented, as Berkes et al (2000, 
p.1254) put, “Biodiversity conservation is not necessarily the objective of the practice but a 
consequence of it.” To qualify as conservation-oriented interventions they have to develop in 
ecological situations in which the long-term benefits outweigh the short-term benefits (Alvard 
1998).  Most of the behaviours neither existed because of their conservation effects nor did they 
evolve as an adaptive strategy. Alvard (1998, p. 64) argues that “in order to identify conservation, 
it is necessary to demonstrate intent on the part of the actor or design via natural selection.” 
Therefore, sustainable harvest and dietary prohibitions (food taboos) cannot serve as evidence of 
conservation without prior intent to do so. Sustainable harvest (non-depletion scenario) may be a 
function of low human population growth and primitive technology (Alvard 1998; Cunha & 
Almeida 2000; Songorwa et al. 2000). On the other hand, despite being tabooed, some species are 
still vulnerable to human impact, as they are not necessarily maintained because of their 
conservation effects. Individuals frequently invoke “exception rules” to allow themselves to eat 
otherwise a tabooed species. For example, in Cameroon some 29 species were found to be 
entirely or partially prohibited, to avoid loss of the child by pregnant women or disease or 
deformation of the newborn. However, these applied to few consumers only and, therefore people 
could hunt and sell tabooed species to persons unaffected by the taboo (Roe et al. 2000).  
       In religions modern to Africa, some species are also prohibited. For example, bush pigs 
(Potamochoerus spp.) and warthogs (Phacochoerus aethiopicus) are prohibited for Moslems. 
Although this reduces hunting pressure on these species, the practise may not be regarded as 
conservation action. Even the Moslems themselves do not ascribe this prohibition to 
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conservation. Nor do they avoid it for anticipating some future benefits from the species. They 
may, therefore, show less concern in case anybody or natural catastrophes destroy these species.  
        Cunha and Almeida (2000) define environmentalism to include both a set of practices and an 
ideology. From this definition they derive three scenarios that tend to be blurred by using a single 
term to cover them all. First, the presence of ideology without practices – a case of lip service to 
conservation. Second, the situation in which both sustainable practices and cosmology are 
present. In this case, which the authors refer to as ‘cultural conservation’, values, taboos on food 
and hunting, and institutional or supernatural sanctions provide the instruments for them to act 
according to this ideology. A third scenario involves presence of cultural practices without 
ideology – in which people adhere to cultural rules governing the use of natural resources 
sustainably despite lack of explicit conservation-oriented ideology (refer Moslems case above).  
        Whether the traditional practices were conservation-oriented or not, the importance for 
knowing them, notably the different ways in which indigenous people value, use and affect 
biodiversity cannot be overlooked. As Braatz et al (1992, p. 26)  put, “Assessing biodiversity in 
relation to past and present land and resource use offers opportunity for maintaining and restoring 
biological diversity in threatened areas.” This important aspect has long been neglected in 
planning of many conservation areas. The most probable reason is that the interaction of local 
people with their environment and their knowledge on this environment were long terminated by 
colonial regimes, which conceptualised local people as environmental threats. Since this 
knowledge is transmitted orally and never documented its accessibility to conservationists had 
been limited, given a rift that had long existed between conservationists and natives. As this 
knowledge is currently gaining currency following realisation of its importance in conservation of 
biodiversity and its perceived potential role in enhancing co-management (Berkes 2003; Moller et 
al. 2004), the need to understand how local communities interacted with their environment in the 
past is imperative. This may provide an entry point for application of this knowledge to 
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complement the current management strategies. This paper seeks to show how the pre-colonial 
traditional societies in western Serengeti coexisted with wildlife and other natural resources. The 
following questions are examined: (1) How did traditional societies in Western Serengeti relate to 
their environment? (2) What motivations inspired this relationship? (2) How effective were 
traditional institutions in ensuring continuity of this relationship? (3) Which factors were 
responsible for erosion of this relationship? (4) What are the potentials and limitations of 
adopting the traditional practices as a way of furthering the contemporary conservation efforts? 
 
METHODS 
The study area 
Serengeti Ecosystem, covering a total area of about 30,000 km2, is a highland savannah 
region with thorn tree woodlands and plains ranging from approximately 900 to 1,500 metres 
above the sea level. It is located in the northern part of Tanzania in East Africa between latitudes 
10 28’ and 30 17’ S and longitudes 330 50’ and 350 20’ E. Average annual precipitation ranges 
between 500 and 1200 mm declining towards the Park boundary and increasing towards Lake 
Victoria (Campbell & Hofer 1995). The ecosystem contains one of the highest diversity and 
concentrations of large mammals in Africa. This is comprised of thirty species of ungulates and 
13 species of large carnivores (Sinclair 1979; Sinclair & Arcese 1995). The area is also inhabited 
by over 500 bird species (Emerton & Mfunda 1999; Sinclair & Arcese 1995). 
The ecosystem is protected through a network of protected areas (Figure 1): Serengeti 
National Park or SNP (14,763 km2), Ngorongoro Conservation Area (8,288 km2), Ikorongo (563 
km2), Grumeti   (416 km2), Maswa (2,200 km2) and Kijereshi Game Reserves (65.7 km2). Also 
included are the lowest categories of protected areas such as Loliondo Game Controlled Area 
(4,000 km2) and Ikoma Open Area (600 km2). Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve (1,368 
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km2) is also part of the ecosystem. UNESCO designated Serengeti, both as a Natural World 
Heritage Site (WHS) and a Biosphere Reserve (BR), in 1981 (UNESCO 2003).  
       The Western part of Serengeti - a focus of this study - is ecologically significant as a buffer 
zone for SNP and a corridor for wildlife species migrating between Serengeti and Maasai Mara in 
Kenya. These species include some 1.4 million wildebeest (Connocahetes taurinus), 0.2 million 
zebra (Equus burchelli), and 0.7 million Thompson’s gazelle (Gazella thompson) (Norton-
Griffiths 1995). The area is diverse in terms of ethnicity with over 20 tribes, the major tribes 
being Ikoma, Sukuma, Kurya, Ikizu, Natta, Isenye, Zanaki, Zizaki, Ngoreme, Taturu and Jita. 
The major livelihood strategies pursued by these tribes are cultivation (largely maize, cassava, 
millet and sorghum for food and cotton for cash) and livestock husbandry (cattle, goats and 
sheep). Additionally, people subsist on off-farm activities such as illegal hunting and charcoal 
burning (Campbell & Hofer 1995; Loibooki et al. 2002).  
    
Data collection  
This study employed the key informant interview technique to obtain insights about the 
traditional values, use and management systems of natural resources. Given the type of 
information that was required in this study, the majority of the interviewees were elders. The 
choice of elders for interview was based on the fact that, having lived in the area for long time 
and having participated in several cultural events, they had the first-hand information and 
knowledge on the environment, culture, norms, beliefs and practices of the society. The elders 
with this knowledge were identified through assistance of village government leaders. They were 
consulted and requested to take part in the discussion.   
 
Nine elders whose ages were above 60 years including one lady volunteered to share with the 
researcher, their knowledge and experience about human-environment interactions in the pre-
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colonial times. Of these, two were former employees of the park and the old lady was a widow of 
one of the tribal leaders. Interviews and discussions were conducted at different times and 
localities. This provided opportunity for cross-checking of the consistency of information and, 
therefore, improvement of reliability and validity of the data. The interview allowed a free flow 
of ideas and information. The questions were framed spontaneously and probing was done to 
gather as much detail as possible.   
 
The discussions were tape-recorded and transcribed after the sessions. Additionally the field 
assistant jotted down the key points given during the discussion. The discussions were conducted 
in Kiswahili (the language spoken by majority of Tanzanians). The analysis involved 
categorising, collating and filtering the data in order to identify and extract dominant themes as 
identified in both the questions asked and the responses provided. More information was obtained 
from the village leaders, the former Member of Parliament for Serengeti constituency and two 
officials from Serengeti National Park. 
  
RESULTS 
Sacred species and sites in western Serengeti 
The spiritual affiliation and totemic links guided the relationship between humans and nature. 
This inspired enforcement mechanisms (taboos or ’emeghilo’), some with positive effects on 
nature conservation. The myths and taboos were observed without being questioned and 
challenged. The elders in western Serengeti consider these taboos as effective, efficient and 
socially acceptable resource management systems. According to them contemporary systems are 
greedy, full of unnecessary commotion and a source of unsustainable use of the resources.  
       Ikoma, Kurya and Natta ethnic groups are divided into several clans called ’Ebhehita’. Each 
Ebhehita had an animal that it recognised as supreme i.e. totemic or sacred (’Oghusengera’) 
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(Table 1). The fact that these animals symbolized a clan or a tribe, and thus had ritualistic or 
religious value to the community, gave them an immunity against wanton destruction even if they 
inflicted some economic and social costs. A totemic or sacred species that happened to get into 
human premises was accorded a benevolent welcome with special foods including milk and meat. 
This continued until when an animal left the place.  
 
Table 1. The wild animal species sacred to waikoma and wanata of Western Serengeti  
Clan (Ebhehita) Sacred animal 
or part 
Scientific name Ikoma/Nata name 
All waikoma Elephant Loxodonta africana Achoghu or Anchogu 
All waikoma Elephant tusk N.A. Machaba bowari 
Wahikumari (k) Green  mamba  Dendroaspis angusticeps Kumari 
Abharanche (k) Python  Python spp Abhosoti  
Some Abharanche(k) Lion  Panthera leo Aka  
Abhaghetigha (k) Puffadder Bitis arietans Magho  
Some Abhaghetigha(k) Spoted hyena  Crocuta crocuta Kikwo ahiti 
Some Abhaghetigha(k) Ostrich Struthio camelus Anungu  
Abhamwancha (k) Puffadder  Bitis arietans Marakanyi  
Abhahimurumbe (k) Cobra   Naja haje Murumbe  
Abasaye (abamwancha) (n) Leopard  Panthera pardus Angwei 
Abasaye(n) Leopard tortoise Geochelone pardalis Akuru 
Abasaye (abamwancha) (n) Hyena  Crocuta crocuta Ahiti 
All wanata & waikoma(n, k) Bush buck Tragelaphus scriptus Angabi 
k= Ikoma clan; n=Nata clan 
 
Though not observed with higher vigilance than before, the totemic species are still being held in 
great respect and veneration. Hunting of sacred species requires observance of the well-defined 
traditional rituals. Killing or wounding a sacred animal is considered a gross violation of a 
customary rule, which may lead into severe penalty. In case this happens a ritual called ’Herana’ 
has to be performed immediately in order to appease the spirit and therefore cleanse the Ebhehita 
and the entire tribe from presumably bad omens (called ’Aring’a’). Aring’a may entail disease 
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outbreaks, deaths, severe droughts, pests and loss of livestock. Herana involves organising a feast 
in which domestic stock is slaughtered along with preparation of local brews and varieties of 
food. Each household from the Ebhehita is obliged to pay a fine exceeding a daily household 
budget, even if a perpetrator does not belong to that household. These communal fines which 
befall all members of the Ebhehita inspire collective responsibility in caring for the sacred 
animal. A perpetrator is perceived as irresponsible and a public nuisance, an embarrassing 
attribute.  
       Further to specific species revered by each ’Ebhehita’, elephant (‘Achoghu’ or ‘Anchogu’) is 
sacred to the entire Ikoma tribe.  It receives full protection. Elephants are believed to be the 
deceased Chiefs. In the past, apart from performing Herana, killing an elephant involved 
mourning for seven days, just as it happens to humans in Ikoma culture.   
       The social taboos also cater for plants and habitats. Different cultural motives inspire this. 
For example, circumcision (‘ghusara’), in Ikoma tribe provides an incentive to protect some tree 
species such as Balanites aegyptiaca (common name: desert date, ikoma name: Mrogoro or 
Mduguyu mtundu), Lannea schweinfurthii (common name: Bastard or false marula; ikoma name: 
omusari) and Ekebergia capensis (common name: cape ash; ikoma name: omisembito)..  
Ghusara occurs during the dry seasons under the shade of these trees, thus justifying their 
protection.  
       Specific sites set aside for rituals are sacred and all human activities such as settlements, 
fishing, firewood collection, cultivation and livestock grazing are excluded. Furthermore, access 
by menstruating women and contamination of the area with human wastes (urine and faeces) is 
prohibited. Examples of these sites are Gateku watershed and Bangwesi hills (for the entire Natta 
tribe), Ng’abati Hill (the entire Ikoma tribe), Kemarishi Hill (waserabati clan), Ngoombe 
(Abamuriho clan), Kirataga Hill (abagikwe clan) and mochwuri Hill (abarumarancha clan).  
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Machaba Bowari: Ikoma peoples’ sacred elephant tusk and wildlife conservation laws43 
Of particular interest to all Ikoma people is a special respect accorded to elephant tusks called 
’Machaba Bowari.’ Male and female Machaba, are kept in Ng’orisa (the western part) and 
Rogoro (the eastern part), respectively. However, the story of female Machaba is rarely told. 
According to elders Machaba has been in Robanda Ikoma for about two centuries and, therefore, 
none of the elders is as old as Machaba.  Their ancestors got it from a famous sorcerer who lived 
in Olduvai Gorge. The elders ascribe to past victories that the tribe won during the wars against 
other tribes. To date the Ikoma society still strongly believe that Machaba can pre-empt the bad 
omens (’Aring’a’). A reverence to elephants by Ikoma people is also attributable to Machaba. 
Although colonial and post-colonial legislation prohibited possession of government trophies, 
’Machaba’ have remained under the control of Ikoma people for decades. Elders claimed that, 
attempts to confiscate Machaba by the colonial (German and British) and post-colonial 
governments proved futile following unusual events that characterised these attempts 
(Summarised in Table 2 below).  
Table 2. Attempts to confiscate Machaba (sacred elephant tusk) by different regimes 
Year of 
attempt 
Regime Unusual event associated with confiscation 
1907 German Soldiers from Fort Ikoma could not cross the bridge in River Grumeti with 
Machaba as the bridge overflowed. This happened during the severe drought 
period 
1936 British A 35 km trip from Robanda to Serengeti Game Reserve headquarters took 
four days with a car after several breakdowns. For three mornings 
consecutively, Machaba was found outside the armoury where it was locked 
the days before. 
1972 Post-colonial 
government 
Three vehicles that carried Machaba and its guardian switched off on their 
way to Mugumu Police Station. The problem was fixed after harassing 
Machaba’s Guardian who supplicated to Machaba. In Mugumu a new 
generator belonging to Police Force knocked after putting Machaba in a 
room which was set for confiscated trophies. 
Source: Narration from elders in Western Serengeti (2003 & 2004). 
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In order to avoid inconvenience from the law enforcers the Ikoma elders were advised to apply 
for a certificate of ownership. In 1990, the former Member of Parliament for Serengeti, Mr Simon 
M. Mongate, requested it from the former Minister for Land, Natural Resources and Tourism. 
The certificate of ownership No. A 05342 was issued on January 31, 1990 accompanied by a 
letter SDC/NRG.10/12/48. The certificate is currently kept in the village government office.  
 
Pre-colonial hunting and use of wildlife resources  
Use of wildlife resources 
Wildlife in Western Serengeti catered for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives. Pecuniary 
motives entailed obtaining meat for household use and items for barter trade. Sukuma, an 
agropastoralist tribe living in Southern Serengeti participated in this trade. They reciprocated 
cereals for wildebeest tails and oils extracted from the lions. Wildlife and its derivatives provided 
a variety of non-food benefits such as raw materials for manufacturing household items and 
substances to cater for witchcraft, protection and medicinal purposes (Table 3). Hunting also 
served for training purposes, as a recreation activity and a marker of status. It was considered as a 
skilful and professional activity and the society accorded high respect to a good hunter.  
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Table 3. Non-food uses of wildlife species along the WSC  
Wildlife species Part/Product 
used 
Uses/Purposes 
Lion Mane 
  Making helmets for male dancers during the ceremonies such 
as initiation 
Lion/Lionesses Pellets 
  For making amulets (something worn as a charm against evil). 
It is believed that a witch or enemy, refrain from a person 
wearing it. 
Small antelopes 
(Duikers, Suni, 
Steenbok, Reed 
bucks and Gazelles 
Skins (Ebisero) 
  Making mats for kid rearing or sits for adults especially women 
  A container in which the grinding stone sit during the 
preparation of grain flour.  
  Making the drum coverings that are used by dancers in 
ceremonies; 
  Used in the past to make traditional skirts which were worn as 
underwear by women 
  Used for making men’s wallets 
Big antelopes e.g. 
Topi etc. 
Skins (Ebisero) 
  Used in the past for making traditional beds for adults and mats 
for drying the grains (millets, finger millets).  
  Used in the past for making traditional bags for storage and 
carrying grains, the sleeping mats and the arrow Quivers 
Small antelopes 
(Duikers, Suni, 
Steenbok, Reed 
bucks and Gazelles 
Hollow Horns 
(Chahembe) 
  Used to store protective charms against harmful effects from 
sorcerer’s magic. Are worn on trousers or short pants. 
Swifts 
(Ebikoryambura) 
Meat  
(Chanyama) 
  It is believed that anyone who eats either grilled or cooked 
meat will improve his/her racing ability, hence enduring 
athletes. 
Ostrich (Anungu) Down feathers 
(Chasingori) 
  Used as ornaments-put on/worn round helmets or perched on 
rings around upper arms by men in traditional dances. 
Ostrich (Anungu) Fat oil 
(Amaguta) 
  Used as laxatives and  Used by expectant mothers to speed up 
delivery 
Big antelopes Tail skins 
(Ebirasi 
vyemekera) 
  Making handles for machetes (Pangas), knives, spears 
Big antelopes Tail hairs 
  Making snares (Emeheto) for birds such as starlings etc. 
  Held by  traditional elders’ to keep flies away and as symbol of 
elderly in the society (Eghise) 
Elephant 
(Anchogu) 
Ivory (Tusks) 
  Making traditional dancing rings worn during the ceremonies. 
It is on these rings where ostrich down feathers are perched. 
Eland/Roan 
antelope 
Hollow horns 
  Used as whistles (Ebheture) in traditional ceremonies. 
Small birds Down/flight 
feathers 
  Ear cleaning materials (sticks) 
Gallous birds Spurs 
  Protective cover on which powerful herbs are put and worn as 
amulets 
Porcupine 
(Ekisabo) 
Pines 
(Chasaboh) 
  To remove pierced thorns on person’s legs 
Gnu (Asamakiri) Tails (Emekera) 
  Used in a barter trade with Sukuma during the famine periods 
who reciprocated cereals;  also served as bride prices (dowries) 
a long time ago. 
 
 
Regulatory mechanisms for wildlife hunting and utilization in western Serengeti  
The traditional norms and values of hunters were built around mythology through which the 
activity was organized, planned and controlled by lineage elders which formed the council of 
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elders called ’Ritongo’. Ritongo had a responsibility of overseeing the functioning and 
enforcement of all rules, which were set for the benefit of the tribe including those governing 
hunting and daily life (Table 4). Hunters were well alert against contravening the rules, which 
guided their profession. 
       To date, despite a ban on hunting, Ritongo is still a powerful institution in western Serengeti 
enforcing the rules aiming at reforming the socially unacceptable behaviours such as theft, 
witchcraft, disobedience and other social vices. Stern disciplinary measures against the 
perpetrators include taking traditional oath ‘kihore’. It is believed that Kihore may result into 
undesirable consequences such as death and insanity. The elders forming Ritongo are believed to 
be talented such that they can speak directly to the Gods of their tribes and forecast the fate of 
any events. Ritongo elders perform a religious rite called ‘Likula’ in order to protect the society 
from natural disasters. The rite lasts for eight to 12 days and occurs after every eight years. 
Essentially, for Kurya and Ikoma people, Ritongo is more powerful than the formal court. In 
formal courts cheating is not uncommon, something which rarely happens in Ritongo. Therefore, 
Ritongo still plays a central role in regulating the lives, culture, behaviours and traditional values 
and norms of the people in Western Serengeti.   
The utilisation arrangements that prohibited accumulation or storage of game meat for 
future use is tied to migration of Ikoma people to their present localities in western Serengeti. 
Historically the tribe originated from the Sonjo ethnic group found in Loliondo area in eastern 
Serengeti. Its members are believed to have been moving following the wildebeest migration. 
They settled in Naabi Hill, in a shrubland dominated by Grewia bicolar (Common name: White 
raisin; Ikoma name: Mkomo). The name Ikoma was derived from these shrubs.  Latter the groups 
moved to Robanda, Natta and Isenye. The group which settled in Robanda retained the name 
“Ikoma” while those settled far in the west, acquired new ethnic status viz. Natta and Isenye. The 
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group that remained in Naabi Hill joined other tribes following relocation by the British colonial 
government in 1950s when the Serengeti National Park was established.  
 
Table 4. Laws and rules that ensured rational use of resources among the societies in Western Serengeti 
  Hunting was limited to meat for household use only; Accumulation or storage for future was considered to 
be morally wrong. 
  Taboos (’emeghilo’) restricted people from killing an animal before finishing the previous hunt 
  All members of the community shared the meat (‘okomussa’). This kept the number of hunters in the society 
minimal  
  Hunting or touching an animal revered (sacred) to a particular clan  (’oghusengera’) was prohibited  
  Taboos restricted killing or hunting an animal found at a water catchment area  
  Hunting was prohibited for an animal found giving birth  
  When found fighting, only one animal was allowed to be killed 
  Friendly non-edible wild animals was protected through taboos (’emeghilo’)  
  Hunting was mostly targeted to adult and  male animals 
  Killing of young, pregnant or lactating animals was prohibited. When happened to be trapped they were set 
free 
  Some animals could not be hunted unless the permits were obtained from the tribal chiefs 
  Hunting of certain species were limited to specific seasons only to give them room for breeding 
  Shot animal was followed until he was found 
  A belief that a person who kills animals indiscriminately will remain poor as he will never own livestock  
  A bushmeat can not be used in functions such as wedding, rituals and by mothering women 
  Abandoned young animals who lost their mothers were taken home to the lactating goat or cow 
  An animal that has sought a refuge in homestead could not be killed 
  Different clans have different preferences for bushmeat e.g. abarumarancha and  abasaye (eland), abakigwe 
(zebra) and abangirate (fish). This reduced competition and therefore ensured sustainability of the resource 
  Medicinal and fruit trees were protected 
   Setting fires was a serious crime that amounted to heavy fines  
  Firewood for cooking and heating was limited to dry trees only 
  Most of the forests were sacred and nobody was allowed to enter and harvest any resource 
  Trees species were allocated specific use(s) depending on availability, durability and workability 
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Erosion of traditional management systems 
The elders in western Serengeti blamed colonialism for divorcing them from their heritage and, 
therefore, undermining their physical and spiritual life. Their proprietorship, user-rights and 
practices were outlawed on grounds of causing decimation of wildlife. Legal hunting was made 
technologically and financially unattainable. The introduced hunting licensing system was too 
expensive for local people to afford and occasionally issuance of the license to natives required 
the governor’s consent. Furthermore, although the indigenous weapons were banned, natives 
were prohibited from owning rifles.  Disproving the claims implicating traditional hunting to 
decimation of wildlife, an elder wondered, “How could inferior weapons as a bow and arrow be 
more destructive to animals than guns and lorries.” White people hunted by lorries and guns.  
       According to elders, creation of protected areas furthered these restrictions. The ‘shamba la 
Bibi’ (Swahili words for queen’s farm) concept made an entry and livestock grazing in the 
protected areas a trespassing. Fuelwood collection became wood theft.  Access to sacred sites, 
which felled in the protected areas, was also prohibited, thus detaching people from their spiritual 
affiliations.  For instance, Kemarishi Hill located inside the Serengeti National Park became 
inaccessible for members of Waserabati clan who used to go there annually for ‘pilgrimage’. 
Creation of national parks and game reserves had involved relocation of people to other places. 
The distance, therefore, became another factor that limited access to these areas. Prohibition of 
hunting, access to sacred areas and other cultural activities limited the amount and quality of 
knowledge which elders transmitted to the young generations. 
       Along with prohibitive laws, new institutions such as formal education and western religion 
in which people were taught to denounce their culture, beliefs, practices and knowledge were 
introduced. Through these new institutions, the natives’ ways of living were regarded as barbaric 
and their replacement by civilised ways considered inevitable. 
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DISCUSSION  
Pre-colonial coexistence between human and wildlife can be described through resource 
utilisation patterns, management and indigenous knowledge systems. Although these practices, 
which were enforced through religious beliefs and taboos, were not necessarily the consensual 
conservation interventions (Alvard 1998; Berkes et al. 2000), they may be useful in enhancing 
conservation of biodiversity. However, some practices, may not be as effective as they used to be 
in the past due to social, economic and policy changes. This section presents some potentials and 
constraints of traditional practices and systems in the contemporary conservation efforts. 
 
Some potentials  
Regulating overexploitation of resources and habitat loss  
There is substantial literature indicating the importance of traditional practices and systems 
(taboos and religious affiliations) in checking resource overexploitation and habitat destruction. 
For example, according to Colding & Folke (1997, 2001), of the 70 specific taboo species 
identified, 21 were listed in the World Conservation Union (IUCN) redlist book of threatened 
species. Of these, four were endemic and five were keystone species. In Western Serengeti, low 
vulnerability of elephant (Loxodonta africana) and bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus) to 
decimation by humans is attributed to totemic link with these species. Elephant, which is hunted 
for meat in some parts of Tanzania (personal experience) and other African countries (Hart & 
Smith 2001; Strieker 2002), is not hunted for that purpose in Western Serengeti (e.g. see 
Campbell & Hofer 1995). The species however, suffered rampant poaching for trophy in 1970s 
and 1980s. According to Ikoma elders, the Kurya people and other tribes, which do not revere to 
this species, were responsible for this problem (Ikoma elders, pers. comm.). Likewise bushbuck is 
the least hunted species with annual offtake of 5.0% compared to other species such as buffalo 
Syncerus caffer (19.5%), warthog Phacochaerus aethiopicus, (24.4%), topi Damaliscus korrigum 
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(20.5%), impala Aepyceros melampus (28.7%), giraffe Giraffa camelopardalis (29.6%) and eland 
Taurotragus oryx (30.9%) (see Campbell & Hofer 1995).  Although taste is attributed to low 
preference for this animal, most of the communities associate its minimal offtake with its totemic 
importance to most clans within the tribes of Western Serengeti such as Sukuma, Natta, Ikoma, 
Issenye, ngoreme and Ikizu.  
 
Alternative incentive and conflict resolution 
Given the disappointing outcomes of the economic incentive strategy in meeting conservation 
goals (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Gibson & Marks 1995; Songorwa 1999), the pre-colonial 
traditional practices and systems may be potential in complementing this strategy and achieve the 
desired results. The economic incentives have erroneously being considered as a panacea for 
motivating people to align their behaviours with conservation goals and, therefore, diffusing the 
tensions between conservation authorities and local people. Contribution of other incentives to 
this end, including cultural and spiritual values, have been neglected (Barrett & Arcese 1995; 
Colding & Folke 2001; Gibson & Marks 1995; Infield 2001).  
       Examples abound to illustrate how important the cultural values can be to local people. In 
Uganda’s Mount Elgon National Park, for instance, Bagisu community were ready to forgo all 
other resources from the park but not smoked bamboo shoots (Arundinaria alpina). Scott (1998, 
p. 49) quoted a local government official as saying, “You [park authorities] can take away 
whatever you like, but you can’t take away our bamboo.” The bamboo shoots are essential to 
biannual circumcision ceremonies, powerful spiritual events to Bagisu people. In Kilimanjaro, 
Tanzania, the Wagweno tribe perform ritual sacrifice of goats and sheep in a sacred forest (Kwa 
Mrigha) to communicate with their ancestors where they make supplications against social and 
ecological crisis and even complain against injustices perpetrated by other members of the 
society (pers. observation). Paying attention to these non-pecuniary values - so long they do not 
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degrade the habitats and deplete the species - may provide a powerful link between the 
communities and protected areas and, therefore, minimise the prevailing resource use conflicts 
for the benefit of conservation.  
       Besides complementing the economic incentives, which may often be too minimal to offset 
the conservation costs (see e.g. Emerton & Mfunda 1999; Norton-Griffiths 1995), cultural 
incentives may be more affordable, reliable and sustainable forms of incentive. Unlike economic 
incentives, cultural incentives do not rely on external funding. Economic incentives on the other 
hand rely on donors, tourism and safari hunting. Vulnerability of these external sources may lead 
to termination or reduction of the benefits and, therefore, reduce the incentive to support 
conservation. If the donor pulls out and market for tourism is obstructed by factors such as 
political instability, terrorism, natural catastrophes and policy changes, the economic incentive 
may cease.  
 
Minimising the costs of law enforcement  
As revealed in results, the life of the people in Western Serengeti is still regulated by elders’ 
council, Ritongo. The influence of this institution can be an opportunity for minimising an 
endemic problem of illegal hunting in the area. However, workability of this will require an 
effective incentive mechanism. Economic, political and legal empowerment of the villagers and 
their local institutions is imperative. Poverty reduction will reduce illegal activities in the 
protected areas while power of decision making will restore a sense of ownership. Legal 
empowerment may involve dealing with criminals (illegal hunters). For instance, Ritongo can be 
empowered to impose penalties against culprits for the benefits of the respective villages. The 
penalties may involve assigning the criminals to do productive activities for society such as 
digging the boreholes, making roads and bricks for building schools, village offices or 
dispensary. In case of fines, villages should retain the money to cater for development needs. 
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Contribution to village developments may motivate the villagers, as potential beneficiaries, to 
expose the culprits. If effectively implemented, this strategy may be cost-affective and may 
minimise the existing conflicts between conservation authorities and local communities. 
 
Complementing the modern scientific knowledge 
Of recent, scientific, social and economic reasons have prompted an increasing interest over the 
indigenous knowledge among the conservation biologists, ecological anthropologists, 
ethnobiologists and other scholars. The knowledge - defined as ” a cumulative body of 
knowledge, practices and beliefs, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through 
generations by cultural transmissions” (Berkes et al 2000, p. 1252) - is esential tool for 
monitoring, responding to, and management of ecosystem processes and functions with special 
attention to resilience. The knowledge had also received political attention internationally as a 
valuable resource for biodiversity conservation through the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN 
1980), and Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future  (WCED 1987) and the Earth Summit 
(UNCED 1992).  
       Combination of scientific and traditional monitoring methods is considered as a form of 
political incentive (empowerment) for strengthening community conservation approaches (Berkes 
2003; Moller et al. 2004). Furthermore, the knowledge enables the indigenous resource users to 
critically evaluate scientific predictions on their own terms and test sustainability using their own 
forms of adaptive management. The knowledge is essential in complementing conventional 
scientific knowledge as Moller et al (2004:online) put, “complementing objectivity with 
subjectivity.” Science strives to be objective (excluding people and feelings) while traditional 
knowledge explicitly includes people, feelings, relationships, and sacredness. 
        
Some practical constraints  
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Literature on efficacy of indigenous knowledge offers huge hopes to conservation success. 
Suggestions are being made on reviving the abandoned practices, taboos and beliefs. While this 
sounds good, the social, economic and political realities in Serengeti (and possibly many other 
parts of Africa) may limit its application. Some of the practices may not be feasible today while 
some may work only after addressing some existing constraints. 
 
Methods of acquiring indigenous knowledge may be complicated         
As stated earlier, the indigenous knowledge was handed down through generations by cultural 
transmission. Folklore or storytelling, continuous observations, practising and attachment on 
natural resources were the major means of taping this knowledge in the past.  The situation today, 
however, hinders effectiveness of these means. To acquire the knowledge, adequate time is 
required for recipient (youth) to interact with the elders and resources. This may be difficult, as 
most of the resources are located inside the protected areas where conventional legislation 
prohibits entry. Furthermore, formal education utilises most of the time, which could be used to 
acquire the knowledge. Primary school begins at the age of seven and lasts for seven years. This 
is compulsory and, thereafter, a pupil may continue with secondary school and colleges for four 
to eight years, often in boarding schools away from the place of birth.   
       Besides formal education, Christianity - another influence of colonialism, had also 
undermined the indigenous knowledge and the ways local people coexisted with natural 
resources. The new Christian churches in the area and those who embraced this new faith 
denounced the traditional ceremonies, rituals and taboos. Association with these cultural 
activities was regarded devilish. Christianity is still expanding through introduction of new sects 
with elements of fundamentalism (popular as Walokole). Given the increased influence of 
Christianity in the area, reverting to traditions may be next to impossible.  
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Prevailing conflicts 
Even if the formal education and Christianity had to be non-factors, the historical resource use 
conflicts that still prevail in Serengeti to date may forestall some attempts to re-introduce 
indigenous knowledge. Pain memories of the involuntary relocation and loss of access to land 
and resources are still fresh among the communities. Attempts to incorporate their knowledge and 
practices into conservation policies may inspire unachievable demands. For instance, people may 
demand returning to their ancestral burial sites in the National Park and Game Reserves or may 
demand the right to hunt some species as a part of enhancing their culture, knowledge and skills. 
Implementation of these demands may be difficult given the high human population growth. 
Their implementation will be tantamount to degazetting the protected areas.      
         
Population growth and change of demands 
Primitive technology, low human population, high wildlife population and, therefore, low 
demand made some traditional practices feasible in the past. Today, if allowed, these practices 
may lead to resource depletion. For instance, ritual killing of lion, considered to be important 
cultural practice for Maasai youth (Moran) is attributed to a dramatic decline of lion population in 
the Kenyan Maasailand  (Frank et al. 2006). 
       Similarly, while hunting was previously limited mainly to subsistence needs, today the need 
for income has emerged as important reason (Campbell et al. 2001; Holmern et al. 2002). Given 
the difficulty of ascertaining the sincerity of the hunters and monitoring, permission to carry out 
ritual hunting may be employed to meet other ulterior motives. Furthermore, given the socio-
economic changes, it is unlikely that the old habits that ensured sustainable utilisation of 
resources such as sharing of meat will be observed. 
 
Poverty  
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Poverty is another major constraint that may limit the practicality of using the traditional 
practices in enhancing conservation. Even if the elders’ councils - Ritongo – will be legally 
empowered and willing to curb illegal hunting this may prove difficult if they will be working 
amid the poor people compelled to hunt in order to survive. The elders, being a part of the 
society, may feel uncomfortable to enforce the law against such people. The likelihood is that, the 
logic will prevail. The previous experience illustrates this scenario. During the British colonial 
era, Ikoma Chief who through indirect rule was endowed with great institutional power was 
reluctant to deal with the problem of illegal hunting and threats directed to wildlife staff by Ikoma 
hunters (Neumann 1998). He did not yield even after his salary was withheld.   
 
Lack of appreciation among the conservation planners 
Despite the significant potentials that can be derived from the traditional practices in 
conservation, conservation planners and managers in many parts of the world, Tanzania not 
exceptional, have paid little attention to these practices (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Colding & Folke 
2001; Infield 2001). Colding and Folke (2001, p. 584) contend, “many resource habitat taboos 
have functions similar to those of formal institutions for nature conservation in contemporary 
society but have not been sufficiently recognised in this capacity.”  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the suppression of the traditional resource management practices through introduction of 
new structures and systems, not all hope is lost as some positive effects of these practices (in 
form of beliefs, taboos and practices) can still be traced to date. Understanding of indigenous 
knowledge, values and practices may provide an opportunity for using them to complement the 
current strategies seeking to address the conservation problems such as resource overexploitation, 
conflicts and limited budget for law enforcement.  Although some constraints may not make 
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these practices as effective as they used to be during the pre-colonial era, these potentials may 
still contribute immensely in the contemporary conservation efforts. While it is imperative for 
conservation planners and managers to understand, recognise and tape these potentials, they 
should also strive to overcome the constraints reducing the efficacy of these practices. The 
problems of poverty, human population growth and prevailing conflicts should be addressed 
along with empowering the local institutions in conservation.  There is a need for attitude change 
among the conservation agencies. The prohibitive laws should be relaxed to allow the uses, which 
are not destructive as a way of providing a link between the local communities and protected 
areas and, therefore, incentive for conservation.   However, monitoring mechanisms are essential 
to check misuse of the provisions.  
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ABSTRACT 
Serengeti, one of the world renowned wildlife areas in the world, has attracted the attention of 
several actors seeking to meet different and often incompatible interests. The politically 
powerful actors have often succeeded at the expense of the weak. The later have, therefore, 
adopted ecologically destructive activities as a way of resenting the policies or earning their 
living. Some interventions have been adopted to address these dilemmas but have been 
unsuccessful. This paper uses environmental history and political ecology to understand 
wildlife conservation issues in Western Serengeti during the colonial and post-colonial regimes. 
It is framed into five empirical questions:  (1) What motivated the conservation policies and 
practices pursued by colonial and post-colonial regimes? (2) Which strategies were adopted in 
pursuing these policies? (3) How did implementation of conservation policies influence 
behaviours of the marginalised actors, and with what results? (4) How did the regimes respond 
to challenges generated by these behaviours and how effective were/are the responses? (5) 
What inferences and reasonable speculations can be drawn from these responses? In conclusion 
the paper offers some recommendations to address the identified challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Western Serengeti, Tanzania, political history, environmental history, wildlife 
conservation, natives, colonial conservation, and post-colonial conservation.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Political, social and economic dimensions have long influenced the wildlife conservation 
policies and legislation in Africa. Essentially, wildlife resource has emerged as important 
political and economic commodity (Gibson 1999). The Berlin Conference of partitioning Africa 
in 1884 gave the European colonialists power to impose the dominance of their myths, values 
and ideas over natural resources. They were able to define a resource, threats and dictate on 
management strategies. Often the powerful stakeholders define a resource in a way that will 
match up with their values and interests (Kaltenborn et al. 2002). They also determine how a 
resource in question should be conserved and utilised, a scenario leading to unequal distribution 
of costs and benefits.  
       The enacted colonial conservation legislation extinguished the natives’ customary rights 
over access and ownership of natural resources and barred them from formal debate on issues 
pertaining to these resources. Their practices were deemed wasteful, barbarous and cruel 
(Adams & McShane 1996; Neumann 1996; Neumann 1998; Rangarajan 2003). The reality that 
game hunting was a ritualized act for marking class status among the whites and offered 
Europeans a symbolic dominance of the continent prompted this false accusations (Neumann 
1998). African practices were intolerable as their approval would mean putting African culture 
and their resource management strategies on equal footing with those of Europeans (Neumann 
1998). This scenario is in line with the general consensus held that European colonisation in 
Africa was not only limited to humans, but also to nature as well (Nelson 2003; Neumann 
1998).  
        Because of their economic power, the Westerners have continued to influence the natural 
resources management in Africa to date. Most of the conservation interventions are being 
imported from West and acceptance by the African governments is conditional, as failure to do 
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so may jeopardise their eligibility for grants and loans necessary for development programmes 
(see e.g. Nelson 2003). Therefore, Western conservation ideologies are still dominant in Africa. 
The interventions that have sought to redefine the conservation policies in view of addressing 
natives’ customary rights have proved ineffective, thus deepening the conflicts and resentment 
towards conservation policies. 
        Challenges of managing and conserving wildlife in Africa are growing in line with rapid 
increase of human population and rural poverty. This translates into increasing environmental 
scarcities. Both environmental history and political ecology have a role in addressing these 
emerging dilemmas. History serves as a bridge connecting the past with the present and 
pointing the road to the future while political ecology uncovers the relationship between 
political economy and ecological concerns. Very little is documented about the environmental 
and natural resources history and politics of conservation in Western Serengeti. Yet, the 
minimal information available in literature is very scattered. In addressing this deficiency this 
paper is framed into five empirical questions: ((1) What motivated the conservation policies and 
practices pursued by colonial and post-colonial regimes? (2) Which strategies were adopted in 
pursuing these policies? (3) How did implementation of conservation policies influence 
behaviours of the marginalised actors, and with what results? (4) How did the regimes respond 
to challenges generated by these behaviours and how effective were/are the responses? (5) 
What inferences and reasonable speculations can be drawn from these responses?  
 
1.2 Meaning of ‘Environmental History’ and ‘Political Ecology’ 
1.2.1 Environmental history 
Beinart (2000) defines environmental history as the study of environment in a historical 
framework aiming at exploring the reciprocal relationship between human and natural forces in 
the examination of the human impact on the natural world. It, therefore, deepens our 
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understanding of how humans have been affected by their natural environment through time 
and, conversely, how they have affected that environment and with what results (Oosthoek 
2005).. 
       Historically, landscapes and natural resources have been subjected to changes due to a 
plethora of factors. To a great extent, these factors are anthropogenic (Walker 2005) and they 
include, among others, the human population growth, technological changes, market forces and 
policies. The impact of these factors have either been beneficial or detrimental to landscape and 
resources.  Humans, on the other hand, have been affected by the changes and the way the 
landscapes and resources are managed. Past experience, gathered through historical analysis of 
these changes and impacts is essential in devising the effective management interventions.  
Political ecology offers valuable contributions to understanding these problems. 
 
1.2.1 Political ecology 
Political ecology is defined differently by different people. For the purpose of this paper, 
Watts’s definition is adopted: a field seeking to “understand the complex relations between 
nature and society through careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and 
control over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable 
livelihoods” (Watts 2000:257).  It analyses the political economy, actors and their politics and 
conflicting representations of the environmental resources (Blaikie 1999). Essentially, political 
ecology “Analyzes power relationships among actors in the way decisions are made and 
benefits are shared; interprets events with reference to behaviours of actors in pursuit of their 
own political agendas” (Berkes 2003:624). Political ecology incorporates the following 
elements (adopted from Svarstad 2006):  
(i) Actor perspective: analyses of what groups of actors, what perceived interests and 
further perceptions on a conflict 
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(ii) Focus upon the production and roles of discourses and narratives: social 
constructivist influences. Discourses are ideology or major arguments given to 
legitimize views and strategies while narratives are views on how a particular 
environmental problem came to be 
(iii) Aspects of natural resources/environment are investigated, and with natural science 
methods 
(iv) Focus on power (in truth constructions and in influence and opportunities of various 
actors to achieve their aims) 
(v) Focus on the political economy of the resource uses 
(vi) Focus on the role of institutions 
(vii) Employ the historical knowledge to understand a conflict as well as the situation 
and changes in natural conditions 
(viii)Focus on how a phenomenon or conflict is displayed across various scales from the 
local to the global 
 Different actors with different and incompatible values and interests contest for limited 
environmental resources. Each actor defines a resource differently to suit his/her values and 
interests. Similarly, the management interventions for such a resource are viewed differently. 
This scenario makes the conflicts inevitable. At the ground level local people have traditionally 
and, continue to depend on resources to pursue their livelihoods. At the top levels, the 
international community (donors and conservation organisations) targets the resources in 
developing countries to sustain their interests and values. These actors, by virtue of their 
economic power, impose the conservation interventions of their choice in developing countries, 
whose governments have to adopt uncritically as failure to do that may risk their access to loans 
and grants (Nelson 2003). Importance of natural resources at the national level is derived from 
its role in generating foreign currency. 
 8
        Sometimes environmental threats or problems are deliberately exaggerated in order to 
legitimize the actions or strategies aimed at meeting the interests of the powerful actors. Blaikie 
(1999:133) contends that, “Environmental issues do not only become so (if at all) because of 
ontologically real changes in nature, but because they are constructed by social processes, 
successfully represented and launched.” Susskind (in Blaikie 1999:133) expounds this by 
arguing: 
‘These involve amongst others discovering the issue, naming it, and establishing the 
basis of the claim; presenting the claim, by commanding attention, and legitimating the 
claim; and then finally contesting other counter claims, by invoking action, mobilizing 
support, leading to successful strategies such as networking, developing technical 
expertise, and opening policy windows.’  
The point of departure of conservation process in Africa has often based on the above criterion. 
The natives are accused of depleting the resources through their unsustainable practices. The 
problem is publicised both locally and globally through mass media, conferences and 
international conventions. The governments take actions by formulating policies and enacting 
the laws to halt the problem. The natives (perceived as ’threats’) are locked out from access to, 
and any policy debate pertaining to these interventions. Protected areas are created and 
authorities are legally mandated to use militaristic strategy to ensure that the resources are 
protected against the claimed misuse by the natives.  
        Criminalisation of natives’ land and resource use (e.g. arable land, grazing land, game 
meat, medicinal plants, firewood etc) and infringement of their customary rights over 
ownership and management of these resources compel them to adopt economic choices that are 
ecologically destructive. Furthermore, despite the stringent law enforcement conducted by 
protected areas staff, lack of alternative livelihoods makes violation of law in order to survive 
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inevitable. Retaliatory response (in form of sabotage and violence) against prohibitive and 
punitive policies also emerges (Neumann 1992; Neumann 1998; Western 1984).  
 
2. METHODS 
2.1 The study area 
Serengeti Ecosystem, spanning a total area of about 30,000 km2, is situated in the northern 
part of Tanzania in East Africa between latitudes 10 28’ and 30 17’ S and longitudes 330 50’ 
and 350 20’ E.  It is a highland savannah region with thorn tree woodlands and plains ranging 
from approximately 900 to 1,500 metres above the sea level. Average annual rainfall ranges 
between 500 and 1200 mm declining towards the Park boundary and increasing towards Lake 
Victoria (Campbell & Hofer 1995). Thirty species of ungulates and 13 species of large 
carnivores have been recorded in the area while avifauna exceeds 500 species (Sinclair & 
Arcese 1995). 
The ecosystem is composed of a network of protected areas falling under different 
management regimes. Serengeti National Park (14,763 km2) falls under the jurisdiction of 
Tanzania National Park (TANAPA) while the Ngorongoro Conservation Area or NCA (8,288 
km2) is managed by NCA Authority (NCAA). Ikorongo (563 km2), Grumeti   (416 km2), 
Maswa (2,200 km2) and Kijereshi Game Reserves (65.7 km2) along with Loliondo Game 
Controlled Area (4,000 km2) and Ikoma Open Area are under the Department of Wildlife of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve (1,368 
km2) is managed by Narok County Council. UNESCO designated Serengeti, both as a Natural 
World Heritage Site and a Biosphere Reserve, in 1981 (UNESCO 2003).  
       The Western part of Serengeti - a focus of this study - is ecologically significant as a buffer 
zone for SNP and a corridor for wildlife species migrating between Serengeti and Maasai Mara 
in Kenya. These species include some 1.4 million wildebeest Connocahetes taurinus, 0.2 
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million zebra Equus burchelli and 0.7 million Thompson’s gazelle Gazella thompson (Sinclair 
& Arcese 1995). The area is diverse in terms of ethnicity. It has over 20 tribes, the major tribes 
being Ikoma, Sukuma, Kurya, Ikizu, Natta, Isenye, Zanaki, Zizaki, Ngoreme, Taturu and Jita. 
Agropastoralism plays a major role in the livelihoods of these tribes. The major crops are 
maize, cassava, millet and sorghum as food crops and cotton as a cash crop. Livestock include 
cattle, goats and sheep. Additionally, people subsist on off-farm activities such as illegal 
hunting and charcoal burning.  
      
2.2 Data and sources of information 
A combination of methods was employed in this study:  
(i) Community meetings: Between July and August 2003 one community meeting was held in 
each of the six villages: Park Nyigoti and Nyichoka (Serengeti district); Mariwanda and 
Nyatwali (Bunda district); Mwabayanda and Kijereshi (Bunda district) where some 50 villagers 
attended (N=300). An additional meeting was held with 20 people who were evicted from 
Nyamuma area, adjacent to Ikorongo Game Reserve.  The meetings, arranged with the village 
government officials, sought to gather information on villagers’ perspective on the process of 
wildlife conservation. Further to information obtained, the meeting proved to be useful in 
establishing rapport between the researcher and the communities. The agenda items for 
discussion were written on flip charts in form of questions seeking to solicit information 
regarding the history of human-wildlife interface, current issues and vision. 
(ii) Resource/land use/historical maps: The participants in the above meetings were also 
requested to sketch a land/resource use map of their respective villages, which was used to 
clarify some issues raised in discussion along with probing for more specific issues including 
environmental and land use changes.  An elder conversant with the history of the area assisted 
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by other elders was requested to sketch a map showing how the area looked like 30 years ago 
focusing on land uses, resources, infrastructures. 
iii) Document analysis and literature studies: Different reports, letters, minutes, policy and 
legal documents, papers and books were used as a source of data and information on the area’s 
conservation issues. These documents complemented other methods in providing information 
about the history, actors, politics and ecological events associated with wildlife conservation in 
Serengeti and Tanzania in general. 
(iv) Focus group: The sessions aiming at providing further insights on attitudes, perceptions 
and opinions (Mikkelsen 1995) of the villagers were conducted with ten women in the six study 
village (N=60) and eight pastoralists from Mariwanda village. Using the village registers, the 
village officials and a key informants assisted in selection of the participants. Selection was 
based on the location of participants’ homes in order to ensure an even geographical coverage 
of the village. With the company of a village official and key informant, the selected 
participants were visited in their homes, briefed on the focus group sessions and invited to 
attend. The good rapport established with the villagers in the previous village meetings, the 
company of the village official and key informant, inspired acceptance of the invitation, with 
exception of the few, who declined due to unavoidable grounds (e.g. attending the sick 
relatives). Replacement was made to those who declined. The prevailing relationship with the 
conservation authorities was also seemingly to have motivated people to accept an invitation as 
they saw it as an opportunity for their voices to be heard. The sessions took place some two to 
four days after invitation was made. During the sessions the discussion was kept on track by 
asking a series of open-ended questions meant to stimulate discussion. Participants were 
encouraged to talk freely and anonymity was guaranteed. The discussion was tape recorded and 
transcribed after the session. Additionally, the field assistant jotted down the key points given 
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during the discussion. The sessions lasted for one to two hours and were conducted in Kiswahili 
(the language spoken by majority of Tanzanians). 
(v) Key informants: These were frequently consulted for specific knowledge (Mikkelsen 1995) 
and clarification of issues that emerged in the aforementioned methods. These involved 
community elders, government leaders, wildlife staff, former and current Members of 
Parliament for Serengeti and former employees of the park.  
 
3. THE KEY ASPECTS OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION DURING THE COLONIAL 
ERA (1890-1961) 
Colonial conservation arrangements in Serengeti resembled those of other parts of Tanzania and 
Africa. Allegations that depicted natives’ mode of hunting as cruel, barbarous and wasteful 
justified banning of Africans’ customary rights over wildlife along with ending their traditional 
management strategies. The colonial conservation policies popular as “Fences and Fines” 
approach became dominant, creating ideal condition for serious conflicts. This section 
examines important features of colonial conservation policies in Serengeti: misperceptions of 
uninhabited landscape, criminalisation of modes of African hunting and establishment of 
protected areas. 
 
3.1 Western perceptions of ‘uninhabited wilderness’ 
Dr Oskar Boumann, a German explorer, was the first European to set a foot in Serengeti in 
1892 on his way to Burundi as an agent of the German Anti-Slavery Committee. His 
compatriots who followed him built Fort Ikoma, which served as the German administrative 
centre until it fell under the British in 1917. Boumann’s arrival in Serengeti coincided with 
Enkindaaroto (a time the Maasai refer to as “the destruction”).  At this time great rinderpest 
epidemic and severe drought killed virtually all Maasai cattle, causing hunger and serving as a 
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predisposing factor for epidemic diseases like smallpox. Competition for dwindling resources 
triggered wars that furthered deaths to Maasai (Adams & McShane 1996). Describing this 
situation, Baumann wrote: 
“There were skeleton like women with the madness of starvation in their sunken eyes, 
children looking more like frogs than human beings, ‘warriors’ who could hardly crawl 
on all fours, and apathetic, languishing elders. ... They were refugees from the Serengeti, 
where the famine had depopulated entire districts, and came as beggars to their 
tribesmen at Mutyek who had barely enough to feed themselves. Swarms of vultures 
followed them from high, awaiting their certain victims. Such affliction was from now 
on daily before our eyes...” (http://www.ntz.info/gen/). 
Despite Boumann’s observations Westerners’ perceptions over African landscapes as open and 
uninhabited persisted. Using Serengeti case, Adams and McShane (1996:48) provide a succinct 
explanation against these perceptions: 
“…. rinderpest and smallpox epidemics eliminated all animals and humans – some 
Maasai remained on the plains, but too few to influence the landscape. The bush 
flourished in the absence of livestock and wildlife to graze the plains and the lack of 
seasonal fires set by the Maasai to encourage the growth of new grass. Since tsetse 
favour dense bush over grassland, with the influence of man removed, the ecosystem 
developed in a way that heavily favoured wildlife – all of which are immune to nagana 
(trypanomiasis), a disease spread by tsetse - over cattle, which have no such immunity.” 
Essentially, Westerners contributed largely to Enkindaaroto, which modified the landscape to a 
condition they referred to as open and uninhabited. Great epidemic of rinderpest may have been 
viruses introduced with cattle brought to Africa by the British from Russia in 1884 or it may 
have been introduced around 1889 with zebu cattle brought from India to Eritrea to feed Italian 
troops (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1985). 
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       The Western conception of ‘uninhabited wilderness’ was mainly used to justify restrictive, 
prohibitive and punitive conservation policies against what they called ‘human invasion’. These 
policies involved outlawing hunting and creation of protected areas.  
 
3.2 Criminalisation of African hunting practices 
One of the salient features of the colonial conservation policies was transfer of proprietorship 
and user-rights of resources from the natives to the State. The German rule enacted the first 
wildlife law prohibiting hunting in 1891 (URT 1998), in which hunting by Africans was 
classified as poaching and militaristic strategy was used to enforce the law. Prohibitive 
mechanisms were set to lock the natives from using the wildlife resource. These mechanisms 
entailed introduction of licensing system and banning the use of indigenous weapons in 
hunting. The expensive license fees, the mandatory condition set for natives to secure 
governor’s consent before issuance of the license and the law prohibiting the natives from 
owning rifles barred them from hunting important species like antelopes, buffalo (Syncerus 
caffer) and hippo (Hippopotamus amphibius). The only species they could hunt without a 
license were those that European settlers considered as vermin. These included bush pigs 
(Potamochoerus spp.), warthogs (Phacochoerus aethiopicus), porcupines (Hystrix spp.), and 
monkeys (Cercopithecidae spp.). The 1900 convention also encouraged killing of lions 
(Panthera leo), leopards (Panthera pardus), wild dogs (Lycaon pictus) and spotted hyena 
(Crocuta crocuta) on similar grounds.  
       While campaigns were being intensified to end cruel, wasteful and barbarous African 
hunting in order to evade a risk of game depletion, Serengeti was increasingly becoming 
Europeans’ favourite hunting destination for the big game. The first European hunters included 
J.A. Hunter, S.E. White and R.J. Cuninghame. White and Cuninghame reported huge 
concentration of wildlife populations ‘especially lions although they saw no elephants’ (Amin 
 15
et al 1984:130). Crusade of native rights over wildlife was passed over to the British 
Administration that succeeded Germans in 1920 following their defeat in the World War I. 
Allegations against natives continued. However, a few Europeans were impartial and decried 
publicly the huge threat white hunters was posing to wildlife. For example, in a series of letters 
to The Times (London) in 1928 and 1929, Dennys Finch Hutton protested the ‘orgy slaughter’ 
in the Serengeti conducted by hunters (he called ‘licensed butchers’) on motorised vehicles 
(Adams & McShane 1996).  
       One of the outcomes of prohibitive hunting laws was emerging of destructive hunting 
technique by using wire snares. With minimal risk of being arrested by rangers, the technique 
became widespread.  According to elders the technique was first used by Europeans in Kenya 
and introduced to Serengeti after World War II. The Italians who enlisted in the Germany Army 
during the World War I (1914-1918) were interned by the British administration in the 
prisoners of war camps at Nanyuki, Embakasi and Magadi. They were assigned to work in 
factories as craftsmen, technical and civil workers. High concentration of wildlife species 
around the camps, inspired hunting for meat. Being prisoners, Italians had no firearms. 
Therefore, they trained camp servants (who were Kenyans) the use of wire snares. Hunting 
became a regular practice and Africans did virtually the entire operations from setting wire 
snares, inspecting them to processing the carcasses. 
       In western Serengeti, the British Administration allowed some Germans and Italians who 
were engaging in mining of gold in Kiabakari, Buhemba, Nyigoti and Kilimafedha to resume 
their activity on condition that they shun politics. This privilege was, however, extinguished 
and the Germans and their allies were repatriated following the end of the World War II (1939 
– 1945). The gold deposits left by the Germans attracted the small-scale African miners 
including the Kenyans who formerly worked in Italians camps. The Kenyans introduced the use 
of wire snares in Serengeti, the technique, which has remained popular to date. 
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       Colonialists also used wildlife law to punish and discipline a person whom they happened 
to differ with. Despite severe penalties imposed on illegal hunters, the British administration 
observed some tolerance to local Chiefs. The indirect rule endowed them with great 
institutional powers. They had control of customary laws (which they were able to manipulate 
for personal benefits), the communal lands and chiefdom police. This scenario is epitomised by 
the immunity against colonial prohibitive laws that Chief Mohamed Makongoro Matutu of 
Ikizu enjoyed over years until he squabbled with colonial officials. The Chief hunted wildlife 
for cash, the operation that was facilitated by his small car, a lorry and a tractor. The Chief’s 
cabinet identified the rich cattle owners who could buy the meat on the basis of a loan. The 
debtors were compelled to sell some of their cattle to repay the loan.  
       A 1958 boundary dispute between Ikizu and Isenye chiefdoms terminated Chief 
Makongoro’s powers and privileges. A senior colonial official sent from Musoma district to 
mediate this conflict, ruled against Chief Makongoro. This disappointed the Chief, who brought 
the official to the disputed area by his car. He drove away, stranding the official in Isenye. The 
colonial office in Musoma, upset by behaviour and arrogance displayed by Makongoro, ruled 
out to punish him. Some few days later the Chief was arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned for 
contravening laws prohibiting hunting and illegal possession of firearm. It was later reported 
that he became sick and died in the prison, the event Ikizu people interpreted as deliberate 
killing of their Chief by colonialists. Wildlife, being central to this death, exacerbated peoples’ 
apathy and resentment towards wildlife policies. It was also said that the relationship between 
Makongoro and the colonialists began to turn sour a year before following his open support to 
freedom movement campaigns. This made the Chief to be rated as a “dangerous person.”  
 
3.3 Creation of wildlife protected areas 
 17
In 1985 the German colonial administration declared the territorial land, whether occupied or 
not, to be crown land i.e. all lands in the territory were declared the property of the German 
Emperor. These lands were alienated on a freehold basis to German settlers for agricultural and 
ranching purposes. The current Ngorongoro Conservation Area was used for ranching by two 
settlers. For the period, which Tanganyika was under German administration, no 
comprehensive statutory instrument was made to manage wildlife except a fragmented 1907 
decree enacted to protect the Serengeti-Ngorongoro wildlife. The British Administration 
enacted a Game Preservation ordinance in 1921 (URT 1995). 
       The British administration viewed wildlife as a source of economic revenues or direct 
benefits through use of resources: recreation, resident hunting and wildlife viewing (URT 
1995). The regime enacted the first comprehensive wildlife conservation legislation, the Game 
Preservation Ordinance of 1921. Pursuant to the provision of ordinance, Serengeti was declared 
a partial Game Reserve in 1921 and later elevated to a full one in 1929. Natives knew these 
areas pejoratively as ‘Shamba la Bibi (Queen’s farm) as all wildlife were symbolically and 
legally declared the property of the Queen of England. In 1951 the area under protection was 
expanded and upgraded to a status of a National Park. The London-based Society for 
Preservation of Flora and Fauna of the Empire (SPFFE) spearheaded the idea of National Parks. 
In 1930 SPFFE sent Major Richard Hingston to the Eastern and Southern Africa colonies to 
investigate the potential for developing a nature protection programme (Adams & McShane 
1996; Bonner 1993). Hingston’s report contained the following observation: 
“The unique fauna of Africa must be preserved ... its disappearance would be a crime 
against posterity … “though the animal life should be persevered, yet it must not be 
allowed to injure man or to interfere with his cultivation and possessions.” … This dual 
objective - preserving nature while not inconveniencing man – could be accomplished 
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“only by placing man and animals in two permanently separate compartments; in other 
words only by establishing National Parks” (Quoted in Bonner 1993:168). 
This excerpt, however, was advocating eviction rather than safeguarding the interests of the 
natives as it is seemingly to suggest because there was no idle land for the National Parks. Nine 
parks were proposed in the five colonies including Tanzania’s Serengeti, Kilimanjaro and 
Selous (Adams & McShane 1996). The proposals accorded the highest priority to the interests 
of the Europeans. The suitability of an area as a National Park was justified by its unsuitability 
for alternative uses by the Europeans. Serengeti was found ideal for National Park because its 
insignificant mineral deposits, infestation with tsetse flies and scant rainfall made it unattractive 
to European miners and farmers (Bonner 1993).  
        Relocations of the natives in favour of the protected areas were justified on the grounds of 
‘saving the interests of the Empire.’ No consultation was sought from the natives who had to 
bear the social and economic costs of the process. The western Serengeti elders recalled a 
number of relocations from the park: From Naabi Hill to Banagi River in 1950s, 
Mochatongarori to Romoti River in 1960s and from Romoti River to their present areas. A 
Taturu elder in Bunda District lamented that ’After taking wildlife which we considered to be 
our second cattle, they then grabbed the land and everything in it.’ Essentially, protected areas 
furthered criminalisation of African land uses practices: Fuelwood collection became wood 
theft while entry and livestock grazing was tantamount to trespassing. People lost access to 
sacred groves, which were located inside the gazetted areas. For example, by being inside the 
park, Kimerishi Hill was out of reach for rituals and supplications by ikoma people. Also 
important training for youth which used to take place in these sacred areas were curtailed, thus 
denying them an opportunity to acquire knowledge and skills related to their culture and 
environment.  
 
 19
4. CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS THAT FACED COLONIAL CONSERVATION 
POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS ADOPTED 
Implementation of the colonial conservation policies prompted three major challenges. These 
were minimal support from the colonial government, local resentment and a fear of 
decolonisation of wildlife conservation as Tanganyika was heading toward its political 
independence.  
 
4.1 Insufficient support from colonial government  
Colonial administrators in Tanzania opposed the recommendation of creating National Parks on 
grounds that it was conflicting with native rights and, therefore, it could risk the colony’s 
political stability (Neumann 1992).  For example, A. E. Kitching, a senior colonial official, 
criticised this recommendation for being inconsiderate to native interests. He observed, ‘The 
recommendations appear to me to be so wrong in principle as to make any detailed examination 
unnecessary’ (Quoted in Neumann 1992:89). 
       Despite criticisms, Hingston’s recommendations provided a basis for agenda of the 1933 
London Convention on wildlife. All signatories (including Tanzania) were required to 
investigate the potentials of implementing the recommendations. Tanzania remained adamant 
for seven years, a situation that inspired serious criticisms and accusations that the colony was 
the worst offender in encouraging slaughter of game by the natives (Neumann 1996). These 
pressures paved the way to the first Game Ordinance that gave the governor a mandate to 
declare any area a National Park. The 1940 Fauna Preservation Ordinance Cap. 302 repealed 
the 1921 Ordinance. Serengeti National Park was established in 1940 but remained a ‘park on 
paper’ until 1951.  
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4.2 Natives’ resentment toward colonial conservation policies  
       Two major factors triggered local resentment toward conservation policies. One was loss of 
rights over wildlife, which meant divorcing the natives from species of importance for 
commercial network, subsistence economy, social relations, and political and cultural life. 
Natives were also denied an important coping strategy against uncertainties such as drought and 
diseases. As stated earlier, the colonial law approved killing of species, which European settlers 
deemed to be vermin. Natives regarded this approval as infringement of their cultural and 
spiritual life. Most of these species were considered to be totemic or sacred by some tribes and 
clans. For example, lion was sacred to the Abharanche clan, leopard to the Abhasaye and 
Abhamwancha and hyena to the Abhasaye and Abhaghetigha.  
       Natives’ reaction to these prohibitive laws involved violating them. For example, the 
Ikoma hunters vowed to resume hunting and threatened to kill the wildlife staff by poisoned 
arrows should they attempt to stop them. The local Chief was sympathetic to hunters and, 
therefore, was unco-operative in halting this problem. This reluctance made the provincial 
commissioner for the region to acknowledge that the problem was uncontrollable (see also 
Neumann 1998). A strategy of withholding the Chief’s half-salary to pressurise him to reveal 
the culprits proved futile and, eventually, the government returned his full salary.  
       Another form of local resentment was violence to protest creation of protected areas. 
However, this resentment was more pronounced to the Maasai who were moved to the east of 
the park in 1950s. Initially they were allowed to remain in the park on grounds that their mode 
of land use and life styles were compatible to wildlife conservation. Maasai depend strictly on 
livestock (cow, sheep and goat) and do not eat game meat. In 1954 the government dishonoured 
its regular promises that the Maasai rights would not be obliterated (see e.g. Bonner 1993). This 
triggered retaliatory response that involved spearing of rhinos, setting fires with malicious 
intent and physical violence (Neumann 1992).  
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        In addressing this conflict, most of the committees, scientific reports, books and verbal 
statements from influential personalities were more biased to wildlife than people. For example, 
the then Serengeti park manager stated overtly, ’The interests of fauna and flora must come 
first, those of man and belongings being of secondary importance’ (Quoted in Neumann 
1992:90).  Lee Talbot, an ecologist from the American Committee for International Wild Life 
Protection (ACIWLP), insisted that Maasai presence in the park would diminish the value of 
the area for wildlife and, therefore, risk the interests of the white tourists (Bonner 1993). Luis 
Leakey, a palaeontologist argued, ’the Maasai had no legal right to remain in Serengeti and, if 
any, should not be greater than the best interests of the rest of the people … of the world’ 
(Quoted in Bonner 1993:174).  
       Of all advocates for Serengeti, Bernhard Grzimek emerged the most prominent personality 
in this war. Grzimek was invited by the Board of Trustees to carry out an aerial count of the 
plain animals in the Serengeti; to plot their main migration routes; and to advise on the 
proposed new boundaries of the park. With the animal censuses conducted by plane, they laid 
the groundwork for modern nature conservation work at Serengeti National Park and for 
Frankfurt Zoological Society's global nature conservation programme (Ole Kuwai, personal 
comm. 2004).  
       Western Serengeti elders described Grzimek as a person who loved animals more than 
humans and, therefore, who felt that wildlife should be conserved at all costs. Some authors 
express similar view (Adams & McShane 1996; Bonner 1993; Nelson 2003). According to 
Bonner (1993), Grzimek was once quoted as saying that he wouldn’t mind sitting down with 
Hitler and Stalin if that would help his animals. He stressed ‘It can be easier to work with a 
dictatorship on matters of conservation than it is to work with a democracy, because you don't 
have to deal with parliaments, and you can get on with the job’ (Quoted in Bonner 1993:136-
137).        
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       Grzimek’s popular books and documentaries: No Room for Wild Animals (Grzimek 1956) 
and Serengeti Shall Not Die (Grzimek & Grzimek 1960) sounded a warning bell over the risk 
wildlife was facing from natives’ interests. Adams and McShane (1996:52) describe the second 
book as ’the Manifesto of Preservationism’, but another of Grzimek’s propaganda tools, filled 
with misleading, often falsified data.” They quote a Nairobi-based journalist writing about 
Grzimek’s fight against the idea of excising Serengeti: ’…he fought NCA as he fought all the 
battles over wildlife conservation, with any weapon at his disposal; First by soft line, next by 
bribery, and if necessary by outright blackmail’ (Adams and McShane 1996:53). Despite 
Grzimek’s outstanding contribution to the survival of Serengeti to date, he has remained 
unpopular to natives, who associate him with the historical sufferings they had experienced 
from wildlife.  
       Despite the fight from conservationists against the idea of splitting the park, the 
government took a bold decision. Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) was excised from the 
park and declared a multiple land use area where along with conservation, the interests of the 
Maasai pastoralists could be accommodated. Two different Ordinances, NCA Authority 
Ordinance Cap. 413 of 1959 and National Parks Ordinance Cap. 412 of 1959 were enacted to 
manage the areas and came into effect on 1 July 1959. The later repealed the National Parks 
Ordinance of 1951. 
 
4.3 Tanzania’s independence and the fate of wildlife conservation 
Freedom struggle against colonialism in Tanganyika picked up the pace in 1954 following the 
formation of a political party - Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Julius K. Nyerere, 
who himself hailed from western Serengeti, was the Party President and a leader of this 
struggle. Mass support was solicited by taking advantage of potentials and problems that 
prevailed in different geographical localities. Anti-conservationist platform was ideal for 
western Serengeti where access and use of wildlife resources featured as a priority. Strategies 
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presented for addressing this agenda convinced the natives to render full support to TANU. 
Furthermore, it seemed unlikely that Nyerere would let down his homeboys.  
       Conservationists translated freedom campaigns as a war against wildlife conservation. 
Their scepticism was apparent. For example, quoted in Bonner (1993:64), Max Nicholson, one 
of the founders of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) contended, ’We felt that under the new African 
governments, all prospect of conservation of nature would be ended.’ He was further quoted as 
saying, ’The fear was that all hell would break loose on independence with the National Parks 
such as Serengeti being inundated’ (Pearce 1997: http://www.panos.org.uk/ ). Conservationists 
also doubted the competence of the Africans in managing wildlife since none of African staff 
was employed at high ranks. This is illustrated by views like: ‘The notion of conserving the 
creatures of the wild to ensure their continuance into the future is alien to the Africans’ (Simon 
in Bonner 1993:64) and ‘Replacement of European staff by untrained, unqualified men spells 
disaster to game’ (Train in Bonner 1993:57). Generally, political independence sounded good to 
Africans, but it was a huge disappointment to Europeans, who saw it as a tragedy to game.  
       As the Tanzania independence came closer, lobbying was the best strategy conservationists 
could use to pre-empt a threat of decolonising wildlife conservation. In September 1961, three 
months before independence, Nyerere, Tanzania’s first Prime Minister, through a statement 
written by WWF officials, affirmed the country’s stance on wildlife conservation at the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) sponsored 
World Wildlife Symposium, which was held in Arusha. The declaration, which targeted all 
African leaders who attended the summit (Bonner 1993:65), has become to be known as Arusha 
Manifesto. Since then it has served as an important landmark statement for Wildlife 
conservation in the country and Africans often cite it to demonstrate their commitment to 
conservation. The Manifesto reads: 
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‘The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. These 
wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important as a source of 
wonder and inspiration but are an integral part of our natural resources and of our future 
livelihood and well being. In accepting the trusteeship of our wildlife we solemnly 
declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our children’s 
grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance. The conservation 
of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained manpower, and 
money. We look to other nations to co-operate with us in this important task, the success 
or failure of which not only affects the continent of Africa but the rest of the world as 
well’ (URT 1998:2).  
Nyerere’s positive stance on conservation dispelled conservationists’ earlier skepticism about 
the future of wildlife conservation in Tanzania. 
 
5. KEY ASPECTS OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 
As mentioned earlier, the oppressive nature of colonial conservation policies made anti-
conservation agenda an ideal tool for winning native support in freedom struggle. However, 
assessment of the legislative process for wildlife conservation during the post-colonial 
government indicates that, of the amendments and new legislation enacted, none paid attention 
to the rights of the natives. The legislation remained typically exclusive, prohibitive and 
punitive.  For example, the amendment of the National Parks Ordinance Cap. 412 of 1959 in 
1962, 1974 and 1975 strengthened the already existed exclusive and punitive policies. The 
Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 which repealed the Fauna Conservation Ordinance 
Cap. 302 of 1940 established ’semi’– protected areas with restrictions attached thereto.  Under 
section 5(1) the President had the power to declare any area of Tanganyika a Game Reserve 
while sections 6 and 13 empowered the Minister and the Director of Wildlife Department to 
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declare any areas of Tanganyika the Game Controlled Areas and partial Game Reserves, 
respectively (URT 1974). The government enacted another punitive law - Economic and 
Organized Crime Act of 1984, which allowed imposition of heavy penalties for certain crimes 
under the National Parks Ordinance and the Wildlife Conservation Act.   
       Nyerere’s political and economic ambitions in relation to the future of Tanzania made him 
endorse the continuation of the conservation laws and policies that favoured Western values 
and ideologies. His government inherited economic impoverishment. Yet he sought to provide 
social services (e.g. education and health) free of charge and promote rural development all 
over the country. Wildlife-based tourism was seen as a promising sector to sustaining these 
ambitions. Disappearance of wildlife in Europe following rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation, general increase of wealth, desire for adventure and exoticism, more time for 
leisure and inexpensive flights (which made travelling long distances to become technically 
possible for larger groups) boosted growth of tourism industry in Africa (Neumann 2002). 
Furthermore, Nyerere considered wildlife as insurance in case of failure of minerals and 
agricultural sectors. He remarked:  
‘I personally am not interested in animals. I do not want to spend my holidays watching 
crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favour of their survival. I believe that after 
diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of 
income. Thousands of Americans and Europeans have the strange urge to see these 
animals’ (Quoted in Levine 2002:1047). 
Nyerere’s commitment to conservation attracted massive infusion of donor money from 
conservation organisations to cater for creation of more protected areas, capacity building and 
law enforcement (Bonner 1993; Levine 2002; Neumann; Neumann 2002). Increasing the 
number of protected areas around western Serengeti is linked to these policies. Maswa Game 
Reserve (2,200 Km2) was created in 1962 while Kijereshi, Ikorongo and Grumeti were declared 
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Game Controlled Areas in 1974 and upgraded to Game Reserves in 1994. From 1967 the 
government recruited the first Africans in high ranks of management. David Babu, Elias 
Kapolondo, Benjamin Kanza, Obadiah Ndossi and L.L. Mitiri were the first park warden cadets 
to report in Serengeti.  
       The conservation developments in the post-colonial era disappointed the natives. They 
were unconvinced with justification given that the resource was now for the benefit of the entire 
nation and the future generations. In a community meeting the elders lamented that they had 
never seen any positive change other than being told to conserve for their grandchildren, the 
story that has persisted to date despite an increase of wildlife-induced costs. They claimed that 
confrontation with people under the post-colonial conservation arrangements surpassed that of 
the colonial era. For example, comparing anti-poaching operations during the two regimes one 
elder observed, “The current game rangers are worse than the colonial ones. They beat people, 
rape women and enter into the houses where they take even the cooked meat.”  Another elder 
queried, ‘Does Uhuru (freedom) mean replacement of white oppressors by black oppressors?’  
  
 
6. CONSERVATION CHALLENGES, DILEMMAS AND INTERVENTIONS 
ADOPTED DURING THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 
Conservation during the post-colonial regime has had a number of challenges. While illegal 
hunting and habitat destruction appear to be the major threats, interventions adopted to address 
them present another form of challenges as they have proved to be fundamentally flawed. 
Population and economic factors and different actors (politicians/government leaders and 
investors) augment to these challenges and dilemmas. These challenges, intervention measures 
and dilemmas are discussed in this section. 
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6.1 Natives’ resentment toward conservation policies  
Failure of the post-colonial government to provide alternative policies, which would address the 
legitimate rights of local people, exacerbated local resentment. Violation of law was pursued, 
both as a survival strategy or retaliatory response. Expansion of Serengeti National Park in 
1960s, which took Kurya’s grazing, arable and hunting land, culminated into resurgence in 
1970s. Kurya declared their independence and pulled down a Tanzania flag, replacing it with a 
leopard banner. Although the government forces ended this resurrection, the hostility between 
Kurya and the park and its staff is still widespread. Discussion with some wildlife staff revealed 
a degree of negativity toward the tribe. They displayed the Kurya as stubborn, crooky and hard 
people to observe the conservation law. Resentment, however, is not limited to Kurya alone 
and, is still a common practice to date. The worst scenarios happened recently leading to 
serious wounding of Game Assistant (Kipara Nyundo) on 9 August 20011 and assassination of 
the Acting Magu District Game Officer (Mr Mihayo Lupilya) on 15 July 20022 by the Sukuma. 
The events were associated with natives’ resentment toward the creation of Kijereshi Game 
Reserve. 
 
6.2 Illegal hunting 
Between 1970s and 1980s Tanzania faced a severe economic depression, which resulted into 
under-funding of different sectors. From 1976 to 1981, the country’s natural resources sector 
(viz. wildlife, forestry and fishery) was the least financed, receiving 1.2% only from the 
national development budget (Yeager 1986). These budget cuts reduced the capacity of the state 
to cope with escalating poaching, which was stimulated by the rise of international wildlife 
market and reduction of rural incomes. In Serengeti trophy hunting started in 1978. The entire 
park was served with one functional vehicle, which was often grounded due to fuel scarcity and 
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the rangers, while poorly equipped, went without salaries for months (Packer 1994). The 
situation worsened as the international agencies were reluctant to support Tanzania due to its 
former anti-western policy (socialism) (Packer 1994). The war between Uganda and Tanzania 
was another factor.  
        Like in other areas of Tanzania and Africa, commercial poaching had serious impact on 
Serengeti’s black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis) and elephant (Loxodonta africana). Somali 
traders and middlemen from urban areas such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Arusha made 
frequent trips to Serengeti to buy the rhino horns and elephant tusks. Trading with Somali 
involved barter systems in which cattle were exchanged for trophies. A rhino horn was worth 
two heads of cattle while two elephant tusks could be exchanged for four to five heads of cattle. 
The middlemen paid Tanzania Shillings ranging between 100,000 and 150,000 per rhino 
horn555. This lucrative business reduced the species drastically. Rhino, numbering 2000 in 1975 
was driven to the verge of extinction in 1986 while elephant numbers dropped by 80% (Dublin 
& Douglas-Hamilton 1987).  
       Although the problem of trophy hunting in Serengeti is virtually eliminated now, most 
likely due to international policies (e.g. CITES), game meat hunting has remained one of the 
critical management challenges in Serengeti. The major drivers for this are poverty and 
population growth. The number of illegal game meat hunters has been on the increase. For 
example, using the human population census the number was estimated at 23,290 in 1978; 
31,660 in 1988 (Campbell & Hofer 1995) and 60,000 in 2002 (Loibooki et al. 2002). It is 
estimated that some 210,000 herbivores are illegally hunted per annum (Campbell & Hofer 
1995). Wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) is the most hunted - ca. 118,922 off-take/year 
(Campbell & Hofer 1995), the situation threatening its future. Mduma et al (1998) suggest that 
a harvest of 80,000 wildebeest per year is unsustainable and may cause a total collapse of 
population by the year 2018. Another species with high rate of hunting is buffalo (Syncerus 
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caffer). Its population dropped by 80% from 63,144 in 1970 to 15,144 in 1998 (Campbell & 
Hofer 1995; TWCM 1999).  
 
6.3 Habitat loss 
Sinclair and Arcese (1995) reported an increasing trend of habitat loss within the legal 
boundaries of Serengeti National Park between 1960s and 1990s. They estimated over 40% loss 
of ecosystem’s original area (ca. 30,143 km2 in 1910). A change of park’s vegetation 
community had affected the fauna populations. For example, the loss of Combretum-dominated 
habitats is attributed to local extinction of roan antelope (Hippotragus equinus) in many parts of 
Serengeti (Sinclair & Arcese 1995).  
       According to Sinclair et al. (2002), the intensity of agriculture and bird species diversity 
and abundance in western Serengeti are negatively correlated. The abundance of bird species 
found in agricultural areas west of park was 28% of that for the same species in the native 
savannah. The agricultural areas have also lost about 50% of insectivorous and granivorous bird 
species. They attributed reduction of insectivorous to a decline of arthropods following 
disturbance to the grass layer. Discussions with local communities also revealed that most of 
the wild animals have abandoned the currently settled and farmed areas. 
 
 
6.4 Flawed intervention measures 
Local and global concern over above threats (illegal hunting and habitat loss) prompted 
intervention measures sought to reconcile conservation with human development. Serengeti 
Regional Conservation Strategy (SRCS) was established in 1988 to this end, and became the 
first flagship community based conservation (CBC) project in Tanzania. The Norwegian 
Agency for International Cooperation (NORAD) funded the project. Its focus was to improve 
the income, food security and social welfare of the communities as an incentive to winning 
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local support in conservation. TANAPA administered another initiative called Community 
Conservation Service (CCS) - popularly in Swahili as “Ujirani Mwema” (good 
neighborliness). CCS sought to minimize the hostility between individual parks and local 
communities, reconcile conservation and development interests and facilitate the programme 
for benefit sharing.   
       Both initiatives, SRCP and CCS placed priority on benefit-based approaches with a view of 
motivating local people to align their behaviours with conservation goals. However, document 
and literature review, discussion with villagers and some key informants uncovered several 
flaws in these approaches as outlined below:  
(a) The benefits are too low to offset the wildlife-related costs. For example, excluding other 
costs (e.g. opportunity costs of resources, livestock depredation and wildlife-related 
accidents), the costs of crop damage by wildlife alone exceeds US$ 500 per household per 
annum. The amount granted to communities indirectly through public goods averages at 
US$ 2.5 only  per annum (Emerton and Mfunda 1999) 
(b) The wildlife-related benefits are too low to outweigh the benefits generated by ecologically 
destructive but profitable land uses. For example, the value of  illegal hunting was 45 times 
greater than the value of game meat provided by SRCP cropping scheme (Holmern et al. 
2002)  
(c) The nature of the benefits granted renders them inequitably distributed. Most of the public 
goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous3 and, therefore, provide a loophole for free 
riders. It is impractical to exclude criminals from using public goods such as walking on the 
roads or barring children from using a classroom. Further, local elites often monopolize the 
benefits 
(d) The initiatives are often limited to few (pilot) villages and majority are left out,  therefore, 
fomenting conflicts between the losers and winners   
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(e) The benefits do not address people’s immediate and felt needs. For example, construction of 
a classroom is hardly appreciated during the critical food shortage 
(f) Poverty may hinder access as some benefits require cash. For example, some villagers 
showed low appreciation to dispensary constructed through CCS programme as they were 
unable to access the services due to cost-sharing policy. Sometimes illegal hunting was 
justified on grounds of generating income to meet these costs. 
(g) The interests of the powerful stakeholders (e.g. investors) may undermine the benefit 
sharing programmes. For example, Grumeti Reserves Fund, an investor in Serengeti, had 
made some attempts to frustrate community hunting conducted by SRCP. 
(h) The sustainability of these projects is not guaranteed, especially in case of donor withdrawal 
or reduction of tourism earnings. The tourism sector is vulnerable to factors such as 
international and local politics, terrorism and natural catastrophes. Human population 
growth may further reduce the share of the benefits granted to local people, thus reducing 
their incentive to conserve. 
 
6.5 Population and economic factors 
Human, livestock and wildlife population increase has heightened conflicts in Western 
Serengeti. The area is the most populated part of the ecosystem. Over 60% of the human 
population is composed of in-migrants attracted to the area, mainly by grazing and arable land, 
fishing and hunting opportunities (Kideghesho, unpublished data, 2004). According to 2002 
national population and housing census, the current human population is above two million 
with annual growth rate exceeding the national average of 2.9% (URT 2002). This huge 
population has resulted in land scarcity.  The fact that the majority of this population is very 
poor - with household income ranging between US$ 0.42 to US$ 0.55 per day (Johannesen 
2002) – illegal hunting and encroachment on wildlife habitats have become the major adaptive 
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and coping strategies. Poverty makes clearing of new lands for agriculture the most feasible 
strategy of increasing crop output as people can barely afford agricultural inputs for land 
improvement such as fertilisers. 
       Livestock population increase along with shrinkage of grazing land due to expansion of 
protected areas and arable land (Kideghesho, unpublished data, 2004) translate into shortage of 
grazing land. The land required to sustain the current livestock population in Serengeti district 
is 3199.5 km2. However, only 2456 km2 is available. In Bunda district the land available and 
land required for livestock grazing is 2408 Km2 and 3205.08 Km2 respectively (Kideghesho et 
al. 2005). The expansion of cultivation and settlements forced realignments of the boundaries of 
Maswa Game Reserve three times, causing 15% loss of the original area (MNRT 1985). 
       Some wildlife species have shown a remarkable increase in Serengeti. For example 
wildebeest increased from 0.25 million in 1960 to 1.3 million in 1990s (Sinclair 1995). This 
was a dramatic recovery following decimation of the species by rinderpest outbreak in 1890s. 
The elephant population increased from 500 individuals in 1986 to 2000 individuals in 1998 
(Walpole 2004). The termination of elephant poaching and increasingly effective conservation 
measures following the creation of the new Game Reserves are attributed to this increase (John 
Muya, pers. comm. 2004). As cultivation is increasing in close proximity to protected areas, the 
risk of crop raiding by elephants also increases. In 2004, elephants raided some 569 ha whose 
yield was estimated at 1408 Tons (Walpole 2004). Wildebeest also damages property, 
contaminate water, transmit diseases and lead to loss of domestic stock during migration. 
 
6.6 Politicians and government leaders 
 
By virtue of their positions, politicians and government leaders, have continued to play a central 
role in conservation of wildlife in Serengeti – further evidence of wildlife being a political 
commodity. However, their decisions and interventions, pursued either intentionally or out of 
ignorance, have often fomented conflicts and sometimes culminated in gross violation of 
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human rights. Forceful eviction of Nyamuma villagers who were legally residing outside 
Ikorongo Game Reserve on grounds of meeting conservation needs is one of such 
interventions4. The Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance convicted the 
Serengeti District Commissioner (DC) for abusing his powers (URT 2004) but the government 
dishonoured this ruling. This furthered villagers’ hatred and scepticism toward wildlife 
conservation programmes. 
        In Bunda district, after meeting the agropastoralists along Grumeti Game Reserve, the DC 
expressed sympathy and assured them of an immediate solution to problem of pastureland and 
water they were facing. She wrote to the Chief Warden Serengeti National Park5 suggesting 
degazettement of a part of the reserve as a part of the solution. She raised the following issues, 
which reflect her minimal understanding of different mandates of government institutions, 
policies and legislation: (1) Pastoralists were severely mistreated, tortured, arrested and later 
taken to court by the Game rangers once found with livestock in River Rubana (2) A woman 
who was collecting firewood close to River Rubana was jailed for 10 years (3) Kids were 
seriously canned if found fishing in River Rubana (4) Some 50,000 cattle belonging to natives 
had no access to pasture and water.  
       The letter suggests lack of knowledge on the following facts: (1) In Tanzania’s wildlife 
conservation network all Game Reserves are under jurisdiction of Wildlife Department and not 
Tanzania National Parks (a parastatal organisation) or individual park administration (2) The 
conservation authorities (and other organs) cannot influence the court decisions (3) the mandate 
of gazetting and degazetting Protected Areas lies within the parliament and not the Chief Park 
Wardens. The fact that a request to degazette a Reserve was a policy and legal issue, it was 
unlikely for immediate solution to be secured as the DC promised - a scenario that could foment 
more conflicts.  
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 The 2002–2007 General Management Plan (GMP) for Ikorongo and Grumeti Game Reserves 
(IGGR) has addressed the problem. Some measures are proposed, but with reservations, which 
implicitly rule diminish the possibility of adopting the proposals. For example, practical 
constraints for permission to fish in Rubana River are identified as lack of information on 
species and their stock and lack of knowledge on control measures. The GMP speculates further 
that, permission to fish may encourage illegal activities among the would be fishermen. 
Vegetation trampling and overgrazing along the river, erosion of river banks and siltation, 
chances of crossing over (livestock trespassing) to the Game Reserve and diseases transmission 
are considered to be practical problems in case livestock will be allowed to access water in the 
River. Creating Community Conservation Use Zone may reduce tourist hunting area and, 
consequently, reduce revenue for the management. It may also create conflicts with outfitters 
(SRCP 20??).  
       Politicians also complicated the issue of Kijereshi Game Reserve. Villagers appealed to 
different authorities and prominent politicians and government against the 1994 order, which 
required them out of the newly established Game Reserve. Some of these people were, the then 
Mwanza Regional Commissioner; the Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism; the 
Member of Parliament for Magu; the Chairman of the presidential committee on land matters, 
the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Retired President Julius K. 
Nyerere. The ‘political sympathy’ and promises raised people’s expectations and feelings that 
they were “safe” against the intended conservation intervention6. This confidence hindered 
smooth implementation of the policies and resulted into serious conflicts that costed life of 
government officilas. The Mwanza Regional Commissioner, who initially was reluctant to act, 
instructed immediate eviction of the villagers from the reserve7. Eviction took place from 20 - 
26 October 20028.  
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6.7 Investors: The new actors  
The recent social-economic liberalisation policies and institutional reforms in Tanzania have 
created an enabling environment for private investors. Private sector is increasingly becoming 
prominent as an engine for economic development and sustainability. Wildlife sector has been 
earmarked as one of the potential areas for investment. Western Serengeti, which until recently 
was under-utilised area, has attracted a number of investors. These investors are involved in 
game viewing tourism or tourist hunting. Examples are Grumeti Reserve Funds, Kijereshi 
Tented Camp, Bunda Safaris and Thompson Safaris.  
       Apart from contributing to the country’s economic prosperity, some investors have pledged 
ambitious schemes in view of supporting local communities’ development programmes. 
However, the behaviours of these investors have prompted perceptions among the local people 
that they are agents of marginalisation.  For example, one of the investors in Serengeti District, 
Grumeti Reserve Funds, was blamed for intention of grabbing villagers’ land. The company 
was also accused for harassment of the villagers using the scouts he has employed; preventing 
villagers from pursuing their legal livelihood strategies and attempting to halt community 
conservation initiative aiming at provision of game meat at affordable price.  The villagers and 
some officials reported that the investor was boasting of political backing from some top 
government officials. He was also accused of frustrating other potential investors in the area. 
The investor was also spearheading relocation of Robanda villagers and Serengeti National 
Park staff residing in Fort Ikoma on claims that these areas are dispersal areas and migratory 
corridors for wildlife. However, the villagers snubbed the agenda of conservation, linking his 
intent to desire of preventing people from interfering with his resort’s luxury safaris. The 
investor has backed the government plan of creating the Ikoma Wildlife Management Area. 
This is said to be consistent with his ambition, as most of human activities will be restricted.  
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       Another investor in Magu District, Kijereshi Tented Camp (KTC) has also been in constant 
conflicts with the villagers. Villagers complained of mistreatment from his employees. His 
pressure on government to evict villagers from Kijereshi had been considerable. On 22 
December 1999, the KTC Director General, wrote to the then Minister of Natural Resources 
and Tourism congratulating her following eviction of Kijereshi residents9. He called for severe 
penalties should the evictees attempt to return.  On 8 September 2001 he wrote to Magu District 
Commissioner complaining that the villagers have invaded the Game Reserve and urged for 
eviction of the ‘invaders’10. A similar letter was sent to Mwanza Regional Commissioner on 26 
September 200211. The Regional Commissioner responded to this letter urging the DC to act.  
       By having the government working on pressure from the investor, the impression of local 
people was that the reserve belonged to an investor, a scenario they translated as ‘selling the 
country to foreigners.’ A retired senior government official in Lamadi Magu stated,”what we 
call investment is nothing but the backdoor through which colonialism is returning to Tanzania. 
And this is the worst form of colonialism as we have willingly invited them.” Villagers in 
western Serengeti felt that the investors were operating as a separate arm of the state. Some 
even believed that the investors were more powerful than the State. 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
7.1 Motives behind wildlife conservation 
The social, cultural and economic importance of wildlife has made it a significant political 
commodity contested by various actors. The powerful actors often win in this battle. They can 
either influence or introduce the new social structures for controlling access to resources. The 
formula: “discovering an issue, naming it and establishing the basis of the claim” (Blaikie 
1999:133) has been important in instituting these structures. As shown in this study, use of 
propaganda ushered by racist languages was one of the prominent strategies in which these 
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structures were founded and maintained during the colonial regime. A number of reports, 
articles, books and conferences overstated the negative impacts that native activities had on 
wildlife resources (Neumann 1996; Neumann 1998; Neumann 2002). By presenting African 
hunting practices as cruel, barbarous and wasteful, justification was secured for criminalisation 
of the native activities. Undermining the interests of the natives (weak actors) and excluding 
them from political debate on issues related to wildlife management and utilisation was 
necessary because the interests of the Europeans depended on abrogating the native rights over 
wildlife. Therefore, the westerners were able to maintain their values and interests by 
formulating the agenda, which gave rise to legislation that alienated the local people from 
wildlife resources.  
      Giving possible reasons which led the colonial government to outlaw hunting by natives, 
Neumann (1998) argues convincingly that, hunting of wild animals in Africa offered Europeans 
a symbolic dominance of the continent and important marker of social class within settler 
society.  Success in military campaigns, at both the individual and group level, could be 
measured by hunting. Therefore, being a ritualised act for distinguishing superior class from the 
inferior one, it could not be pursued along with traditional hunting as this would mean putting 
African culture and resource management practices on equal footing with those of Europeans. 
The cultural values and practices that motivated hunting by Africans seemed to offend the 
sensibilities of Europeans who held fast to their own values and myths concerning wildlife 
(Neumann 1998).  
        Although the African countries attained their political independence, the westerners were 
able to retain their interests and values over African wildlife. Their influence made the post-
colonial governments to embrace the colonial conservation ideologies and laws uncritically. 
This was not difficult because the newly independent governments needed an economic base 
for political power and resource for promised socio-economic development. Wildlife-based 
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tourism was one of the major promising sectors to this end. To date, the westerners, by virtue of 
their economic power, have managed to retain their influence in prescribing what they consider 
to be the best conservation practices in the developing countries. The leaders in these countries 
are compelled to adopt these prescriptions for fear of risking the loans and grants from these 
potential donors. Reflecting on this, Nelson (2003:77) observes that, continuation of the flow of 
money depends “in significant part on a deep respect for the wishes of Europeans and 
Americans, including prominently international environmental organisations and their 
constituencies.” However, embracing the colonial conservation policies meant disappointing 
the natives whose expectations for regaining their extinguished customary rights over wildlife 
were raised by political campaigns during the freedom movements. Therefore, resentment to 
conservation policies had remained a salient feature of conservation policies. 
 
7.2 Issues and claims: How genuine were they? 
As aforementioned, conservation work has long been achieved by discovering issues, naming 
them and establishing the basis of claims. Reality derived from this study and literature, 
however, suggest insincerity in most of these issues and claims, especially during the colonial 
period. They were intended to secure justification for satisfying the interests of the powerful 
actors against those of weak actors. For example, the fact that the pressures that led to 
criminalisation of African land uses came from the ‘politically powerful conservationists in 
London’ rather than  ‘the colony’s natural resources professionals’ (Neumann 1992:88-89), 
illustrate how powerful actors framed the issues and claims to satisfy their interests.  
       Claims over destructive practices, which African natives were accused for in the past could 
hardly be justified given primitive technology, low population and the purpose for which 
hunting was conducted. In Serengeti, bows and arrows were mainly used in hunting. As 
revealed in this study, the use of wire snares started after World War II - some four decades 
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after laws prohibiting hunting came into force. Europeans hunted by guns and vehicles and 
targeted big games. The argument that hunting game for meal by bows and arrows was more 
destructive than guns and vehicles is far from reality. White hunters’ activities worried even the 
fellow Westerners. For example, in a series of letters to The Times (London) in 1928 and 1929, 
Dennys Finch Hutton protested the ‘orgy slaughter’ in the Serengeti conducted by hunters (he 
called ‘licensed butchers’) on motorised vehicles (Adams & McShane 1996). Remarks by Sir 
Philips Cunliffe-Lister, the Secretary of State for the colonies, to the delegates who attended 
London Convention in 1933, also implicated white man (rather than natives) with decimation of 
wildlife: 
“the greatest danger to the animals……was the man who hunted for profit – the man 
who in 99 cases out of a hundred did not care a damn about the animals and their 
possible extinction, but was simply out to make all the money he could in the easiest 
way he could.” (Quoted in Bonner 1993:168) 
Reports blaming Africans for slaughter of game have been criticized for being too general. 
Neumann (2002:30) observes, ‘the claim of slaughter was not specified geographically, nor in 
terms of numbers of species, nor was there any discussion of hunting rates in relation to wildlife 
population dynamics.’  For example, in 1947 Major Keith Caldwell’s report on situation of 
game claimed the loss of game areas by half ‘and the game within many of the left by 75%’ 
(Neumann 2002:32). He cited Tanganyika, in particular, as a territory where natives had 
decimated wildlife – a scenario he attributed to government’s liberal policy on native hunting. 
Despite contradicting the individual territorial reports that indicated an increasing trend of 
wildlife populations, Colonial Office accepted Caldwell’s generalised and unsubstantiated 
report as authoritative and final. It was, therefore, used as a basis for pressing the territorial 
governments to outlaw African hunting and create a system of National Parks. 
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       The number of animals that white hunters killed is further evidence that blames of 
indiscriminate killing of game by Africans were mere fabrications. While Africans hunted a few 
specimens of the animals for food, examples abound showing how white hunters killed several 
animals. Dennys Finch Hutton’s letter in The Times in the late 1920s quoted an American who 
had already killed twenty-one lions from his car exclaiming, ‘Let us kill every living thing we 
can find and see what bag is possible in one day’ (Quoted in Adams & McShane 1996:30). 
William Finaughty wrote in his book that he killed 500 elephants in Matebeleland using large 
bore muzzleloaders (Finaughty 1991). In his hunting trip to East Africa in 1909, Theodore 
Roosevelt, the former United States President, killed over 500 large mammals (Adams & 
McShane 1996). Scotsmann Gordon Cumming boasted of having killed hundreds upon 
hundreds of elephants, impalas (Aepyceros melampus), rhino and wildebeest in his career while 
Fredrick Selous had recorded thirty one lions, and at least 200 buffaloes, and scores of 
elephants (Adams & McShane 1996).  Available records indicate that white hunters were 
responsible for extinction of South Africa’s quagga (Equus quagga) and a large antelope called 
blaubok (Hippotragus leucophaeus) (Pearce 1997). 
 
7.3 Behaviour of marginalised actors, impact on wildlife and a need for a change 
As observed in this study the conservation policies had influence on behaviours of the natives. 
One, adoption of economic choices that are incompatible with conservation objectives became 
a necessity for survival. Two, resentment in form of violating laws, violence and vandalism (as 
a typical weapon of the weak) were reflections of unacceptable policies.  These behaviours, 
further to fomenting of serious hostility with conservation authorities, had been detrimental to 
wildlife species and their habitats. Use of violence and other means to resent wildlife policies 
have been reported in many developing countries (see e.g. Gibson 1999; Machlis 1989; Wells 
& Brandon 1992).  
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       As revealed in this study, the adoption of Community Conservation (CC) as an approach to 
end detrimental impacts associated with ‘fences and fines’ approach was fundamentally flawed. 
Poor performance has been reported for other CC programmes in Africa. Similar or different 
reasons have been advanced for these failures. (Gibson & Marks 1995; Songorwa 1999; Wells 
& Brandon 1992). These failures indicate that the interests of the weak actors are not yet 
addressed. The recent forceful evictions in western Serengeti and continued prohibitive and 
punitive policies raise questions on validity and sincerity of community conservation (CC) 
programmes. The reasonable speculation here is that the CC approach was adopted in response 
to situation that threatened to wipe out the elephants and rhinos in 1970s and 1980s rather than 
seeking the ‘true’ partnership with local communities as it is often being claimed. It is 
seemingly that the government and its agencies no longer consider local support as a necessity 
in conservation. Reasons that were given to justify evictions is another testimony that when it 
comes to meeting the interests of the powerful actors (government) those of weak actors (local 
people) become the non-issues. 
 
8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From this study a number of conclusions can be drawn: (1) that wildlife is highly contested by 
various actors due to its role as a social, economic and political commodity. (2) Powerful actors 
have often emerged the winners while the weak actors pay the costs. (3) The use of propaganda 
and fabrications has often been the key strategy in justifying conservation decisions and 
undermining local interests. (4) The post-colonial regime had maintained the colonial 
conservation laws due to economic and political ambitions. (5) Maintenance of these laws 
deepened conflicts with local communities who resumed resentment at the detriment of 
wildlife. (6) The CC approach adopted as an intervention to these conflicts has led to 
disappointing outcomes. (7) Continuation of punitive and exclusive policies raises a question of 
whether the approach is still valid and whether the local support is necessary in achieving 
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conservation goals. (8) Political and government leaders may be the major stumbling blocks in 
conservation programmes and  (9) Investors as new and powerful players in conservation may 
frustrate the conservation goals, despite their anticipated key role in economic development.  
     However, despite the snags observed, importance of wildlife conservation remains 
indisputable. The snags identified can serve as important entry points towards more effective 
and realistic conservation efforts. We recommend the following as a way forward:   
(i) Reverting to ‘fences and fines’ approach and assumption that local support is 
unnecessary should be considered as a flaw in conservation efforts. The use of force and 
propaganda paved the way for expansion of protected territories. However, today it may 
not be feasible due to such factors such as rapid population growth, increased poverty 
and increased awareness on human rights and activists who are ready to offer legal 
support to marginalised people.    
(ii) The community Conservation approach is still important. However, there is a need to 
address the deficiencies associated with the approach 
(iii) Benefit-based approaches should seek to address the problem of poverty and other 
factors threatening the ecosystem  
(iv) Politicians and government bureaucrats need to be sensitised on wildlife legislation and 
policies. Good governance is also important 
(v) The investment policies should be well harmonised with conservation and development 
policies. They should preclude any loopholes for marginalisation.  
(vi) There is an urgent need to address the question on who pays for, and who benefits from 
wildlife conservation.  
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NOTES 
 
1A letter Ref. Kumb Na. DG.10/134 (in author’s file) 
 
2A letter Ref. Kumb. Na.. G.10/4/161 from Magu District Commissioner to Mwanza Regional 
Commissioner (in Author’s file)  
 
3“Non-rivalrous goods” are goods whose benefits fail to exhibit consumption scarcity i.e. once 
produced, everyone can benefit from them without diminishing other's enjoyment e.g. roads, classrooms. 
“ Non-excludable goods” – these are benefits which once created, it is very difficult or impossible to 
prevent access to the goods. 
 
4Discussion with anonymous senior wildlife officials revealed that although the mandate of proposing 
and gazetting Wildlife Management Areas rests with Wildlife Department they were not aware of the 
plan. The DC justified eviction on grounds of the need to create WMA. 
 
5A letter dated 12 June 2003 (No Ref No.) from Bunda District Commissioner to Chief Park warden 
Serengeti National Park (in Author’s file) 
 
6Community meetings with villagers and anonymous wildlife officials in /2003 and 2004 
 
7Letter  Kumb. Na. L20/5/Vol.III/56 (in Author’s file) 
 
8Letter Kumb. Na. GD/KDU/SRT/QR/Vol.2/18 (in Author’s file) 
  
9A letter dated 22 December 1999 (Ref. KTC/99) from the Kijereshi Tented Camp Director General to 
the then Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism (in author’s file). 
  
10 A letter dated 8 September 2001 (Ref. No. KTC/CR/MZA/4) from the Kijereshi Tented Camp 
Director General to the then Magu District Commissioner (in author’s file). 
 
11A letter dated 26 September 2001 (Ref. KTC/MZA/CR) from the Kijereshi Tented Camp 
Director General to the then Mwanza Regional Commissioner (in author’s file). 
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ABSTRACT
Serengeti, a World Heritage Site and a Biosphere Reserve, is increasingly being
threatened by human factors, which undermine its natural resource base and, therefore,
contradict the ambition contained in Grzimeks’ popular book ‘Serengeti Shall Not
Die’. We discuss five forces against the ambition: rapid human population growth,
poverty, illegal hunting, habitat destruction, and wildlife diseases. We also review some of
the current strategies adopted in view of pre-empting the negative outcomes resulting
from these forces by pointing out their deficiencies. We conclude that, although human
population growth and poverty are underlying factors threatening the Ecosystem, the
current mitigative strategies barely address them adequately. We, therefore, recommend
that, for Grzimeks’ ambition to remain valid, the two factors should take priority. We also
call for more research to establish the reasons making people exhibit unsustainable
behaviours toward the resources. We further suggest learning from past mistakes in view
of correcting the identified deficiencies. Support in the form of alternative sustainable
livelihood strategies and discouraging all ecologically destructive policies are equally
important. Drawing from experience of the Kenyan part of the Ecosystem we suggest
banning of land privatization, commercial agriculture and other development policies
conflicting with conservation interests around Serengeti National Park.
INTRODUCTION
Historical background of wildlife
conservation in Tanzania
Tanzania has a long history of wildlife conservation
dating back to the pre-colonial era. Although
the notion of conservation among the pre-colonial
traditional societies is highly disputed (Redford
and Sanderson 2000; Songorwa et al. 2000), totemic
links and spiritual affiliation to particular animals,
plants or sites had benefited wildlife and habitats in
some parts of Tanzania. For example, Mgumia and
Oba (2003) showed that sacred groves and ritual
sites represent a potential contribution to the
conservation of biodiversity in the miombo wood-
land among the Wanyamwezi people of central
Tanzania. In Tanzania’s Western Serengeti
Corridor, special respect accorded to sacred
species such as elephant (Loxodonta africana) and
bushbuck (Tragelaphus scriptus) has reduced their
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vulnerability to poaching compared to other edible
species. As far as we can ascertain, there are
currently no cases of elephant hunting for meat
within 45 km west of the park. Likewise the annual
offtake of bushbuck is the lowest (5%) compared to
other species (Campbell and Hofer 1995).
The German colonial administration (1885–
1919) enacted the first formal written wildlife law
to regulate hunting in 1891 (URT 1998). This was
followed by the creation of a number of protected
areas (PAs). By 1911, about 30,000 km2 or 5% of the
colony had been included within 15 PAs (Baldus
et al. 2002). The British Administration (1919–
1961) established Selous Game Reserve (GR) as the
country’s first GR in 1922, followed by Ngorongoro
Crater and Serengeti GRs in 1928 and 1929,
respectively (URT 1998). In 1928, an aspiration for
National Parks (NPs), a category prohibiting all
human activities except research and game-viewing
tourism, emerged. Strong advocacy for this idea
came from the politically powerful conservation
societies in England, spearheaded by the Society
for the Preservation of the Flora and Fauna of the
Empire (SPFFE) (Neumann 1992, 1996). Major
Richard Hingston, who was sent to Tanganyika by
the SPFFE in 1930 to investigate the needs and
potential for developing a nature protection pro-
gramme, recommended the creation of NPs as a
matter of urgency.
The London Convention for Flora and Fauna
of Africa, held in 1933, obligated all signatories
(including Tanganyika) to investigate the poss-
ibilities of creating a system of national parks.
Administrators in Tanganyika, however, remained
adamantly against this idea on grounds that the
strategy conflicted with African rights to such a
degree that it could threaten the political stability
in the colony (Neumann 1992, 1996). Pressures
from powerful individuals in London, who consist-
ently overstated the problem of what they termed
‘indiscriminate slaughter’ of wildlife by Africans,
forced the colonial government to yield (Neumann
1996:90). The first game ordinance that gave the
governor a mandate to declare any area a NP was
enacted in 1940.
After independence in 1961, no radical changes
were made to wildlife conservation policies to
address the previously lost customary rights
(Neumann 1996; Rugumayo 1999; Levine 2002).
This was contrary to pledges made during the free-
dom movement campaigns (Levine 2002). The
economic justification of wildlife-based tourism,
rather than ecological reasons, triggered more
support for creating PAs. Julius K Nyerere, the first
President of Tanzania, backed this economic
motive, as he was quoted saying,
‘I personally am not interested in animals. I do
not want to spend my holidays watching croco-
diles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favour of
their survival. I believe that after diamonds and
sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with
its greatest source of income. Thousands of
Americans and Europeans have the strange urge
to see these animals’ (quoted in Levine 2002)
Nyerere further affirmed the position and commit-
ment of Tanzania to wildlife conservation through
a statement he released at the International Sympo-
sium on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources held in September 1961 in Arusha, Tan-
zania. This statement has become known as the
Arusha Manifesto, and has since become an impor-
tant landmark statement for wildlife conservation
in the country (URT 1998).
Currently, Tanzania with an area of
945,087 km2, has about 30% of its land surface
devoted to one form or another of wildlife pro-
tection (URT 1998). Tanzania’s wildlife policy,
enacted in 1998, demonstrates an ambition to
include more areas with rich and unique biological
values within the PA system, fostering ecological
conservation and economic prosperity (URT
1998). Udzungwa NP (1900 km2) was established
immediately following the signature of the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992.
The size of Katavi NP was doubled in 1998 from
2253 to 4471 km2 (Kideghesho 2001). Saadan and
Kitulo have been proposed for inclusion into the
NP system, while Ikorongo, Grumeti, Kijereshi and
Usangu have been upgraded to GRs from their
previous status as Game Controlled Areas.
Despite these historical conservation efforts, the
wildlife habitats and species in Tanzania are
increasingly threatened. Already with 46 extinct
animal species, the country ranks third in Sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of the number of animal
species threatened (177), after South Africa (282)
and Madagascar (254) (IUCN 2004). Of these 177
threatened animal species, 11, 69 and 72 fall in the
categories of critically endangered, endangered
and vulnerable, respectively (IUCN 2004). The
country also ranks the third in terms of the number
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of threatened plants in Africa, with some 239 threat-
ened species, just behind Madagascar (276) and
Cameroon (334) (IUCN 2004). Globally, Tanzania
moved from 20th position in 1996 to 14th in 2002
on the list of countries with the highest number of
threatened species (IUCN 2003). Some species
(including those that are not globally threatened)
are already locally extinct in some parts of Tanzania
while some are prone to extinction (Newmark
1996; Kideghesho 2001).
The mounting pressures attributable primarily
to socio-economic factors such as demographic
growth, poverty and market forces have led to
poaching and habitat destruction and conse-
quently impaired the ecological integrity of many
Tanzanian ecosystems. This has ultimately led
either to the loss of species or has driven them to the
verge of extinction (Newmark 1996; Kideghesho
2001; Brooks et al. 2002). The focus of this paper
is the Serengeti Ecosystem. It seeks to uncover
the forces contradicting the popular ambition
‘Serengeti Shall Not Die’ (Grzimek and Grzimek
1960). It also reviews some strategies employed
to overcome these forces and attempts to iden-
tify deficiencies, which have decreased their
effectiveness.
The Serengeti Ecosystem
The Serengeti Ecosystem, with an area of about
25,000 km2, is situated between latitudes 1° and 3°S
and longitudes 34° and 36°E (Figure 1). The history
of creation of PAs in this ecosystem dates back to
1928 when Ngorongoro GR was gazetted, followed
by the declaration of Serengeti as a partial and then
a complete GR a year later (Rugumayo 1999). The
creation of these GRs infringed on the rights of
over 10,000 resident Maasai pastoralists, initially by
prohibiting cultivation and later by forceful
eviction.
The Ordinance passed in May 1940 contained a
clause that declared Serengeti the first NP in British
colonial Africa. However, little was done about this
due to World War II (Rugumayo 1999). A separate
National Parks Ordinance passed in 1948 re-
affirmed Serengeti as a NP and established an
independent Board of Trustees (Neumann 1992).
Calls for a full investigation of customary rights
within the proposed boundaries of the NP were
ignored. This resulted in resentment, leading to
violence and sabotage. For example, the Maasai
resistance triggered political disorder and the
destruction of wildlife habitats and species through
setting fires with malicious intent and spearing of
rhinos (Diceros bicornis) (Neumann 1992).
A committee of enquiry appointed in 1956 to
look into the matter recommended splitting of the
park into Serengeti NP (SNP) and Ngorongoro
Conservation Area (NCA) so that, along with con-
servation, the interests of the Maasai pastoralists
could also be accommodated in the latter (Perkin
1995). This recommendation was adopted and two
different ordinances, NCA Authority Cap. 413 of
1959 and National Parks Ordinance, Cap. 412
of 1959, were enacted to manage the areas. The
National Parks Ordinance prohibits all human
activities other than conservation, game viewing
and research.
Along with SNP (14,763 km2) and NCA
(8,288 km2), falling under the jurisdictions of
Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and the NCA
Authority (NCAA) respectively, more PAs have
been gazetted in the ecosystem after independence
in 1961. The new PAs sought to provide a buffer
zone for SNP and to protect the corridors for
ungulates migrating between SNP and the adjacent
Maasai Mara National Reserve (MMNR) in Kenya.
MMNR (1,368 km2) is managed by Narok County
Council. Maswa Game Reserve (2,200 km2) was
established in 1962 while Ikorongo and Grumeti
were declared Game Controlled Areas (GCAs)
in 1974. The two GCAs along with Kijereshi
(65.7 km2) were elevated to GRs following realiza-
tion that the natural resources were still at risk and
restriction in this category were inadequate to en-
sure effective protection of wildlife and the migra-
tory corridors (John Muya, pers. comm. 2003).
Between Ikorongo (ca. 563 km2) and Grumeti GRs
(ca. 416 km2) lies Ikoma Open Area (IOA) (ca.
600 km2) (Figure 1). The Department of Wildlife
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
administers all GRs and GCAs.
The SNP and MMNR permit neither human
settlement nor the extraction of natural resources.
The legal uses are research and game viewing. In
the GRs, trophy hunting and game cropping are
allowed, although settlements are also prohibited.
The upgrading of the GCAs to GRs in 1994, there-
fore, involved relocation of the local people. Lim-
ited cattle grazing, firewood collection, hunting
(game cropping, resident and trophy hunting) and
bee keeping are allowed in the Ikoma Open Area.
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Forming the same ecosystem complex,
Ngorongoro and Serengeti together were desig-
nated as one Biosphere Reserve in 1981. They
were inscribed separately on the World Heritage
List in 1979 and 1981 respectively (UNESCO 2003).
A unique combination of diverse habitats en-
ables Serengeti to support over 30 species of large
herbivores and nearly 500 species of birds (Sinclair
1995). These species include both migrant and resi-
dent populations. Serengeti holds the largest and
one of the last migratory systems of ungulates in the
world (Sinclair 1995). Some 1.4 million wildebeest
(Connochaetes taurinus), 0.2 million zebra (Equus
burchelli) and 0.7 million Thompson’s gazelle
(Gazella thompsoni) migrate annually between
Serengeti and Kenya’s Maasai Mara National
Reserve (Norton-Griffiths 1995). The resident
herbivores found in Serengeti include warthog
(Phacochaerus aethiopicus), eland (Tragelaphus oryx),
impala (Aepyceros melampus), giraffe (Giraffa camelo-
pardalis), topi (Damaliscus korrigum), hartebeest
(Alcelaphus buselaphus), water buck (Kobus ellipsi-
prymnus), and Grant’s gazelle (Gazella grantii).
Elephants (Loxodonta africana) and hippo (Hippo-
potamus amphibius) are both charismatic and key-
stone species in the Ecosystem.
The Ecosystem supports one of the highest popu-
lations of carnivores in savannah, with lion (Panthera
leo) numbering up to 3000 individuals (Packer 1990,
1996); leopard (Panthera pardus) ranging from 800
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Figure 1 Location of Serengeti National Park and Surrounding Protected Areas
to 1000 (Borner et al. 1987); spotted hyena (Crocuta
crocuta) estimated at 9000 (Hofer and East 1995);
and cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus) and Black-backed
jackal (Canis mesomelas), numbering 250 and 6300
respectively (Caro and Durant 1995). Total numbers
of three species of mongoose – banded (Mungos
mungo), dwarf (Helogale parvula) and slender
(Herpestes sanguineus) – exceed 160,000 (Waser et al.
1995). Of the 500 bird species, some have restricted
ranges, including rufous-tailed weaver (Histurgops
ruficauda) (monotypic genus), Usambiro Barbet
(Trachyphonus usambiro), grey-crested helmet shrike
(Prionops poliolophus), grey-breasted francolin
(Francolinus rufopictus), Fischer’s lovebird (Agapornis
fischeri), and Karamoja apalis (Apalis karamojae)
(Stattersfield et al. 1998).
‘SERENGETI SHALL NOT DIE’:
FORCES AGAINST THE AMBITION
In 1959, Benhard Grzimek and his son Michael
co-authored a book entitled ‘Serengeti Shall Not
Die’ (Grzimek and Grzimek 1960). The title of the
book has not only amassed popularity worldwide,
but has also been adopted as a ‘motto’ among
nature lovers. This has been inspired by a desire to
see Serengeti survive to benefit current and future
generations of humankind, both locally and
globally. Although this ambition has somehow
remained valid for nearly five decades, the socio-
economic and ecological changes in the region
prompt a growing debate over the future prospects
of this ecosystem. Huge pressures are threatening
its ecological integrity. Huge pressures are threat-
ening its ecological integrity (see e.g. Campbell and
Hofer 1995; Hilborn 1995; Mbano et al. 1995;
Sinclair and Arcese 1995; Loibooki et al. 2002). In
1985, Bernhard Grzimek warned (MNRT 1985:2):
‘But the rhinos are gone and the elephants have
been sadly reduced. Even more disturbing has
been the tremendous growth in the number of
people around the National Park. Areas, which
we knew as wilderness, are now heavily settled
and cultivated. Each day the park becomes more
of an island, and pressures on its boundaries con-
tinue to grow. We must urgently renew our vigi-
lant custodianship, lest we lose this asset for all
mankind.’
In this section we discuss five factors – demo-
graphic factors, poverty, illegal hunting, habitat
destruction, and wildlife diseases – to show how
they contradict this ambition of sustaining
Serengeti as the global asset. Our main focus is the
western part of the Ecosystem. The part is defined
as all buffer zones (all Open Areas and GRs) and
Districts bordering the park in the west.
Demographic factors
Over the last five decades, the western part of
Serengeti Ecosystem has experienced rapid demo-
graphic growth accompanied by the expansion of
human settlements and increased livestock popula-
tions. Between 1948 and 1978, the human popula-
tion in the Eastern Lake Victoria basin increased
from 1.5 to 3.3 million, but this growth is said to
have had minimal effect on the areas adjoining SNP
(MNRT 1985). Increased human settlement on the
fertile lands close to Lake Victoria stimulated move-
ment to the periphery of the park. Between 1957
and 1967, the human population adjacent to SNP
grew at a rate of 10% per annum. The natural rate
of increase was 3.4% and immigration contributed
the remaining 6.6% (MNRT 1985).
Population growth around SNP has continued
to be an issue. For instance, between 1988 and 2002,
Serengeti and Bunda Districts recorded increases
of 56% and 30% in population and 71% and 51%
in the number of households, respectively (URT
1988; URT 2002). The current population in the
seven districts to the west of the park is over two
million with annual growth rate exceeding the
national average of 2.9% (Packer 1996; URT 2002).
This growth is mainly due to migration from within
and even from outside the Tanzania, especially
Kenya (Kideghesho, unpublished data). Economic
potential due to good agricultural land, wildlife (as
a source of game meat), water bodies (rivers and
Lake Victoria for fishing), and gold deposits have
been the major population pull-factors to the area.
Hackel (1999) lists three conservation problems
associated with people settling in or using new
areas, which are also applicable to Serengeti (see
Table 1).
Associated with human population growth is the
increase of livestock numbers. This adds pressure
on land, leading to overgrazing and land degrada-
tion. Statistics obtained from Serengeti District
indicate that, between 1990 and 2002, the livestock
units had increased by 52% from 175,680.5 to
266,624.5. This had lowered the carrying capacity,
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which was already considered to be exceeded a
decade ago (Kauzeni and Kiwasila 1994). Table 2
shows the land available for livestock grazing in
Serengeti and Bunda Districts and the land
required based on livestock number/units.
Poverty
Poverty is defined in a variety of ways. The World
Bank (WB 1992:26) defines it as ‘the inability
to attain a minimal standard of living.’ Chambers
(1987:8–9) views it as ‘a state of deprivation associ-
ated with lack of incomes and assets, physical weak-
ness, isolation, vulnerability and powerlessness.’
Both definitions conform to the situation in many
rural areas of Tanzania, where poverty is
considered a rural phenomenon. Between 22%
and 39% of Tanzanians live below the food poverty
line and basic needs poverty line, respectively (URT
2002). About 19.9% and 59.7% of the population
live below US$1 and US$2 per day, respectively,
while 41.6% live below the national poverty line
(UNDP 2003). Serengeti is not exceptional – prob-
ably the situation is much worse.
Mara Region, in which much of Serengeti falls,
ranks sixth in terms of poverty among the 21 admin-
istrative regions of Tanzania’s mainland, with a
regional annual per capita income of TAS 118,591
or US$119 (URT 2002). Gross annual income per
household from crop production in Bunda and
Serengeti is estimated at US$555 and 679 (Emerton
and Mfunda 1999), respectively. Kauzeni (1995)
and Johannesen (2002) reported a much lower
income of between US$150 to 200 per household.
Taking an average of 6 persons per each household
for both districts (URT 2002), average expenditure
for each individual is evidently far below US$1 per
day.
Poor performance of agriculture and livestock
in the area – attributed to land scarcity, drought,
diseases and pests, poor soil fertility, lack of agricul-
tural inputs and crop damage – is the main cause of
poverty (Kauzeni 1995; Emerton and Mfunda 1999;
Johannesen 2002). The villagers often blame wild-
life conservation for exacerbating these factors
(Kideghesho, unpublished data). The monetary
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Problem Situation in Serengeti
Disruption of ecological
processes essential to maintain
long-term biodiversity
Human impact causes depressed activities of migratory herbivores leading to
detrimental effects on vegetation dynamics (McNaughton and Banyikwa 1995)
Disruption of migratory corridors can render migration in the Serengeti a global
Endangered Biological Phenomenon (EBP) (Meffe and Carroll 1997)
Increased hunting for home
or market
Poaching data in Serengeti illustrate the relationship between human population
growth and pressure on wild resources (see discussion on illegal hunting)
Increased pressure from local
people to open protected
lands for community use
The expansion of cultivation and settlements forced realignments of the
boundaries of Maswa Game Reserve three times, causing 15% loss of the original
area (MNRT 1985)
The pastoralists in Bunda District (viz. Hunyari, Mariwanda, Kihumbu, Nyamatoke,
Kyandege and Mugeta villages) and Serengeti (Nyichoka and Park Nyigoti villages)
are currently appealing to the Government to legalise access to critical grazing and
water points in Grumeti and Ikorongo Game Reserves (Personal observation).
Manchira and Rubana Rivers in the two reserves, respectively, are critical water
sources for communities who constantly complain of denied access. However,
these communities have admitted that they illegally access these resources due to
lack of alternatives
Table 1 Problems of settling close to Protected Areas (Hackel 1999) and how they apply to the Serengeti Ecosystem
District
Livestock
units
(2002)
Land
available
(km2)
Land
requirement
(km2)
% of
land
exceeded
Serengeti
Bunda
266 624.5a
267 090c
2456b
2408c
3199.5a
3205.08c
30.3
33.1
Sources: aDALDO Serengeti District reports; bURT
2003, cDALDO Bunda District livestock reports. *The
land requirement is calculated based on livestock units
(LU), where 1 LU = 1 cow/bull = 2 goats or sheep = 5
donkeys, and requires 1.2 ha (Kauzeni 1995)
Table 2 The land available and land required* for live-
stock grazing in Serengeti and Bunda Districts in 2002
cost of crop damage by wildlife may be as high as
US$0.5 million a year for the whole of Western
Serengeti: US$155 for each of 3,000 households
who regularly suffer from crop damage (Emerton
and Mfunda 1999).
The above scenario constrains people’s liveli-
hoods, thus compelling the use of coping strategies
that involve setting priorities and making economic
choices that are ecologically destructive. Histori-
cally, illegal hunting and encroachment on wildlife
habitats have been employed in Serengeti as both
coping and adaptive livelihood strategies among
poor households (Campbell et al. 2001; Johannesen
2002; Loibooki et al. 2002).
Illegal hunting
Demand for game meat has been the main driver
for illegal hunting in Serengeti. However, between
the 1970s and 1980s when commercial hunting for
trophies became rampant in many African coun-
tries, Serengeti was one of the focal points. The
commercial poachers from outside the area tar-
geted the black rhinoceros and elephant. The for-
mer was driven to the verge of extinction while the
population of the latter decreased by 80% (Dublin
and Douglas-Hamilton 1987). Trophy hunting was
also linked to a dramatic decline of the buffalo
(Syncerus caffer) population from 63,144 in 1970 to
15,144 in 1998 (TWCM 1999).
‘Operation Uhai’ (Uhai is Swahili word for life)
was a countrywide war launched by the Tanzania
government against poachers in 1989. The war
which comprised army, police and wildlife staff
resulted in arrest of many poachers and confisca-
tion of a large number of weapons (Baldus et al.
2003). This, along with a global ban on ivory under
the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) of 1988,
kept the problem at minimum in the country and
it was virtually eliminated in Serengeti.
However, illegal hunting for game meat has
remained the major challenge to date. The
economic situation forces people to pursue illegal
hunting as a coping strategy to meet their
livelihood requirements, i.e. protein and other
household budgets, along with paying government
levies and other contributions (Holmern et al.
2002; Johannesen 2002; Loibooki et al. 2002). Over
75% of the illegal hunters in Serengeti have
limited sources of income and virtually no livestock
(Campbell et al. 2001; Loibooki et al. 2002).
Holmern et al. (2002) found that about 60.5% of
illegal hunters in Western Serengeti hunt for their
own consumption while 8.5% hunt for cash and
31% for both purposes. Illegal hunting earns the
hunters an annual income of US$200, a value close
to or equivalent to average on-farm income
(Holmern et al. 2002).
Wire snaring is a common technique used by
illegal hunters. The technique is very destructive
and wasteful as it also kills untargeted species. How-
ever, it is the most preferred because it reduces the
risk of arrest, as poachers spend the least time in the
bush. Population growth and urbanisation have
contributed to increased markets for game meat
and consequently to escalating illegal hunting in
Serengeti (J. Chuwa pers. comm. 2003). Tarime
(particularly in villages bordering Kenya),
Serengeti (Mugumu town), Bunda, Magu and
Bariadi Districts and even some parts of Kenya are
potential markets for bush meat from Serengeti.
Based on a 1991 aerial survey, Campbell and
Hofer (1995) estimated that 210,000 herbivores
(75,000 residents and 135,000 migratory) are
hunted illegally each year within 45 km west of the
protected areas. About 57% (118,922 off-take/
year) are wildebeest. Mduma et al. (1998) suggest
that a harvest of 80,000 wildebeest per year is unsus-
tainable and may cause a total collapse of the popu-
lation by the year 2018. Campbell and Hofer’s
estimated annual off-take is 50% higher, signifying
an unpromising future for this species if the predic-
tions of Mduma et al. are correct. In addition, the
following seven resident species are estimated to
experience heavy hunting pressure: waterbuck
(94.3%), eland (30.9%), giraffe (29.6%), impala
(28.7%), warthog (24.4%), topi (20.5%) and
buffalo (19.5%) (Campbell and Hofer 1995).
As discussed above, human demography is an
important factor dictating the magnitude of illegal
hunting, along with other pressures on the eco-
system. On the basis of 1978 and 1988 national
census data, Campbell and Hofer (1995) estimated
the number of poachers within 45 km west of
Serengeti National Park boundary and associated
protected areas to be 23,294 and 31,655, respec-
tively. More recent estimates of illegal hunters
range between 52,000 and 60,000 (Campbell et al.
2001; Loibooki et al. 2002), an increase of 90% from
1988 to 1998.
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Destruction of wildlife habitats
Wildlife habitats provide shelter, breeding places,
dispersal and foraging grounds along with move-
ment and access to critical resources in other
localities. These roles make them the critical com-
ponents for ecological integrity and the long-term
survival of any Ecosystem. Unfortunately, extensive
utilization of land and other resources driven by
human population growth, limited alternative
survival strategies for local people, land tenure and
development policies, is increasingly causing des-
truction and outright loss of some critical habitats
in Serengeti Ecosystem.
Failure to afford modern technologies and agri-
cultural inputs has made expansion into new land –
including sensitive areas for wildlife, such as migra-
tory corridors and dispersal areas – the most feas-
ible strategy for increasing agricultural output to
cope with population growth. As in other parts of
Tanzania, firewood and charcoal are extensively
used in both urban and rural areas around
Serengeti, due to a lack of alternative sources of
energy. The high market demand for charcoal and
firewood increases the vulnerability of critical wild-
life habitats. Electricity could be an alternative
source of energy, but most areas do not have access
to this service including some District Head-
quarters such as Mugumu, Serengeti. However,
even in areas with electricity, such as Bunda District,
only few households can afford it, due to high instal-
lation costs; and even in the few households with
the service, high tariffs make its use for cooking and
boiling water economically unaffordable. For most
Tanzanians (including some senior government
officials), electricity is used for lighting and radio.
There is considerable encroachment for agricul-
ture in SNP and Maswa GR, and mining and settle-
ment are taking place in migratory corridors.
Villagers in Park Nyigoti in Serengeti District
reported that, during migration, it was becoming
common to find several wildebeest killed after
falling in the pits created by gold mining within the
village. They also revealed that the animals have
abandoned routes which are heavily settled by
humans (Park Nyigoti villagers, pers. comm. 2003).
Also contributing to land degradation and loss
of ecological integrity are overgrazing by live-
stock, deforestation and bush fires. The latter origi-
nate mainly from human settlements along the
western boundary of the SNP. Deforestation and
unplanned fire also affect woodland vegetation.
Conversion of once-wooded vegetation to open
grasslands is said to have had an impact on browsers
in the North of SNP (Sinclair and Arcese 1995).
In 1995, Sinclair and Arcese (1995) estimated
that 40% of the Serengeti Ecosystem’s original
area (ca. 30,143 km2 in 1910) had been lost. They
reported that the loss was accelerating rather than
abating and that it was taking place largely within
the legal boundaries of the park. They further
observed that the greatest loss had occurred
between the 1960s and 1990s, despite the great
attention devoted to the area by researchers and
conservationists. According to Sinclair, (as quoted
by Morell 1997: 2059), ‘Thirty to 40% of the park
has changed its vegetation community in the last 25
years,’ and that ‘change should bring an accompa-
nying change in the fauna.’
One example of the implication of habitat
changes on fauna is the local extinction of roan
antelope (Hippotragus equines) in many areas of
the Ecosystem due to the loss of its Combretum-
dominated habitats (Campbell and Borner 1995;
Sinclair 1995). Sinclair (2005) reported an extra-
ordinary loss of some 50% of bird species outside of
Serengeti due to habitat loss, along with a loss in
insect diversity due to human intervention in their
systems. Loss of tree cover in riverine forests has led
to the disappearance of the previously healthy
populations of trogons and large-casqued hornbills
(Morell 1997). Some bird species, such as shrikes
and thrushes, have moved into the park, while black
and white colobus monkeys (Colobus angolensis),
previously seen along the Grumeti River, have
moved further west. Rural communities have also
reported the disappearance and reduction of
animal species in areas where they were previously
abundant, due to habitat loss.
Despite the above pressures on habitats in the
Tanzanian part of the Ecosystem, its land tenure
system, land use policies and market conditions
have made it less prone to destruction compared to
the Kenyan part. In Tanzania, the land belongs to
the State, although most of it (except PAs) is held
in a communal type of tenure – often called the
deemed right of occupancy. In Kenya, the land out-
side the core PAs is privately owned. In both coun-
tries wildlife belongs to the State. In contrast to
private land tenure, State control of land has the
advantage that the State can implement policies
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against land uses likely to cause detrimental
impacts on wildlife.
The private land tenure system in Kenya has led
to considerable negative impact on wildlife in
the Kenyan part of the Serengeti Ecosystem. The
system had allowed the landowners to respond to
market opportunities for mechanized agriculture
(Homewood et al. 2001). Between 1975 and 1995,
the Kenyan part of Serengeti Ecosystem experi-
enced higher decrease in vegetation cover than the
Tanzanian side. In the former, over 50,000 ha of
rangeland were converted to large-scale mecha-
nised wheat farms (Serneels and Lambin 2001).
This, along with fencing, had destroyed the wet
season dispersal and/or calving grounds for the
resident wildebeest population, leading to a
decrease of 81% from 119,000 in 1977 to 22,000
in 1997 (Ottichilo et al. 2001a). The total non-
migratory wildlife population declined by 58% in
the same period. Populations of giraffe, topi,
buffalo and warthog declined by 73 to 88% while
populations of waterbuck, Thompson and Grant
gazelles, kongoni, and eland decreased by about
60% (Ottichilo et al. 2001b). According to Serneels
and Lambin (2001) the decline in the Kenyan
wildebeest population had little effect on Serengeti
wildebeest population over the last decades. How-
ever, they warn that more land conversion closer to
Maasai Mara National Reserve would reduce the
dry season range for the Kenyan and Serengeti
population and consequently affect the entire
ecosystem. In Tanzania, external investors have
earmarked the Lobo and Loliondo areas, east of
the SNP, as potential areas for large-scale agricul-
tural schemes. If the government errs in its political
decisions and allow the project on grounds of
granting priority to food security, that will be
another tragedy to Serengeti wildlife.
Recently, further development programmes
with potential negative impacts to Serengeti Eco-
system have been proposed on the Kenyan side.
The conservationists are concerned that, if imple-
mented, the programmes may affect the water
quantity in Mara River – a dry season refuge for over
a million wildebeest and zebra of the Serengeti.
The proposed programmes are Mau forest de-
gazettement, irrigation of mechanized farming and
the development of the Amala Weir Hydropower
project (Gereta et al. 2002). Using the ecohydrology
model, Gereta et al. (2002) predicted that the pro-
jects might cause severe drought and thus reduce
wildebeest population by 80%. With 50% die-off,
it may take 20 years for the population to
recover, while with 80% there may be no popula-
tion recovery (Gereta et al. 2002).
Failure of wildlife conservation to compete
effectively with alternative land uses in the area
provides incentive for conversion to agriculture.
For example, decision by the landowners around
MMNR to convert their rangelands into agriculture
is ecologically costly but economically profitable:
the value of developing the land to full agricultural
potential was 15 times greater than its use for
wildlife-based tourism along with limited agricul-
ture and livestock. Profit earned by landowners for
devoting their land to wildlife conservation was
US$2.78 per hectare compared to US$43.21 for
alternative use (Norton-Griffiths 1995).
Wildlife diseases
Although diseases in wildlife areas have received
minimal attention in the past, there is now a
tendency to view this factor as one of the major
constraints to the effective management of
biodiversity in Tanzania. Drastic drops of wildlife
populations due to diseases in Tanzanian protected
areas at different times have contributed to making
diseases an important agenda item for the effective
conservation and management of wildlife.
Recent and serious epidemics in Serengeti have
been canine distemper virus (CDV) and rabies.
CDV killed about 1,000 out of 3,000 lions in
1993–94 (Harder et al. 1995; Morell 1995; Roelke-
Parker et al. 1996). The CDV epidemic spread north
to Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve, where it
also affected a large number of hyenas, foxes, and
leopards (Roelke-Parker et al. 1996). Rabies con-
tributed to the drastic decline of wild dogs (Lycaon
pictus) and their ultimate decimation in the
Serengeti and the Maasai Mara (Woodroffe and
Ginsberg 1997) in the 1990s. Domestic dogs (Canis
familiaris) on the perimeter of the Serengeti
National Park (estimated at 30,000) have been
identified as the source of both epidemics. Lack of
vaccination against the two diseases had made these
animals potential agents of transmission (Morell
1995; Roelke-Parker et al. 1996). However, the asso-
ciation between domestic dogs, rabies and
disappearance of wild dogs is contested (Dye
1996; East and Hofer 1996). Another disease is
rinderpest: an outbreak killed several hundred
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buffaloes in the Serengeti-Ngorongoro area in 1982
(EMERCSA 2002).
SUSTAINING THE AMBITION:
SOME STRATEGIES AND THEIR
DRAWBACKS
Some strategies are being adopted in order to
ensure that Serengeti survives. However, these have
not been sufficiently effective in meeting the
intended objectives. In this section, an attempt is
made to show why these strategies are flawed.
Provision of adequate conservation status
to wildlife areas
One strategy has been to create new PAs or upgrade
areas from lower to higher categories. In Serengeti,
the GCAs have recently been elevated to GR. In the
legal context, GCAs are the least restrictive category
of PAs in Tanzania (URT 1974b). They, therefore,
present lower opportunity costs to people in terms
of land and other resources. This has rendered
many GCAs prone to degradation in the face of
increasing human population and unsustainable
land uses.
As pointed out earlier, Ikorongo, Grumeti and
Kijereshi were declared GCAs in 1974 (URT 1974a)
in order to provide a buffer zone for Serengeti
National Park and protect corridors for migratory
herbivores in the western part. However, this status
could not meet the objectives for which these GCAs
were established. Therefore, a consultative meeting
in 1984 between the Wildlife Department and
Bunda and Serengeti District Councils proposed
upgrading them to GRs. The Mara Region Develop-
ment Council endorsed and submitted this pro-
posal to central government in 1985. However, the
intervention was needlessly delayed until 1994
(URT 1994). And yet after gazettement, effective
enforcement was delayed until 2000.
The process of establishment of the GRs was
fundamentally flawed because the ten-year time lag
allowed more developments and expansion onto
previously unoccupied lands. The local communi-
ties, therefore, resented the process as this meant
loss of economic opportunities. Later, as the pro-
cess became a matter of urgency, implementation
was effected as a ‘fire fighting’ or ‘crash
programme’ culminating with forceful eviction,
human rights violations, and a general failure to
observe the principles of good governance. Apathy
and resentment towards wildlife conservation
increased among the rural communities, a scenario
unhealthy for conservation.
Generally, the above events have lowered the
credibility of the government and its conservation
agencies as communities have lost trust. There is
poor acceptability and scepticism towards conserva-
tion initiatives aiming at promoting conservation
and development, despite the promise they hold
for communities.
Anti-poaching activities
It is claimed that improved anti-poaching opera-
tions have resulted in a substantial increase in the
number of poachers arrested annually (Joseph
Chuwa, pers. comm. 2003). Between 1995 and
2002, SNP staff (excluding Game Reserves, Village
Game Scouts and Anti-poaching Unit) arrested
7359 poachers, an average of 1051 per annum
(J. Chuwa, Pers. comm. 2003). Considering the
high number of poachers estimated to be living in
the area (ca. 52,000 to 60,000) (Loibooki et al.
2002), this achievement is insignificant. Between
July 2002 and June 2003, 433 court cases were filed
against poachers in the four Districts of Western
Serengeti – about 0.72% of the estimated poachers.
This may suggest that, despite heavy investment in
anti-poaching operations, the strategy is not effec-
tive in overcoming the problem of poaching, which
is one of the serious threats to the ecosystem.
Community participation in conservation
and management of wildlife
Community conservation (or participation in con-
servation) is increasingly gaining prominence as a
major paradigm of conservation work in Africa. It
seeks to address the deficiencies of the ‘fences and
fines’ approach. The latter is believed to have failed
to conserve wildlife mainly due to shrinkage of
government budgets (Gibson and Marks 1995;
Songorwa 1999: Newmark and Hough 2000; Baldus
et al. 2003). Community participation entails
the involvement of communities in designing, plan-
ning, decision-making, benefit sharing, implemen-
tation and evaluation and monitoring.
In the Serengeti Region, the approach has
enjoyed considerable publicity through two com-
munity conservation programmes: Community
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Conservation Service (CCS) and Serengeti
Regional Conservation Project (SCRP) run by
Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and Wildlife
Division (WD), respectively. The two initiatives are,
however, flawed in that their main focus had been
on benefit provision. Only minimal emphasis is
given to other components of participation,
thus rendering the communities the ‘passive
beneficiaries.’
The perception among the communities is that
genuine participation is lacking, and that the wild-
life managers often reserve the right to the final say
on what should or should not be done. The exercise
of developing the General Management Plan
(GMP) for Ikorongo and Grumeti GRs in 2000 may
be cited as an example. The communities were
invited along with other stakeholders to the
planning workshops, giving an impression that the
process was participatory. The communities, how-
ever, complained later that their interests did not
appear in the draft GMP document as agreed dur-
ing the planning sessions. Some of the provisions
identified and agreed upon during the planning
exercise were access to water points for livestock
during the dry season, salt licks and visits to sacred
groves. However, these activities have remained
illegal and liable to penalties, prompting the local
people to question the logic of being invited to the
planning workshops if their ideas and interests are
ignored (Villagers bordering Grumeti GR, pers.
comm. 2004).
Benefit-based strategy
The benefit-based strategy is a key component of
many community conservation programmes. Such
a strategy aims at motivating rural residents to align
their behaviours with conservation goals. It is con-
sidered as a positive rather than negative incentive.
The latter – relying primarily on regulation and
control – is considered to be necessary, but ‘insuffi-
cient and inherently unstable’ (Murphree in
Hutton 2004:586). Through the strategy the target
beneficiaries are expected to ‘surrender access to,
or curtail illegal offtake of, native species and their
habitats’ (Barrett and Arcese 1995: 1074) for the
interest of conservation. The assumption behind
this is that lack of benefits prompts illegal use
and/or active destruction of the resource
(Emerton 2001). Examples of the benefits that are
often provided include low cost game meat
(through cropping schemes) and social services
(e.g. health and education facilities). Despite being
popular, compared to other components of
participation, benefit-based strategy is flawed,
and thus its efficacy in meeting conservation objec-
tives is limited. Some of the flaws constraining the
strategy are discussed below.
Priority compared to other strategies
The benefit-based strategy receives low priority
compared to the promotion of the unpopular
‘fences and fines’ approach, in which the wildlife
managers still invest heavily. For example, SNP
records (as of 2004) indicate that the Law Enforce-
ment Department (LED) had 172 staff, 18 centres/
ranger posts, and 21 vehicles, in contrast to 18, 6
and 4, respectively, for the Community Conser-
vation Service (CCS). The budgets allocated to
the two departments from 1999 to 2004 were
US$862,000 and 361,000, respectively. Donor
agencies also direct most of their support in the
form of vehicles, uniforms and ammunitions to
LED. Villagers in Robanda, Serengeti District, criti-
cised Frankfurt Zoological Society [FZS: a donor
organisation] for neglecting the development
aspect of the people while investing heavily in
supporting anti-poaching activities.
The nature and types of the benefits granted
Most of the conservation-induced costs (such as
property damage and opportunity costs) are borne
and felt by individuals and households rather than
the entire community. However, conservation-
related benefits often accrue communally (in the
form of social amenities such as the construction of
roads, classrooms and dispensaries) rather than to
individuals and households. This means that the
victims of the wildlife costs are insufficiently com-
pensated. Additionally, these benefits are not easily
realised by the victims, since they rarely solve the
actual problems caused by wildlife, such as food
insecurity and conservation-induced opportunity
costs. A classroom or a tarmac road has lower value
than a bag of maize to a person who is starving (due
to crop raiding by elephant); as a villager in
Nyichoka, Serengeti District, observed, ‘even if
the classrooms are decent like ikulu (State house),
children cannot concentrate with empty stomachs.’
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Another problem with communal benefits is
that they can hardly be distributed evenly. The
share for households/individuals incurring serious
losses due to conservation is the same as that gained
by the least affected and those reaping the benefits
illegally (e.g. through poaching). For example, it is
impractical to bar a poacher from walking on a road
constructed by a conservation agency or denying
his son the right to sit in a classroom donated
through a conservation initiative. There is also a
tendency for local elite to monopolise the benefits.
Total benefits are too small to balance the costs
The conservation-related benefits that trickle down
to rural communities are too small to balance the
costs of conservation. Emerton and Mfunda’s
(1999) cost–benefit analysis at individual house-
hold level shows that each of the 9,500 households
in Western Serengeti indirectly receives an average
of US$2.5 per year as benefit-sharing through the
implementation of development projects. The
wildlife-related costs range from US$155 per house-
hold for farmers adjacent to the Serengeti National
Park and Grumeti and Ikorongo GR to more than
US$770 a year for illegal cultivators inside the
Reserve. The Secretary of the Pastoralists in
Hunyari ward, Bunda District, elaborated this by
saying:
‘This is a joke! Few shillings used to construct two
classrooms and two kilograms of bush meat we
buy from SRCP (Serengeti Regional Conserva-
tion Project) per year can not match up to loss of
pasture and water sustaining our cattle amount-
ing to 70,000. Nor could they (classrooms and
meat) be able to restore our dignity, which is
openly being abused by game rangers when they
get us inside the reserve. What is the use of
school if it means loss of the cattle which pro-
vides food, clothes and school requirements for
children who are intended to attend to this
school.’
Moreover the ‘ecologically damaging’ activities are
more economically profitable compared to bene-
fits people receive in order to abstain from these
(destructive) activities. For example, illegal hunt-
ing in Western Serengeti generates an economic
value 45 times greater than that derived from the
SRCP community cropping scheme (Holmern et al.
2002). In Maasai Mara, returns for landowners
from agriculture and ranching were 15 times
greater than from conservation (Norton-Griffiths
1995). Therefore wildlife conservation is more of a
liability rather than an asset, making it
disadvantageous for people to forego their current
activities in favour of conservation goals.
Sustainability of the benefits
As already mentioned, conservation-related bene-
fits are granted in order to win local support for
conservation. Likewise, these benefits are often
believed (in theory) to aim at reducing poverty
since this is the main driving force triggering
poaching and other unsustainable activities. For
communities to access these benefits, however,
stakeholders from developed countries (i.e. donors
and tourists) are critically important. Virtually all
conservation projects or programmes in Africa
depend on donor funding and revenues generated
through tourism.
Experience shows that most of the conservation
projects have been vulnerable to collapse since the
host governments or departments are unwilling, or
can rarely afford, to fund these projects after the
donor pullout. The Norwegian Agency for Develop-
ment Cooperation (NORAD) funds SRCP and, as
the project will end in 2006, there has been a sub-
stantial reduction of budget allocation every year in
what is termed as ‘smooth landing’. Experience of
similar projects in Tanzania such as Matumizi
Bora ya Malihai Idodi and Pawaga (MBOMIPA)
and the Selous Conservation Project (SCP) has
indicated the government’s reluctance to take over
the responsibilities after donors have pulled out on
the grounds of inadequate financial capacity
(Songorwa 2004). This scenario may suggest that
no miracles will emerge for SRCP. The unwilling-
ness and/or inability of the Tanzanian government
to fund these projects signals that even the minimal
benefits that accrue to communities are to be termi-
nated. On the other hand, tourism is susceptible to
factors such as political instability, economic hard-
ship, or terrorism. This again reduces the reliability
of the industry as a viable source of benefits to
communities. Since the benefits are intended to
change people’s behaviours, their curtailment may
inevitably turn people to illegal and unsustainable
activities.
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Establishment of Wildlife Management Areas
The Wildlife Policy of Tanzania prescribes the
establishment of Wildlife Management Areas
(WMAs) as a pragmatic way of empowering people
to manage and benefit from wildlife on their
lands. In Western Serengeti, Ikona WMA is being
established to this end. Five villages bordering
Ikorongo and Grumeti GRs (Robanda, Park
Nyigoti, Nyichoka, Natta-mbiso and Nyakitono) are
the intended beneficiaries. However, the optimum
acceptability of the intervention is likely to be con-
strained by past history, policy, and institutional
failures.
Perceptions that politicians and government
bureaucrats have hijacked the idea of WMAs have
lowered the credibility of the intervention. The
District authorities are accused for giving orders
contradicting the guidelines of WMAs, deciding on
the type of investors and ‘protecting’ them even in
cases where they have failed to observe the con-
tracts. Scepticism is furthered by the fact that there
are fewer local representatives on the board than
District officials and that no law has been enacted to
back this intervention. The participation of some
organizations, which have had historical conflicts
over wildlife conservation with local people, has
amplified the cynicism that the creation of WMA is
an impending land grab by the government and
foreigners (Nyichoka Villagers, pers. com. 2003).
At the conservation stakeholder meeting held in
Robanda village on 16 September 2003, villagers
were less convinced that Frankfurt Zoological
Society (FZS), whose priority for decades has been
‘wildlife against people’, could stand for the
interests of the local people. One villager had this
to say in the meeting:
‘WMA cannot be a good thing to us (communi-
ties), if it is spearheaded by Frankfurt. The his-
tory of Frankfurt since Grzimek’s time has been
to save wildlife at the expense of our life. And
there is no sign that this practice has changed as
to date it is still donating new vehicles and guns
to TANAPA as if there is a war to fight.’
Communities are also worried about the likely
increased restrictions to access over resources,
such as grazing land and water, within the current
proposed boundaries of WMAs. Narrating the his-
tory of relocation in Serengeti, an octogenarian
in Nyichoka says:
‘History has taught us a lot. We were forced out
of Serengeti (National Park). First the boundary
was moved from Naabi Hill to Banagi River in
1950s. Then, in 1960s Mochatongarori became
the new boundary and later we were pushed to
Romoti River in 1970s. In 1974 Ikorongo and
Grumeti were set aside as Game Controlled
Areas and we were promised to remain in and
continue to enjoy resources critical to our house-
holds, although in few weeks we were relocated
because of the so-called villagisation policy. Our
attempt to go back and make living from our
lands in Ikorongo and Grumeti after failure of
villagisation policy was defeated by the govern-
ment in 1994 by mere baptizing the areas as
Game Reserves. We were therefore forced out
of the reserve and we therefore lost Manchira
River, which was critical source of water and salt
for domestic use and livestock. Further to this we
lost our grazing land, settlements, sacred sites
and mining areas, which served as a source of
employment to our youth. Today they want to
baptize our land with the name WMAs. As usual
we see a lot of promises here! But next year the
name will change and we (communities) will be
forced out. Can’t these people be advised that we
are fed up? What is the difference between this
policy and several other government policies,
which we have heard of before? Is it not true that
despite a lot of good promises these policies
ended in vain? Where is ujamaa vijijini (villagi-
sation policy)? where is Azimio la Arusha
(Arusha Declaration)?’
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Serengeti has ecological importance as the last
intact plains ecosystem supporting the Earth’s
largest populations of terrestrial mammals. The
designation of protected areas and the designation
of the area as a Biosphere Reserve and World
Heritage Site should have been important mea-
sures for guaranteeing the ecological integrity and
viability of Serengeti. However, as trends discussed
in this paper show, Serengeti – a global asset –
remains endangered. Further, interventions other
than creation of the protected areas – such as com-
munity participation, benefit-based strategy, anti-
poaching, and the creation of WMAs – are also
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flawed as observed in this paper due to problems of
implementation. The following specific recom-
mendations are essential for Grzimeks’ ambition to
be sustained:
Making human population growth a matter of priority:
Although population growth is one of the under-
lying causes of threats facing Serengeti Ecosystem,
none of the current strategies addresses it ade-
quately. Overlooking this factor is synonymous to
treating the symptoms rather than the causes.
Unless a proactive intervention is sought, it is
apparent that human population will keep on grow-
ing and, therefore, demand for more land and
resources will increase. As population increases, the
effectiveness of the current strategies will be diluted
and conflicts will intensify. The possible strategies
may include developing the active policies to
reduce immigrants from other areas by limiting the
population-pull factors.
Provide alternative sustainable livelihood strategies:
The agenda of human survival is critical if forces
threatening the ecosystem are to be halted. It is
illogical for anyone to accept a scenario where
preservation of biodiversity implies starvation. To
reduce the pressures on natural resources and habi-
tats, strategies may include: (1) devising a special
policy which will obligate other regions of the
country to provide employment opportunities to
young people from Serengeti area; (2) supporting
the agricultural sector by subsidizing inputs, pro-
viding credits and access to markets, and control-
ling problem animals; and (3) securing and
subsidizing the alternative sources of energy (e.g.
biogas and electricity) to reduce dependency on
fuelwood.
Knowledge on the nature of illegal activities: The current
strategies suggest that there is either lack or inade-
quacy of this knowledge. Knowing why local people
exhibit a particular unsustainable behaviour may
be useful in devising more pragmatic solutions
to current challenges facing the ecosystem. More
research programmes in this area are, therefore,
imperative.
Learning from mistakes and correct identified deficiencies:
Current conservation-related flaws in Serengeti
can be a good entry point to safeguarding the
ecosystem: (1) ensure the genuine participation
of local people and value their concerns and
contribution in conservation activities; (2) review
the mechanisms for benefit sharing to ensure that
they are evenly distributed, adequate to offset the
conservation-induced costs and they can outweigh
those generated by alternative land uses; (3) the
government, its agencies and donors have to prove
to people that, unlike in the past, they are credible
and trustworthy and, therefore, the initiatives or
programmes they propose will work; and (4)
wildlife staff, donor organizations and other stake-
holders also need to change their attitude regard-
ing local people and the way conservation should
be pursued – sensitization may help.
Discourage land privatization and commercial agricul-
ture: The detrimental impact of private land tenure
on wildlife around the Kenyan part of Serengeti
Ecosystem should serve as a precaution against
adopting similar policies around Serengeti. The
current state/communal land tenure and policies
restricting commercial and mechanization agricul-
ture should be maintained. Further, practical ways
seeking to harmonize the development policies
around the Ecosystem should be developed by both
countries sharing the Ecosystem.
Participatory land use planning: The appropriate
zones should be determined for particular uses.
The uses that are incompatible with conservation
should be discouraged in critical wildlife areas
such as migratory corridors, calving and dispersal
grounds
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Summary 
Community Conservation (CC) has become a major paradigm of conservation work in Africa. 
This paradigm, developed in response to the perceived failure of fortress conservation approach, 
uses benefits as a positive incentive to motivate local people to align their behaviours with 
conservation goals. Proponents of the strategy view it as a pragmatic way of transforming 
wildlife from a liability to an asset and therefore reconciling conservation interests with 
development. There are some mixing views regarding the efficacy of the strategy. Growing 
literature and field experience in some parts of the world claim that the strategy is not working as 
expected. This paper employs the current community conservation programmes in Serengeti to 
establish whether the strategy has a desired impact for future of wildlife in the area. It finally 
recommends some measures to strengthen the strategy in order to better its contribution to 
conservation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
       American’s Yellowstone National Park - cited as the beginning of the modern era of 
protected areas (Chape et al., 2005) - had served as a model for creation of protected areas in the 
world.  The model - popular as “fences and fines” or “fortress conservation” - has been operating 
under the principal “define a rich wildlife area, declare it protected, remove indigenous people, 
and prevent them from re-entering” (Meffe and Caroll, 1997, p. 510). The adoption of the model 
in Africa alienated the natives from resources they, or their chiefs, formerly had the right to own 
and control (Bonner, 1993; Neumann, 1992). Resentment from local communities toward this 
model – aiming at forcing opportunities to secure their access to resources - is well documented 
(IIED, 1994; Machlis, 1989; Neumann, 1992; Wells and Brandon, 1993; Western, 1984). 
       Despite local opposition towards the model, the post-colonial governments inherited it 
uncritically. These governments devoted more land for conservation and some went to extremes 
by adopting a “shoot-on-sight” policy against illegal bushmeat hunters. For instance, in Kenya 
one poacher was killed on the average of every four days in the late 1980s while in Zimbabwe 
145 illegal hunters were killed between 1984 and 1991 (Bonner, 1993).  Yet these harsh measures 
could not guarantee the survival of wildlife. Human encroachment on wildlife habitats and illegal 
hunting continued - both as coping and adaptive livelihood strategies (Gibson and Marks 1995; 
Loibooki et al., 2002; Wells and Brandon 1993). Surveys in the last two decades suggested that 
human activities had reduced Africa’s original wildlife habitats by more than 65% (Newmark and 
Hough 2000). Illegal hunting in 1970s and 1980s reduced the African elephant (Loxodonta 
africana) population by 50% while black rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis) was driven to the verge of 
extinction (Adams and McShane, 1992; Bonner, 1993; Rolfes, 1997).  This sad story to 
conservation is attributed to shrinkage of government budgets at the face of worsening rural 
poverty, human population growth and availability of trophy market1. Minimal budgets allocated 
to wildlife conservation could hardly cater for effective patrol of protected areas2. 
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       Further to minimal budgets, it was also argued that even the well-funded coercive 
conservation programmes could barely prosper where people’s livelihoods and household 
budgets depended largely on prohibited natural resources from protected areas (Agrawal and 
Gibson, 1999; Wells and Brandon, 1993). Local resentment is furthered by, not only opportunity 
costs from restriction over resources, but also property damage and wildlife-induced accidents to 
people (Parry and Campbell, 1992; Songorwa et al., 2000).  
       The above realities have inspired a growing recognition that successful long-term 
management of the protected areas can potentially be secured if local people participate fully in 
their conservation and derive tangible benefits from the resources therein. The proliferation of the 
community conservation (CC) initiatives is a response to this recognition3. These initiatives seek 
to provide alternative sources of income and sustenance, or direct compensation in form of social 
services associated with an improved standard of living by inducing “rural residents to surrender 
access to, or curtail illegal offtake of, native species and their habitats” (Barrett and Arcese, 1995, 
p. 1074). Essentially, as Songorwa puts it, the focus is “to change rural people’s behaviours and 
practices and use those people and their new behaviours as a vehicle for achieving a conservation 
goal” (1999, p. 2061). An incentive to conserve, and to tolerate wildlife-related costs, among the 
local communities is, therefore, a function of economic gain – short of that may lead to illegal use 
and/or active destruction of the resource (See e.g. Emerton, 2001; Neumann, 1992; Wells and 
Brandon, 1993; Western, 1994).   
       The importance of linking protected areas management with local economy has enjoyed 
political backing internationally as numerous reports and publications indicate.  For examples, the 
World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980); the 1982 World Congress for National Parks in Bali 
(Wells & Brandon 1993); Our Common Future (Brundtland, 1987); Caring for the Earth 
(IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991) and the Rio Summit (UNCED, 1992) underscore the need to 
reconcile conservation interests with human needs. However, the outcomes of many 
programmes/projects seeking to attain this desire are disappointing. Contrary to expectations, 
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illegal hunting and hostility towards the wildlife staff are still prevalent (Gibson and Marks, 
1995; Loibooki et al., 2002) – a failure attributed to a number of factors (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Some flaws of Integrated Conservation Development Projects (ICDPs) 
Flaw Source(s) 
1. Problematic, untested and unjustified assumptions Wells & Brandon (1993); Barrett 
& Arcese (1995); Songorwa et al 
(2000);  Newmark & Hough 
(2000) 
2. Inadequate socio-economic data for effective project design Wells & Brandon (1993) 
3. Missing or unclear critical linkage between development and 
conservation  
Barrett & Arcese (1995); Wells 
& Brandon (1993)  
4. Limited budgets that render the projects too small to exert a 
reasonable influence over the forces threatening protected 
ecosystems 
Wells and Brandon (1993) 
5. Mistaken vision that views communities as a unified, organic 
whole, and consequently disregarding of differences affecting 
resource management outcomes, local politics and strategic 
interactions within the communities 
Agrawal & Gibson (1999) 
6. Missing link between the benefits and costs; uneven and 
narrowly distribution of benefits 
Gillingham & Lee (1999); 
Madzudzo (1997); Wells & 
Brandon (1993) 
7. General lack of interest among the rural communities Songorwa (1999) 
8. Buffer zones are ill-defined, without specific enabling 
legislation   
Wells & Brandon (1993) 
9. Inadequate or lack of political commitment  Songorwa et. al.(2000); 
Songorwa (2004b) 
10. Inadequate monitoring and evaluation  Wells & Brandon (1993) 
11. Lack of participation of local communities in decision making 
for resource management 
Parry & Campbell (1992) 
12. Lack of constructive relationship between the key 
stakeholders  
Wells & Brandon (1993) 
13. Limited viable alternatives to the extensive resource use Wells & Brandon (1993) 
 7
      Some earlier evaluators, linked under-performance of most CC projects with life cycles, that 
they had not been underway long enough to be fairly evaluated (Newmark and Hough, 2000; 
Wells and Brandon, 1993). Having operated for about two decades now, most of these projects 
are mature enough for fair and critical evaluation. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing 
debate in the conservation literature regarding the efficacy of CC approaches. It seeks to answer 
the following questions: (1) Is commitment to CC genuine and adequate? (2) Do the nature and 
distribution of the benefits address people’s felt needs and guarantee a fair and equitable access 
(among the individuals, households and villages)? (3) Are the CC benefits adequate enough to 
offset the wildlife-induced costs, and outweigh the returns generated by alternative land uses 
considered to be ecologically damaging? (4) How do the roles, behaviour, interests and powers of 
‘other stakeholders’4 influence people’s perceptions and access to CC benefits? (5) And can the 
benefit-based approaches save the region’s wildlife? - If so, what critical issues have to be 
resolved? The paper is organized as follows: following an overview of CC in Tanzania (Section 
2), Section 3 is about methodology (description of study area, data collection and analysis). 
Results, discussion and conclusion are presented in Sections 4, 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
2. COMMUNITY CONSERVATION IN TANZANIA 
Tanzania, which has devoted over 28% of its land (ca. 945,090 km2) for wildlife protection, went 
through a deep economic recession between 1970s and 1980s, like other African countries. This 
resulted into serious under-funding of the natural resources sector (i.e. wildlife, forestry and 
fisheries). From 1976 to 1981, the sector was the least financed, receiving only 1.2% from the 
development budget. In this period only US$52 million were allocated for the entire sector 
(Yeager, 1986). The wildlife subsector had not stabilised and continued to worsen. For instance, 
in 1994 and 1995 the Wildlife Department had a total budget of US$1.04 Million and US$1.01 
Million, respectively – a decrease of 3% (URT, 1995). The Selous Game Reserve’s budget in 
1987 amounted to US$3/km2 (Baldus et al., 2003). This was far less compared to the amount 
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required for effective control of commercial poaching, which ranged between US$200 and 
400/km2  per annum (Bonner, 1993; Leader-Williams et al., 1990).  
       Inadequate staff and equipment (Masilingi, 1994; Severre, 2000) to conduct effective law 
enforcement led to a dramatic decline of wildlife species in the country. Elephant and rhino were 
the most affected species. The elephants declined from 203,000 individuals in 1977 to 57,334 in 
1991 (IUCN, 1998) while in 1992 only 275 rhinos remained compared to 3,795 individuals in 
1981 (Rolfes, 1997). The economic crisis also stimulated illegal hunting for game meat to cater 
for household budgets. In 1989 the government intervened by launching “Operation Uhai” (Uhai 
is swahili word for life) that comprised army, police, and Wildlife Department personnel (Baldus 
et al., 2003).  
       Although the operation minimised the problem, it could not be sustained given the resource 
constraints. The situation forced Tanzania, (just like other African countries), to subscribe to 
Community Conservation programmes with ambitious objectives of reconciling human 
development and conservation interests. The Selous Conservation Project (SCP) and MBOMIPA5 
emerged as the country’s pioneer flagship conservation projects. Their success and sustainability 
is, however, being questioned (Songorwa, 1999; 2004). A similar intervention was also 
introduced in the Western Serengeti to address the long-term conservation and socio-economic 
problems that threatened the ecological integrity and, therefore wildlife populations. The 
Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) and Tanzania National Parks’ (TANAPA) 
Community Conservation Service (CCS) were set up for this purpose.  
 
(a) Serengeti Regional Conservation Project  
       The Serengeti Regional Conservation Project (SRCP) is an outcome of a workshop held at 
Seronera in Serengeti National Park (SNP) in December 1985 with the ”goal of identifying and 
implementing long-term solutions to the resource use conflicts threatening conservation of the 
ecosystem” (Mbano et al. 1995, p. 605). The project started in 1988. The basic premise of the 
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Seronera workshop, that ”conservation and human development in Serengeti can no longer 
proceed in isolation  from one another” gave rise to the overall goal of SRCP, i.e. to design a new 
approach toward the management and utilization of the Serengeti Region’s natural resources. 
Specifically, SRCP aimed at ensuring that: (1) Human development needs and natural resource 
conservation requirements in the region are reconciled with one another through the cooperation 
of all resource users and managers; (2) The protected areas, and wildlife resource in particular, 
play a central role in the economic development of the region; (3) Local communities are 
committed to the conservation of the Serengeti region’s wildlife resource through being directly 
involved in its management and utilization and through receiving direct benefits; and (4) Local 
communities achieve sustainable use of other natural resources in the region through ownership 
of land and village-generated land use plans, thereby reducing pressures on the resources of the 
protected areas” (Mbano et al. 1995, p. 606).  
 
(b) Community Conservation Service or Outreach programme 
       Implemented by TANAPA, the Outreach programmes started in 1988 around SNP. When it 
started it was known as Neighbours as Partners before it changed name to Community 
Conservation Services (CCS) and now Outreach programme. The programme evolved from a 
working group at the Serengeti Regional Conservation workshop in 1985, which recommended 
having a ‘Rural Extension Education’ programme (Bergin & Dembe 1996). The African Wildlife 
Foundation (AWF) sponsored a pilot project to support TANAPA in developing its capacity for 
CCS focusing on three villages (viz. Ololosokwan, Oloipiri and Soit Sambu) of eastern Serengeti 
in 1988 (TANAPA 2000). In 1992 CCS became a full-fledged department in TANAPA’s 12 
national parks and at the headquarters. The programme has four objectives: (1) Improving 
relations between individual parks and local communities; (2) Ensuring that the interests of 
National Parks with regard to natural resource conservation and community welfare are presented 
at all levels; (3) Facilitating the sharing of benefits with target communities; and  (4) Assisting 
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communities to gain access to information, resources and services which promote sustainable 
development (TANAPA 1994). 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
(a) Study area 
       The study was conducted in three districts bordering SNP in the Western part: Serengeti and 
Bunda (in Mara region) and Magu (in Mwanza region) (Figure 1). SNP forms 60% of the greater 
Serengeti ecosystem spanning an area of about 30,000 km2 (lat: 10 and 30 S and long: 340 and 360 
E). The Serengeti region is world-wide famous for its prolific wildlife - including 30 species of 
ungulates, 13 species of large carnivores and over 500 bird species (Sinclair, 1979; 1995). Some 
of the bird species are endemic to Serengeti (Stattersfield et al., 1998). The regions holds the 
largest of the last migratory systems of ungulates in the world (Sinclair, 1995). 
       The wildlife conservation efforts in the area have traditionally involved creation of a series of 
protected areas. These include SNP (14,763 km2), Ngorongoro conservation Area - NCA (8,288 
km2), Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve (1,368 km2) and four Game Reserves - Maswa (2 
200 km2), Ikorongo (563 km2), Grumeti (416 km2) and Kijereshi (65.7 km2). NCA and SNP 
together were designated as one Biosphere Reserve in 1981 and separately inscribed on the 
World Heritage List since 1979 and 1981, respectively (UNESCO, 2003).  
       Land alienation and restriction over access to resources associated with creation of PAs in 
Serengeti Ecosystem had often engendered local resentment. The most widely publicised dispute 
involved Maasai tribesmen spearing rhinos and setting fires with malicious intent in the late 
1940s (Neumann, 1992). Rapid human population growth and poverty have worsened the 
situation by causing mounting pressures on natural resources, particularly in the Western 
Serengeti (Campbell and Hofer, 1995; Mbano et al., 1995; MNRT, 1985; TWCM, 1998; 1999) - 
critical area in preserving the ancient migratory corridors. Over two million people living in this 
area have annual population growth rate beyond the national average of 2.9% (URT, 2002). The 
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population is multiethnic comprised of over 30 tribes, which pursue agropastoralism as their key 
livelihood strategy.  An average household income range from US$ 0.42 to US$ 0.55 per day 
(Johannesen, 2002). The annual income is, therefore, far below the country’s per capita income of 
US$ 280 (WB, 2003). Illegal hunting is pursued to complement the household budgets for the 
poorest and during the bad years (Loibooki et al, 2002).   
 
(b) Data collection and analysis 
A combination of methods was employed in this study: (i) Between July and August 2003 one 
community meeting was held in each of the six villages (N=6) viz. Park Nyigoti and Nyichoka 
(Serengeti district); Mariwanda and Nyatwali (Bunda district); Mwabayanda and Kijereshi 
(Bunda district) where some 50 villagers attended (N=300). An additional meeting was held with 
20 people who were evicted from Nyamuma area, adjacent to Ikorongo Game Reserve.  The 
meetings were arranged with the village government officials. Further to information obtained, 
the meeting proved to be useful in establishing rapport between the researcher and the 
communities. The agenda items for discussion were written on flip charts in form of questions 
seeking to solicit information regarding the protected area-people relationships, problems, 
opportunities, priorities and visions. The participants in the meetings were also requested to 
sketch a land/resource use map of their respective villages, which was used to clarify some issues 
raised in discussion along with probing for more specific issues.  (ii) Focus group sessions aiming 
at providing further insights on attitudes, perceptions and opinions (Mikkelsen, 1995) of the 
villagers were conducted with ten women in each study village (N=60) and eight pastoralists 
from Mariwanda village. Using the village registers, the village official and a key informant 
assisted in selection of the participants. Selection was based on the location of participants’ 
homes in order to ensure an even geographical coverage of the village. With a company of a 
village official and key informant, the selected participants were visited at their homes, briefed on 
the focus group sessions and invited to attend. The good rapport established with the villagers in 
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the previous village meetings, the company of the village official and key informant, inspired 
acceptance of the invitation, with exception of the few, who declined due to unavoidable grounds 
(e.g. attending the sick relatives). Replacement was made to those who declined. The prevailing 
relationship with the conservation authorities was also seemingly to have motivated people to 
accept an invitation as they saw it as an opportunity for their voices to be heard. The sessions 
took place some two to four days after invitation was made. During the sessions the discussion 
was kept on track by asking a series of open-ended questions meant to stimulate discussion. 
Participants were encouraged to talk freely and anonymity was guaranteed. The discussion was 
tape recorded and transcribed after the session. Additionally, the field assistant jotted down the 
key points given during the discussion. The sessions lasted for one to two hours and were 
conducted in Kiswahili (the language spoken by majority of Tanzanians); (iii)Various key 
informants were frequently consulted for specific knowledge (Mikkelsen, 1995) and clarification 
of issues that emerged in the aforementioned methods. These involved community elders, local 
leaders, wildlife staff, Member of Parliament for Serengeti, and District officials; (iv) Personal 
observations were made through physical visiting of the specific areas of interest in and outside 
the PAs; (vi) Relevant official documents were accessed and used as a source of data.  
       Data collected were analysed with the help of the communities while content and structural – 
functional analysis techniques were used to analyse qualitative data and information. Components 
of verbal discussions were analysed in detail with the help of the content analysis method. In this 
way the recorded dialogues with respondents were broken down into small meaningful units of 
information or themes and tendencies. 
 
5.  RESULTS 
(a) Commitment to CC 
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A balance – in terms of priority accorded in allocating resources - between the CC and law 
enforcement (as conservation strategies) and perceptions among the wildlife staff were used to 
assess the commitment to CC approaches.  
 
(i) A balance between community conservation and law enforcement 
        The view that CC and law enforcement are “the right and left hands of one management 
strategy with CC providing incentives for conservation-friendly behavior and law enforcement 
providing disincentives for illegal activities” Bergin (2001, p. 103) is barely reflected in pursuing 
conservation work in Serengeti. Despite an increasing verbalization of CC as a viable conservation 
strategy and as an alternative to the “fences and fines” approach, too much weight is being placed on 
law enforcement. This makes the rationale for CC somehow redundant. The 1994 upgrading of 
Kijereshi, Ikorongo and Grumeti Game Controlled Areas to Game Reserves, which culminated in 
forceful evictions in the year 2000, and the change of ownership of the hunting blocks in 2002 also 
reinforced the emphasis on law enforcement. The new leaseholder (Grumeti Reserves Fund Ltd.) 
boosted security and started a close cooperation with Local Village Game Scouts and Bunda Anti-
Poaching Unit. Moreover, they also invested heavily in anti-poaching training and equipment6. 
Further, SNP’s organization structure, budget allocation and investment law enforcement department 
receives compared to other departments give an impression that law enforcement is not only 
superior, but also the heart of conservation. The law enforcement Warden automatically becomes the 
Deputy Park Warden and more resources (in terms of equipment, infrastructure and funds) are 
allocated to the department compared to CC Department (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of investments in community conservation and law enforcement 
departments in Serengeti National Park in 2004 
Department No. of staff No. of 
centres/posts 
No. of 
vehicles 
Total budget allocated: 
1999-2004 (in US$) 
CCS 8 6 4 361 000 
Law enforcement  172 18 21 862  000 
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 Source: SNP – Law enforcement and community conservation service annual reports 
 
       In addition to lion’s share in operational budgets, support to conservation by donor agencies has 
traditionally been biased towards the law enforcement department, mainly through provision of 
uniforms, vehicles and other equipment and field gears. At the conservation stakeholders meeting 
held at Robanda village on 16 September 2003, communities criticised Frankfurt Zoological Society 
(an international conservation/donor organisation) for this bias. One villager claimed, “Frankfurt is 
repeatedly donating new vehicles and guns to the park as if there is a war to fight”. Communities felt 
that part of the huge funds that SNP and donor agencies commit to anti-poaching activities could be 
used to supplement the minimal benefits they receive through CCS if they (the communities) were 
expected to support conservation. In other study villages, CCS department was frequently blamed 
for making false promises. For instance, in Park Nyigoti, Serengeti, villagers stated that they were 
told to build houses and grow vegetables on promise that TANAPA/SNP would give them the 
improved goat breeds and find a market for the vegetables, respectively. However, they were not 
seen to date. 
 
(ii) Acceptance of the CC initiative among the wildlife staff  
       Discussion with the wildlife staff revealed differing views regarding the efficacy of benefit-
based approaches. The proponents claimed to have realized “huge success” in terms of change of 
people’s attitudes and increased local support for conservation. However, they lack sufficient 
explanation on why do the managers still invest heavily in the expensive and disputed “fences and 
fines” approach if their claims are genuine. The other camp emphasises on continuation of the 
militaristic approach, accusing CC for diluting the conservation agenda. In an interview, one senior 
officer stationed in the area described CC as “mere politics” implying that it was unrealistic and 
unachievable. He felt that the approach was defeating rather than promoting conservation, as the 
local communities, deliberately or unknowingly, misunderstood the approach as a “permission to 
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violate the law.”  The officer argued further that some local people thought that CC was adopted to 
provide them with immunity if and when found hunting illegally.   
       Showing obvious prejudice - a sign of disapproving the approaches- another officer described 
the local communities as stubborn, arrogant and conservative. He stated explicitly that, “criminals 
are never changed by rewards, but severe punishments.” These perceptions give the impression that 
either the wildlife officers were inadequately prepared to implement the new conservation policies or 
that, even after 18 years of implementing CC, they still see no light at the end of the tunnel - a 
scenario suggesting performance snags and a slim chance of having CC objectives achieved. Local 
communities also see strict law enforcement to be more effective tool in conservation. Those who 
held this view were twice the number of those who called for improved benefits and increased legal 
supply of the game meat (see also Kaltenborn et al, 2003).  
 
(b) Nature and distribution of the CC benefits  
       Currently, the benefits accruing to local communities in the western Serengeti are mainly 
communal benefits with much emphasis on infrastructure development through construction of 
roads, classrooms and dispensaries. Experience has, however, shown that people are motivated to 
participate in conservation activities - both by doing and refraining from illegal activities – not 
only by accessing communal benefits, but mainly by enjoying them at individual and household 
level (Madzudzo, 1997; Songorwa, 2004). This is because most conservation-induced costs (such 
as property damage and opportunity costs) are borne and felt by individuals and their households 
rather than the entire community. Essentially communal benefits undermine people’s short-term 
needs and create a loophole for free riders as they barely address the question of “who pays for, 
and who benefits from wildlife resource”. In some cases, household poverty or/and exclusion of 
the village from the programme may sanction people from accessing the benefits. 
 
(i) Short-term (felt) needs and nonpecuniary benefits 
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       Generally, the villagers criticised the communal benefits for failure to address their actual 
(short-term) needs and priorities. For them, food support during the periods of shortage carried 
more weight than classrooms7 as one villager expounded, “Even if the classrooms are as decent 
as a Ikulu (State House), children cannot concentrate with their studies on empty stomachs.” 
Another villager noted that, “neither a classroom nor a tarmac road can substitute for lost pasture, 
firewood and medicinal plants.” One warden claimed that when crop harvests fail illegal hunting 
increases.  
       More criticism was leveled at wildlife related benefits for failing to address the socio-cultural 
costs induced by wildlife conservation. The tribes of western Serengeti consider hunting as 
important part of their culture and a way of coming into contact with the spirits of animals (also 
see Kaltenborn et al, 2005). A successful hunter earns status from the community. The non-food 
parts of hunted animals have various uses such as medicinal, protective against sorcerer’s magic, 
and used during the spiritual events. Likewise, the sacred groves and ancestral burial sites within 
the gazetted areas are critical for religious deity. These forfeited nonpecuniary values are barely 
observed and compensated accordingly. 
 
(ii) The problem of free riders  
       The problem of free riders or cheaters (actors who take more than their fair share of the 
benefits or do not shoulder their fair share of the costs of a resource) is evident in Serengeti. This 
is because of non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature exhibited by communal benefits8. The 
villagers in the study area were concerned that some individuals/households were being 
overtaxed through wildlife-related costs, while others were only minimally affected. By virtue of 
their behaviours or positions they held in a society (e.g. leadership) some people were gaining 
substantially.  Lack of mechanisms that guarantee a fair compensation and reward for good 
individual behaviours gives the victims, non-victims and culprits an equal access to communal 
benefits - a scenario that may reduce the intended impact of the benefits in checking people’s 
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unsustainable behaviours (see Hardin, 1968). Citing the weakness of communal benefits, an elder 
in Mariwanda village, Bunda District, wondered how can one stop a poacher from walking on the 
road or deny his son from sitting in a classroom donated by SNP? 
       Sometimes the benefits reach neither the victims nor the intended beneficiaries. The then 
Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism verified this when she was responding to a question 
in the parliament on 28 July 2005 about compensation for wildlife-related costs9. She criticised 
the district councils for using their 25% share of revenues from tourist hunting for (paying) sitting 
allowances instead of directing it to target communities. Even if some of this money gets to the 
communities, all villages in the district are rewarded equally regardless of the costs they incur. 
The communities therefore fail to differentiate between the conservation-related benefits and 
other handouts given by the government. One village chairman complained that there were some 
villages that reap the benefits though they do not even know how an elephant look like, leave 
alone the havoc it wrecks on people. 
 
(iii) Failure to access the benefits due to poverty 
       Discussion with villagers revealed that poverty restricts the poor households from accessing 
some wildlife-related benefits. For example, in Mariwanda village, Bunda district, some villagers 
could not access the medical services from the dispensary constructed by TANAPA due to 
government’s cost sharing policy which required each villager to contribute some US$ 10 per 
year. This defeats the objective of the initiative i.e. inspiring local support to conservation.  
         Impact of poverty on restricting access to benefits was also expressed in SRCP’s game 
cropping scheme and TANAPA’s support in construction of secondary school. Although the 
game meat was cheap compared to beef, some villagers still felt that they could hardly afford 
buying it due to low income. Regarding support to education sector, it was stated that despite 
knowing its value some people could not benefit fully from it. One of the village officials in Park 
Nyigoti, Serengeti district, described construction of secondary schools in some of the wards as 
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being “an expensive benefit.” He clarified that, by increasing the chances for primary school 
leavers to join secondary schools, the parents were compelled to pay for school fees, buying 
uniforms and meeting other requirements. For poor parents, access to this benefit may be limited. 
According to the villagers, sometimes money to buy these requirements had to be obtained 
through illegal hunting, signifying that this form of benefits was encouraging rather than halting 
illegal activities. In the literature it is generally agreed that poaching is driven mainly by poverty 
and the need to increase food availability and economic income. Loibooki et al (2002) for 
instance reported from Serengeti that income poverty was the main reason for illegal hunting. 
Kaltenborn et al (2005) also documented that poverty is the main driver behind illegal hunting, 
but also argues that hunting fulfils other social-cultural needs.  
 
(iv) Exclusion and inequitable distribution 
       Despite the fact that wildlife-related benefits are too low and often erratic, some degree of 
support to conservation activities among the participating villages was apparent. Village Game 
Scouts (VGS) in these villages assisted in controlling illegal activities, mainly poaching. But, 
SRCP’s game ‘cropping’ scheme in Western Serengeti has been operating in 14 pilot villages 
only. This is just a fraction of the villages which have a stake in the wildlife especially those that 
produce illegal hunters. Records from TANAPA and SRCP itself indicate that poachers hail from 
126 villages. 
       This small-scale of operation has made non-participating villages (hereafter non-SRCP) see 
the SRCP’s initiative of ‘including few villages while excluding the majority’ as a ‘double 
standard’ and as a way of reinforcing the unpopular “fences and fines” approach. They question 
the criteria used to leave them out since, wildlife being a fugitive resource, is also costly to them. 
They interpreted the initiative as a government strategy of suppressing their interests through 
contracting the few villages to implement “the fences and fines” approach. At Park Nyigoti 
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village, Serengeti district, an elderly man equated this to colonial systems of “divide and rule” or 
“indirect rule10.”  
       The SRCP project has created tensions between the SRCP and non-SRCP villages. The 
SRCP villages are regarded as “betrayers” and this has inspired revenge in response to arrests 
made by VGS to illegal hunters from non-SRCP villages. For example, in 1999 and 2001 two 
VGS from Iharara and Hunyari villages, in Bunda district, were reportedly killed by poachers 
suspected to have come from non-SRCP villages. Another incident was that of setting ablaze a 
house belonging to Kihumbu Village Natural Resource Committee chairman in 2000. Even 
within the villages participating in SRCP, access to or distribution of the benefits among 
households had been under constant criticism. The village government officials and village 
wildlife management committee members were accused for using their positions to earn lion’s 
share from wildlife-related benefits. This explains why election campaigns to win these posts are 
big events prompting use of money and other assets (e.g. livestock) to “buy votes.” 
 
(c) Amounts of the benefits granted 
By virtue of being too minimal the benefits are unable to offset the costs and compete effectively 
with land uses considered to be ecologically damaging. 
 
(i) Inability to offset the wildlife-induced costs 
       It was learned during the village meetings, focus group and key informant discussions that 
the wildlife granted benefits were too minimal to offset the wildlife-related costs. The costs were 
said to be increasing. These observations were confirmed by the Serengeti District Game Officer 
who attributed them to the newly created Game Reserves around SNP. According to him, the 
improved habitats, effective protection and, therefore increased wildlife populations and their 
proximity to people and their properties have exacerbated the problem of crop damage within the 
past 3-4 years. Assessment on crop damage conducted by his Office between November 2003 
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and January 2004 revealed that about 192.3 ha of food crops (406.6 tonnes) belonging to 407 
households in the district were destroyed.  
       Using the crop prices in the local market in Mugumu town (the district headquarters), the 
above loss is equivalent to about US$210,000 (an average of US$516 per household). The 
wildlife-related benefits have remained more or less the same as estimated by Emerton and 
Mfunda (1999) i.e. US$2.5 per household per annum.  Further, since these benefits are earned 
indirectly through implementation of development projects, the communities barely feel their 
impact as being fairly compensated. 
 
(ii) Inability to compete with other land uses 
       During this study it was apparent that the local communities were unwilling to abstain from 
ecologically damaging activities, which they perceived to be economically profitable. For 
example, rumours that the government had a plan to relocate Nyatwali villagers in Bunda district 
as a measure of safeguarding the wildlife migratory route from SNP to Lake Victoria caused 
panic to villagers. They stated bluntly that they would use any weapon at their disposal to resent 
the plans.  The lake is the reliable source of water for wildlife during the dry season. The 
possibility of being compensated (if the government was willing) was ruled out on grounds that 
the actual benefits could not surpass the opportunity cost that would result from foregoing the 
profitable fishing activity. In Hunyari Ward, in the same district, SNP’s donation of two 
classrooms and SRCP hunting scheme were slated as unrealistic compensation for the lost pasture 
and water (following creation of Grumeti Game Reserve). The Secretary of the Pastoralists stated 
that:  
“This is a joke! A classroom and two kilogrammes of bush meat we buy from SRCP per 
year cannot match up to loss of pasture and water sustaining some 70 000 cattle. Nor 
could they (classroom and meat) be able to restore our dignity, which is overtly being 
abused by game rangers when they arrest us inside the reserve. What is the use of school 
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if it means loss of cattle giving us food, clothes and school requirements for children who 
are intended to attend to this school?” 
An officer from SRCP admitted that conservation efforts were constrained by failure of the 
current benefits to offset the costs of alternative land uses and expressed scepticism about 
possibility of rectifying the situation.  
       Literature also demonstrates failure of wildlife conservation in Serengeti to offer competitive 
advantage over alternative land uses. For example, an economic value of illegal hunting in 
Western Serengeti is 45 times greater than that derived from the SRCP ‘cropping’ scheme 
(Holmern et al, 2002). In the group ranches adjacent to Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve, 
the lower value of wildlife-based tourism with limited agriculture compared to full-fledged 
agriculture and ranching (Norton-Griffiths, 1995) inspired the landowners to develop the latter. 
The consequence has been a destruction of core breeding and calving grounds for wildebeest - a 
situation that has caused a decline of resident population by 81% - from 119,000 in 1977 to only 
22,000 in 1997 (Ottichilo et al, 2001). 
 
(c) Roles, personality, interests and powers of ‘other stakeholders’ 
       During the course of this study it became evident that confusion over roles and 
responsibilities, poor personality of civil servants working in institutions supported by 
conservation agencies and stakeholders seeking to meet their interests on ‘non-transparent deals’ 
may undermine the good intentions of CC programmes. 
 
(i) Confusion over roles and responsibilities 
       It became evident at the community meetings that at times wildlife-related benefits flowing 
to the villages are perceived to be initiated by local politicians. This may diminish the role these 
benefits are expected to achieve i.e. enticing conservation objectives. For example, at Bonchugu, 
Serengeti district, villagers vehemently disagreed with their fellow villager who cited a borehole 
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as one of the benefits that the village had received from TANAPA/SNP. They attributed the 
benefit to their Member of Parliament (MP) on argument that, even if TANAPA had sponsored 
the borehole by 100%, this would have not been possible without the MP’s efforts. To some 
extent TANAPA itself was to be blamed. It appeared only at the stage of implementation i.e. 
benefit provision. TANAPA staff never sat down with the villagers to prioritise their needs, plan 
and design the project.  This, therefore, gave credit to the MP while TANAPA remained 
unpopular. 
 
(ii) Poor personality 
The conservation agencies providing communal benefits have no mandate over the officers or 
civil servants working in sectors or institutions they support. After completion of the project (e.g. 
school, dispensary) the conservation agency hands it to local or central government. Sometimes 
the government officers working in “supported institutions” may become irresponsible, and thus 
diminish the communities’ appreciation to conservation initiatives. For instance, in Mariwanda 
village, Bunda district, villagers accused the medical personnel (in the dispensary constructed by 
TANAPA) of arrogance, using abusive language to the patients, bribery, pilferage of medicines 
and vacating offices during working hours.  Because of this behaviour, it was said that sometimes 
the patients opted to remain at home or consult the traditional healers rather than reporting to 
dispensary. 
 
(ii) Interference from ‘powerful’ stakeholders 
       By virtue of being economically powerful, one of the stakeholders was accused of being 
arrogant and assuming superiority over other stakeholders. This was said to jeopardise the flow of 
direct benefits to the villagers. The stakeholder (Grumeti Reserves Fund Ltd) started by stopping 
trophy hunting in the area. Later it went on and stopped resident hunting conducted through the 
District Council. The next step aimed at community hunting conducted through SRCP. The 
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company defended this intervention by arguing that it was meant to allow recovery of the resident 
wildlife populations since there was not enough wildlife left in the area. This intervention and the 
conduct of law enforcement are, however, contradictory to the interests of the project and the 
communities.  
       The disbursement of funds to SRCP for 2004 hunting season was coincidentally delayed and 
thus hunting did not take place. Some key informants claimed that, VIP Safari Club took 
advantage of the delay, colluded with some village leaders and prepared minutes of village 
meetings, which were never convened. The fake minutes showed that the villagers had agreed on 
receiving payment of some TAS 1.8 million (US$ 1,800) as compensation for their hunting 
quotas. A representative of the company reported, however, that there was a negotiation, the 
claims that were strongly refuted by the villagers who maintained their dislike over the decision 
of selling the quota.   
       On 16 June 2005 a representative of the investor reported that the communities get many 
tangible benefits. He mentioned supply of books to schools, provision of scholarships, a drilling 
rig, health, self-help projects e.g. brick burning and slate making, creation of jobs (about 3,000 
villagers are employed as casual labourers at the hotel construction work), purchase of vegetables 
from local farmers, etc.  However, the villagers still felt that community hunting gave them more 
direct benefits than the money that would result from selling their quotas to VIP11.  
       In Nyichoka village, Serengeti district, Grumeti Reserves Fund Ltd was implicated in 
“buying” the village government and Village Natural Resource Committee leaders in order to 
protect its interests, i.e. control of village land, which is rich in wildlife12. The area was the only 
reliable pastureland for the village. Further to supporting the village leaders materially, the 
investor was also accused of financing village election campaigns for the sake of ensuring that 
“his men” remained in office. 
       Some villagers urged the government to give its position over Grumeti Reserve Funds Ltd, as 
the company seemed to over-power the government. The general (mis)conception was that the 
 24
investor had bought all wildlife in the area. Some villagers went further by speculating that this 
was an indicator of gross corruption characterizing the higher government circles. This seemed to 
exacerbate cynicism over the Wildlife Division’s intention to create Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs). The villagers wondered how the communities (being politically, economically, and 
legally weak) could manage to halt the unacceptable behavior of the investor if the government 
cannot. 
       The midterm review report for SRCP’s Phase III (2002-2006) also accuses the company for 
undermining the intention of the project.  It concludes by pointing out that, “Villagers are agitated 
about the fact that an investor ‘VIP’ has already acquired a large tract of land and intends to 
acquire more land (including the intended site for Serengeti National Park Headquarters at Fort 
Ikoma). And thus furthermore non-transparent ‘deals’ seem to be underway for VIP to buy up all 
villagers’ hunting quotas” (Bryceson et al., 2005, p. 107).  Regarding the issue of SNP 
headquarters at Fort Ikoma and the neighbouring Robanda village, the representative of the 
investor argued that the company was willing to compensate the park and every family at 
Robanda and build them new homes somewhere else as their houses/offices were located on the 
migratory routes. He also revealed the company’s plans of paying lease for the land occupied 
currently by Robanda village. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
(a) Has benefit based approach saved wildlife in Serengeti?  
       Based on the CCS and SRCP objectives, one would have expected that adoption of benefit-
based approaches would have led to improved local livelihoods, a significant decrease in the 
hostility characterizing the “fences-and-fines” approach and thus, inspire local support to 
conservation. However, the dilemmas discussed above have rendered this desire unrealistic.       
       Continuation of punitive and exclusive policies, with inadequate attention to CC approaches, 
has continued to undermine local livelihoods and, therefore, inspire hostility and opposition 
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towards conservation as a way of forcing opportunities for increased access to land and wildlife 
resources. The worst scenarios of this were serious wounding of a Game Scout in Magu District 
on 28 July 2001 followed by killing of the District Game Officer on 15 July 2002 - events 
associated with local protest against relocations from Kijereshi Game Reserve13. 
       However, one obvious fact is that enlarged effective conservation areas (Ikorongo, Grumeti 
and Kijereshi Game Reserves) had led to increased wildlife populations, a situation that can be 
cited as achievement in conservation. However, this has negative social and economic 
connotations to local communities who stand to suffer more from property damage and wildlife-
related accidents, which raises questions on the social responsibility of protected areas managers. 
A similar scenario unfolded around Kenya’s Amboseli National Park. Western (1998, p. 1507) 
described increased conflict between elephants and Maasai tribesmen as a result of “the very 
success of local community involvement beginning in the 1970s.” He verified the success by an 
increase of elephants from 480 to nearly 950. Sadly, human deaths from elephant attack rose 
from nine a year to over 40 (Western, 1998). Likewise, in the western Serengeti elephant 
populations have increased sharply from only 500 in 1986 to over 2000 in 2003 (Walpole, 2004). 
This has exacerbated human-elephant conflicts, largely due to increasing cultivation close to the 
boundaries of the protected areas and greater security in the Game Reserves that has resulted in 
greater incursions of elephants into settled and cultivated area. Crop raiding is a serious issue in 
both districts bordering the Game Reserves, since there currently exist no effective deterrent. An 
increased human-elephant interaction level has also resulted into increase of the number of deaths 
and injuries. 
        Currently there is no evidence to associate the benefit-based approaches with a decrease in 
illegal hunting (see also Loibooki et al., 2002). One villager from Mariwanda argues that, “If at 
all poaching has diminished in this area, it is not because of the benefits from CCS and SRCP, 
but rather because of more ‘soldiers’, more cars, and a helicopter all of which patrol over here 
every day.” Between 2001 and 2003 a total of 1931 poachers were apprehended originating from 
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126 villages in six districts in Western Serengeti (an average of 15 poachers per village). 
Bonchugu and Machochwe villages had the highest numbers of apprehended poachers viz. 135 
and 105, respectively, despite accessing the benefits through CCS14. Holmern et al. (2004) also 
reported high rate of illegal hunting among SRCP households than households outside SRCP 
although annual number of animals per hunter was much higher for the latter than former.   
       There is a general consensus that distribution of game meat from SRCP hunting scheme is 
both unfeasible and uneconomical option. Holmern et al. (2002) recommended that the scheme 
should be discarded, a recommendation that the Director of Wildlife supported when he was 
quoted by Lwezaula (2001, p. 26) saying, “the idea of spoon-feeding villagers with game meat as 
part of community-based conservation did not, unfortunately, attain the expected results.” 
 
(b) Can benefit-based approaches save wildlife in Serengeti? 
        In the research based literature there is reasonable consensus around certain conditions - 
which must occur together in order to have returns from wildlife conservation which exceed the 
alternative land use options. These include (1) areas with very poor or marginal lands - poor soils, 
erratic rainfall – and, therefore, rare crop surpluses (Child, 1996; Little, 1994; Murphree, 1996);  
(2) large tracts of uninhabited and uncultivated land, large wildlife populations and only small 
human populations (Murphree, 1996); (3) less stratified human population economically with 
strong intra- and inter-community linkages where conflicts are minimal (Songorwa et al., 2000); 
and (4) where easy market for wildlife products and service is guaranteed (Songorwa et al., 
2000). In Western Serengeti, these conditions are either lacking and/or inadequate. The wildlife 
resource, therefore, cannot meet the criteria that inspire communities’ support to sustainable 
resource management. De Merode et al. (2003) outline these criteria as: (1) the resource must 
have a sufficient value;  (2) the proceeds must be well enough distributed (see also Madzudo, 
1997; Gillingham and Lee, 1999); and (3) future access and control must be sufficiently well 
guaranteed.  
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       Even if the first two criteria above can be met (although it has proved to be difficult), the 
donor dependency syndrome and vulnerability of the tourism industry may thwart the third 
criterion. Generally, the benefit-based approach in Africa is mainly sustained through external 
funding (IIED, 1994) and photographic and sport hunting tourism. Experience shows that most of 
the donor funded projects are vulnerable to collapse as the host governments or departments are 
either unwilling or incapable of running them after the donors pullout (Barrett and Arcese 1995; 
Songorwa 2004; Songorwa et al., 2000). For example, the Tanzanian government has shown 
reluctance in taking over responsibilities of sustaining MBOMIPA and Selous Conservation 
Project (SCP) after donor pullout on grounds of inadequate financial capacity (Songorwa, 2004). 
       However, inadequate financial capacity does not seem to be the major constraint. 
Unwillingness and low commitment among the governments and its wildlife authorities seem to 
be promted by the fact that these initiatives are external demand with minimal inputs from within. 
The minutes for the 1994 annual national workshop for wildlife officers in Tanzania verify this: 
“Most of the Community Conservation projects in the country are donor initiated and funded. 
This approach is top-down and the local institutions…and communities are only passengers while 
the donors are doing steering” (URT 1994, p. 13). Neumann (1997, p. 559) shares this view as he 
argues, ”despite the emphasis on participation and benefit-sharing, many of the new projects 
replicate more coercive forms of conservation practice…”   
       As observed above, there is a potential risk associated with heavy reliance on donor funding 
for implementation of the CC projects. The benefits to communities are likely to be terminated in 
event of donor pullout. In the case of SRCP, funded by NORAD, there could be no miracle to 
exempt it from this scenario. In the period between 1998 and 2002, NORAD provided some US$ 
330,000 annually, but since then the amount has been decreasing gradually as the project is 
approaching to an end in 2006.  
        The tourism industry - another potential source of wildlife-related benefits to communities - 
is susceptible to factors such as political instability, economic hardship, international politics, 
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terrorism and even natural catastrophes. For example, in Zimbabwe, the land reform programme 
in 2000 that led to declining international image and deepening economic and political crisis had 
detrimental impacts on the tourism and wildlife sectors. Tourism revenues fell from US$ 700 
million in 1999 to US$ 71 million in 2003 and over 80% of its large game in private 
conservancies was poached (ZimConservation, 2004). In Tanzania, following bombing of 
American Embassy in Dar es Salaam travel agencies and tour companies reported a drastic drop 
of inquiries about holidaying with some clients who had already booked for safaris calling back 
to cancel the bookings (Anon., 1998).  Ecological factors such as diseases, drought, floods and 
other natural catastrophes may reduce (or even wipe out the entire population) of charismatic and 
suitable wildlife species for hunting (see e.g. EMERCSA, 2002; Morell, 1995; Harder et al, 
1995) and, therefore, reduce the revenues from game viewing and hunting industries. 
        Unpredictability of donors and tourism (as the principle sources of CC benefits) along with 
human population growth suggests that even if the benefits provided would lead to anticipated 
positive effects (instilling conservation-friendly behaviours), the situation may be temporary and 
unstable. The intended outcomes may be achieved initially, but as soon as the benefits are 
terminated or reduced people may inevitably revert to their unsustainable illegal hunting 
behaviours - the probable scenario being “no benefits no conservation.” Delay of disbursing 
funds to SRCP in 2004 (October instead of July) and the subsequent failure for community 
hunting illustrate this.  Some village leaders admitted to having allowed illegal hunting by 
suspending anti-poaching activities by village game scouts on grounds of observing humanity. 
They claimed that it was unethical and inhumane to prevent a starving person from getting food.  
       However, even if donor funding and tourism industry are to remain stable as potential 
sources of benefits, a share of the benefits to individuals and/or households may not remain the 
same due to factors such as demographic changes. The fact that the current benefits are already 
perceived to be insufficient to offset the wildlife-induced costs and opportunity costs of 
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conservation, the local communities may hardly understand and tolerate further reduction of these 
benefits.   
        
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
       As other African countries, Tanzania subscribed to CC in late 1980s and adopted the benefit-
based approach as a strategy of motivating the rural communities to align their behaviours with 
conservation goals. Unfortunately - as this study reveals - several factors seem to work against 
this desire. The benefits granted are barely adequate and equitable enough to motivate 
conservation-friendly behaviours. The ecological, social and economic factors of the area 
provides a dire chance for current returns from wildlife to outweigh those generated by 
alternative land uses which are ecologically destructive. The current benefits are heavily 
depending on donors and tourism – the sources that are unreliable. 
       In order to sustain the benefit-based approaches in Serengeti and realize the desired 
outcomes, the government has to resolve the seemingly critical and challenging issue of benefit 
provision with a view of ensuring that they are adequate, equitably distributed and replicated on a 
much larger scale. However, the emerging question is sustainability. Will the government be able 
to do this on its own in villages exceeding 100 if it could not do so in 14 villages? 
       The dilemmas characterizing benefit-based approaches in Serengeti prompts a conclusion 
that the current benefits are less effective in inspiring sustainable conservation behaviours. We 
recommend a more comprehensive and integrated study that will offer more innovative and 
effective options in view of making the CC initiatives more plausible. The options should seek to 
increase more opportunities that will divert the communities from heavy reliance on wildlife 
species and habitats for survival. For example, the benefits should be more realistic and lead to 
improvement of local people’s living standards at the household level.  
 
NOTES  
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1. The price for ivory rose from about US$ 5 in 1960 to US$ 52 in 1978 and up to US$ 300 in 1988 per 
kg (http://www.achimerfriendsofrhino.de). In 1980 a kg of rhino horn was worth US$1,000 
(EMERCSA 2002). 
2. For example, while the ideal staffing ratio for Game Reserves is 1:25 (persons:km2), in the year 2000, 
the ratio in Tanzania’s  Game Reserves was 1:125  (Severre 2000) and Cameroon’s Lobeke National 
Park was 1:200 (Koulagna Koutou 2001). Law enforcement was also seriously constrained by poor 
remuneration and under-equipment of the wildlife staff who had to patrol the large remote areas and 
face the poachers well-equipped with automatic weapons (see e.g. UNESCO 2001; Bonner 1993; 
Masilingi 1994).  
3. Some of these projects/programmes in Africa are Zimbabwe’s WINDFALL (Wildlife Industries New 
Development for All) and CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources), Burkina Faso’s NWUP (Nazinga Wildlife Utilisation Project) and Zambia’s ADMADE 
(Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas) and LIRDP (Luangwa Integrated 
Resource Development Project). These became the pioneer and flagship Community Conservation 
projects in Africa (IIED 1994). 
4. The term ’other stakeholders’ here refers to politicians, civil servants (other than wildlife staff)  and 
investors. 
5. MBOMIPA is Swahili acronym for “Matumizi Bora ya Malihai Idodi na Pawaga Divisions” which 
literally means, ”Project for Sustainable Use of Natural Resources in Idodi and Pawaga Divisions.” 
The project was operating around Ruaha National Park in Tanzania’s Southern tourist circuit. 
6. Since the Grumeti Reserves Fund Ltd bought hunting blocks inside the Game Reserves and in the 
Ikoma Open Area, it has increased the anti-poaching effort significantly. In the period between 2002 
and 2004 eighty Village Game Scouts (VGS) have undergone a six weeks training course in anti-
poaching techniques and over US$480 000 have been invested in anti-poaching equipment such as 
vehicles, VHF radios, handheld GPSs and night-vision binoculars (VIP 2004). 
7. Interview with anonymous key informants in Nyichoka village in Serengeti District, 21 July 2003. 
8. “Non-rivalrous goods” are goods whose benefits fail to exhibit consumption scarcity i.e. once 
produced, everyone can benefit from them without diminishing other's enjoyment e.g. roads, 
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classrooms. “ Non-excludable goods” – these are benefits which once created, it is very difficult or 
impossible to prevent access to the goods. 
9. The current wildlife policy (URT 1998) and legislation - the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 
1974 (URT 1974) – lack provision for compensation. The Bill seeking to replace this Act – A Draft 
Bill for the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2004 has also remained silent on this matter 
(URT 2003).  
10. “Divide and rule” is a system in which the colonial masters used to keep themselves in a position of 
power by causing disagreements among the Africans so that they are unable to question the power of 
the rulers.  Under “indirect rule” British colonial masters delegated some of their powers to local 
chiefs in order to reduce opposition to their policies. 
11. Interview with anonymous villagers in Nyichoka and Robanda villages, in Serengeti district, 15 & 17 
April 2005. 
12. It was alleged that the investor bribe the village leaders by building them the modern houses, giving 
them the radio calls, giving them transport and organising parties with them.  
13. A part of the letter (Ref: Kumb. Na. G.10/4/161) dated 18 September 2002 from Magu 
District Commissioner to Mwanza Regional Commissioner reads:  
“The assassination of the government officer has triggered a huge concern and a fear that 
the invaders (to Game Reserve) have defeated the government. It is on this ground that I 
am compelled to write you to request that a special operation to evict the invaders is 
conducted before cultivation season starts.” 
14. TANAPA reports: Illegal hunters arrested from 2001 to 2003. 
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Doctoral theses in Biology 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Biology 
Year Name Degree Title
 1974 Tor-Henning Iversen Dr. philos 
Botany 
The roles of statholiths, auxin transport, and auxin 
metabolism in root gravitropism 
 1978 Tore Slagsvold Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Breeding events of birds in relation to spring temperature 
and environmental phenology. 
 1978 Egil Sakshaug Dr.philos 
Botany 
"The influence of environmental factors on the chemical 
composition of cultivated and natural populations of 
marine phytoplankton" 
 1980 Arnfinn Langeland Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Interaction between fish and zooplankton populations 
and their effects on the material utilization in a 
freshwater lake. 
 1980 Helge Reinertsen Dr. philos 
Botany 
The effect of lake fertilization on the dynamics and 
stability of a limnetic ecosystem with special reference to 
the phytoplankton 
 1982 Gunn Mari Olsen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Gravitropism in roots of Pisum sativum and Arabidopsis 
thaliana
 1982 Dag Dolmen Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Life aspects of two sympartic species of newts (Triturus, 
Amphibia) in Norway, with special emphasis on their 
ecological niche segregation. 
 1984 Eivin Røskaft Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Sociobiological studies of the rook Corvus frugilegus.
 1984 Anne Margrethe 
Cameron 
Dr. scient 
Botany 
Effects of alcohol inhalation on levels of circulating 
testosterone, follicle stimulating hormone and luteinzing 
hormone in male mature rats 
 1984 Asbjørn Magne Nilsen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Alveolar macrophages from expectorates – Biological 
monitoring of workers exosed to occupational air 
pollution. An evaluation of the AM-test 
 1985 Jarle Mork Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Biochemical genetic studies in fish. 
 1985 John Solem Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Taxonomy, distribution and ecology of caddisflies 
(Trichoptera) in the Dovrefjell mountains. 
 1985 Randi E. Reinertsen Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Energy strategies in the cold: Metabolic and 
thermoregulatory adaptations in small northern birds. 
 1986 Bernt-Erik Sæther Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Ecological and evolutionary basis for variation in 
reproductive traits of some vertebrates: A comparative 
approach. 
 1986 Torleif Holthe Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Evolution, systematics, nomenclature, and zoogeography 
in the polychaete orders Oweniimorpha and 
Terebellomorpha, with special reference to the Arctic 
and Scandinavian fauna. 
 1987 Helene Lampe Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The function of bird song in mate attraction and 
territorial defence, and the importance of song 
repertoires. 
 1987 Olav Hogstad Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Winter survival strategies of the Willow tit Parus 
montanus.
 1987 Jarle Inge Holten Dr. philos 
Bothany 
Autecological investigations along a coust-inland 
transect at Nord-Møre, Central Norway 
 1987 Rita Kumar Dr. scient 
Botany 
Somaclonal variation in plants regenerated from cell 
cultures of Nicotiana sanderae and Chrysanthemum 
morifolium
 1987 Bjørn Åge Tømmerås Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Olfaction in bark beetle communities: Interspecific 
interactions in regulation of colonization density, 
predator - prey relationship and host attraction. 
 1988 Hans Christian 
Pedersen 
Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Reproductive behaviour in willow ptarmigan with 
special emphasis on territoriality and parental care. 
 1988 Tor G. Heggberget Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Reproduction in Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar): Aspects 
of spawning, incubation, early life history and population 
structure. 
 1988 Marianne V. Nielsen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The effects of selected environmental factors on carbon 
allocation/growth of larval and juvenile mussels (Mytilus
edulis).
 1988 Ole Kristian Berg Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The formation of landlocked Atlantic salmon (Salmo 
salar L.). 
 1989 John W. Jensen Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Crustacean plankton and fish during the first decade of 
the manmade Nesjø reservoir, with special emphasis on 
the effects of gill nets and salmonid growth. 
 1989 Helga J. Vivås Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Theoretical models of activity pattern and optimal 
foraging: Predictions for the Moose Alces alces.
 1989 Reidar Andersen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Interactions between a generalist herbivore, the moose 
Alces alces, and its winter food resources: a study of 
behavioural variation. 
 1989 Kurt Ingar Draget Dr. scient 
Botany 
Alginate gel media for plant tissue culture, 
 1990 Bengt Finstad Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Osmotic and ionic regulation in Atlantic salmon, 
rainbow trout and Arctic charr: Effect of temperature, 
salinity and season. 
 1990 Hege Johannesen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Respiration and temperature regulation in birds with 
special emphasis on the oxygen extraction by the lung. 
 1990 Åse Krøkje Dr. scient 
Botany 
The mutagenic load from air pollution at two work-
places with PAH-exposure measured with Ames 
Salmonella/microsome test 
 1990 Arne Johan Jensen Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Effects of water temperature on early life history, 
juvenile growth and prespawning migrations of Atlantic 
salmion (Salmo salar) and brown trout (Salmo trutta): A 
summary of studies in Norwegian streams. 
 1990 Tor Jørgen Almaas Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Pheromone reception in moths: Response characteristics 
of olfactory receptor neurons to intra- and interspecific 
chemical cues. 
 1990 Magne Husby Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Breeding strategies in birds: Experiments with the 
Magpie Pica pica.
 1991 Tor Kvam Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Population biology of the European lynx (Lynx lynx) in 
Norway. 
 1991 Jan Henning L'Abêe 
Lund 
Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Reproductive biology in freshwater fish, brown trout 
Salmo trutta and roach Rutilus rutilus in particular. 
 1991 Asbjørn Moen Dr. philos 
Botany 
The plant cover of the boreal uplands of Central Norway.
I. Vegetation ecology of Sølendet nature reserve; 
haymaking fens and birch woodlands 
 1991 Else Marie Løbersli Dr. scient 
Botany 
Soil acidification and metal uptake in plants 
 1991 Trond Nordtug Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Reflctometric studies of photomechanical adaptation in 
superposition eyes of arthropods. 
 1991 Thyra Solem Dr. scient 
Botany 
Age, origin and development of blanket mires in Central 
Norway 
 1991 Odd Terje Sandlund Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
The dynamics of habitat use in the salmonid genera 
Coregonus and Salvelinus: Ontogenic niche shifts and 
polymorphism. 
 1991 Nina Jonsson Dr. philos. Aspects of migration and spawning in salmonids. 
 1991 Atle Bones Dr. scient 
Botany 
Compartmentation and molecular properties of 
thioglucoside glucohydrolase (myrosinase) 
 1992 Torgrim Breiehagen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Mating behaviour and evolutionary aspects of the 
breeding system of two bird species: the Temminck's 
stint and the Pied flycatcher. 
 1992 Anne Kjersti Bakken Dr. scient 
Botany 
The influence of photoperiod on nitrate assimilation and 
nitrogen status in timothy (Phleum pratense L.) 
 1992 Tycho Anker-Nilssen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Food supply as a determinant of reproduction and 
population development in Norwegian Puffins 
Fratercula arctica
 1992 Bjørn Munro Jenssen Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Thermoregulation in aquatic birds in air and water: With 
special emphasis on the effects of crude oil, chemically 
treated oil and cleaning on the thermal balance of ducks. 
 1992 Arne Vollan Aarset Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
The ecophysiology of under-ice fauna: Osmotic 
regulation, low temperature tolerance and metabolism in 
polar crustaceans. 
 1993 Geir Slupphaug Dr. scient 
Botany 
Regulation and expression of uracil-DNA glycosylase 
and O6-methylguanine-DNA methyltransferase in 
mammalian cells 
 1993 Tor Fredrik Næsje Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Habitat shifts in coregonids. 
 1993 Yngvar Asbjørn Olsen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Cortisol dynamics in Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar L.: 
Basal and stressor-induced variations in plasma levels 
ans some secondary effects. 
 1993 Bård Pedersen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Theoretical studies of life history evolution in modular 
and clonal organisms 
 1993 Ole Petter Thangstad Dr. scient 
Botany 
Molecular studies of myrosinase in Brassicaceae 
 1993 Thrine L. M. 
Heggberget 
Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Reproductive strategy and feeding ecology of the 
Eurasian otter Lutra lutra.
 1993 Kjetil Bevanger Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Avian interactions with utility structures, a biological 
approach. 
 1993 Kåre Haugan Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Mutations in the replication control gene trfA of the 
broad host-range plasmid RK2 
 1994 Peder Fiske Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Sexual selection in the lekking great snipe (Gallinago 
media): Male mating success and female behaviour at the
lek. 
 1994 Kjell Inge Reitan Dr. scient 
Botany 
Nutritional effects of algae in first-feeding of marine fish 
larvae 
 1994 Nils Røv Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Breeding distribution, population status and regulation of 
breeding numbers in the northeast-Atlantic Great 
Cormorant Phalacrocorax carbo carbo.
 1994 Annette-Susanne 
Hoepfner 
Dr. scient 
Botany 
Tissue culture techniques in propagation and breeding of 
Red Raspberry (Rubus idaeus L.) 
 1994 Inga Elise Bruteig Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Distribution, ecology and biomonitoring studies of 
epiphytic lichens on conifers 
 1994 Geir Johnsen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Light harvesting and utilization in marine phytoplankton: 
Species-specific and photoadaptive responses 
 1994 Morten Bakken Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Infanticidal behaviour and reproductive performance in 
relation to competition capacity among farmed silver fox 
vixens, Vulpes vulpes.
 1994 Arne Moksnes Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Host adaptations towards brood parasitism by the 
Cockoo. 
 1994 Solveig Bakken Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Growth and nitrogen status in the moss Dicranum majus 
Sm. as influenced by nitrogen supply 
 1995 Olav Vadstein Dr. philos 
Botany 
The role of heterotrophic planktonic bacteria in the 
cycling of phosphorus in lakes: Phosphorus requirement, 
competitive ability and food web interactions. 
 1995 Hanne Christensen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Determinants of Otter Lutra lutra distribution in 
Norway: Effects of harvest, polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs), human population density and competition with 
mink Mustela vision.
 1995 Svein Håkon Lorentsen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Reproductive effort in the Antarctic Petrel Thalassoica 
antarctica; the effect of parental body size and condition.
 1995 Chris Jørgen Jensen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The surface electromyographic (EMG) amplitude as an 
estimate of upper trapezius muscle activity 
 1995 Martha Kold Bakkevig Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The impact of clothing textiles and construction in a 
clothing system on thermoregulatory responses, sweat 
accumulation and heat transport. 
 1995 Vidar Moen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Distribution patterns and adaptations to light in newly 
introduced populations of Mysis relicta and constraints 
on Cladoceran and Char populations. 
 1995 Hans Haavardsholm 
Blom 
Dr. philos 
Bothany 
A revision of the Schistidium apocarpum complex in 
Norway and Sweden. 
 1996 Jorun Skjærmo Dr. scient 
Botany 
Microbial ecology of early stages of cultivated marine 
fish; inpact fish-bacterial interactions on growth and 
survival of larvae. 
 1996 Ola Ugedal Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Radiocesium turnover in freshwater fishes 
 1996 Ingibjørg Einarsdottir Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Production of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) and Arctic 
charr (Salvelinus alpinus): A study of some 
physiological and immunological responses to rearing 
routines. 
 1996 Christina M. S. Pereira Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Glucose metabolism in salmonids: Dietary effects and 
hormonal regulation. 
 1996 Jan Fredrik Børseth Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The sodium energy gradients in muscle cells of Mytilus
edulis and the effects of organic xenobiotics. 
 1996 Gunnar Henriksen Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Status of Grey seal Halichoerus grypus and Harbour seal 
Phoca vitulina in the Barents sea region. 
 1997 Gunvor Øie Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Eevalution of rotifer Brachionus plicatilis quality in 
early first feeding of turbot Scophtalmus maximus L. 
larvae. 
 1997 Håkon Holien Dr. scient 
Botany 
Studies of lichens in spurce forest of Central Norway. 
Diversity, old growth species and the relationship to site 
and stand parameters. 
 1997 Ole Reitan  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Responses of birds to habitat disturbance due to 
damming. 
 1997 Jon Arne Grøttum  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Physiological effects of reduced water quality on fish in 
aquaculture. 
 1997 Per Gustav Thingstad  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Birds as indicators for studying natural and human-
induced variations in the environment, with special 
emphasis on the suitability of the Pied Flycatcher. 
 1997 Torgeir Nygård  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Temporal and spatial trends of pollutants in birds in 
Norway: Birds of prey and Willow Grouse used as 
Biomonitors. 
 1997 Signe Nybø  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Impacts of long-range transported air pollution on birds 
with particular reference to the dipper Cinclus cinclus in 
southern Norway. 
 1997 Atle Wibe  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Identification of conifer volatiles detected by receptor 
neurons in the pine weevil (Hylobius abietis), analysed 
by gas chromatography linked to electrophysiology and 
to mass spectrometry. 
 1997 Rolv Lundheim  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Adaptive and incidental biological ice nucleators.     
 1997 Arild Magne Landa Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Wolverines in Scandinavia: ecology, sheep depredation 
and conservation. 
 1997 Kåre Magne Nielsen Dr. scient 
Botany 
An evolution of possible horizontal gene transfer from 
plants to sail bacteria by studies of natural transformation 
in Acinetobacter calcoacetius.
 1997 Jarle Tufto  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Gene flow and genetic drift in geographically structured 
populations: Ecological, population genetic, and 
statistical models 
 1997 Trygve Hesthagen  Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Population responces of Arctic charr (Salvelinus alpinus 
(L.)) and brown trout (Salmo trutta L.) to acidification in 
Norwegian inland waters 
 1997 Trygve Sigholt  Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Control of  Parr-smolt transformation and seawater 
tolerance in farmed Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar)
Effects of photoperiod, temperature, gradual seawater 
acclimation, NaCl and betaine in the diet 
 1997 Jan Østnes  Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Cold sensation in adult and neonate birds 
 1998 Seethaledsumy 
Visvalingam 
Dr. scient 
Botany 
Influence of environmental factors on myrosinases and 
myrosinase-binding proteins. 
 1998 Thor Harald Ringsby Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Variation in space and time: The biology of a House 
sparrow metapopulation 
 1998 Erling Johan Solberg Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Variation in population dynamics and life history in a 
Norwegian moose (Alces alces) population: 
consequences of harvesting in a variable environment 
 1998 Sigurd Mjøen Saastad Dr. scient 
Botany 
Species delimitation and phylogenetic relationships 
between the Sphagnum recurvum complex (Bryophyta): 
genetic variation and phenotypic plasticity. 
 1998 Bjarte Mortensen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Metabolism of volatile organic chemicals (VOCs) in a 
head liver S9 vial  equilibration system in vitro. 
 1998 Gunnar Austrheim Dr. scient 
Botany 
Plant biodiversity and land use in subalpine grasslands. – 
A conservtaion biological approach. 
 1998 Bente Gunnveig Berg Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Encoding of pheromone information in two related moth 
species 
 1999 Kristian Overskaug Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Behavioural and morphological characteristics in 
Northern Tawny Owls Strix aluco: An intra- and 
interspecific comparative approach 
 1999 Hans Kristen Stenøien Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Genetic studies of evolutionary processes in various 
populations of nonvascular plants (mosses, liverworts 
and hornworts) 
 1999 Trond Arnesen Dr. scient 
Botany 
Vegetation dynamics following trampling and burning in 
the outlying haylands at Sølendet, Central Norway. 
 1999 Ingvar Stenberg Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Habitat selection, reproduction and survival in the 
White-backed Woodpecker Dendrocopos leucotos
 1999 Stein Olle Johansen Dr. scient 
Botany 
A study of driftwood dispersal to the Nordic Seas by 
dendrochronology and wood anatomical analysis. 
 1999 Trina Falck Galloway Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Muscle development and growth in early life stages of 
the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua L.) and Halibut 
(Hippoglossus hippoglossus L.) 
 1999 Torbjørn Forseth Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Bioenergetics in ecological and life history studies of 
fishes. 
 1999 Marianne Giæver Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Population genetic studies in three gadoid species: blue 
whiting (Micromisistius poutassou), haddock 
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) and cod (Gradus morhua)
in the North-East Atlantic 
 1999 Hans Martin Hanslin Dr. scient 
Botany 
The impact of environmental conditions of density 
dependent performance in the boreal forest bryophytes 
Dicranum majus, Hylocomium splendens, Plagiochila 
asplenigides, Ptilium crista-castrensis and 
Rhytidiadelphus lokeus.
 1999 Ingrid Bysveen 
Mjølnerød 
Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Aspects of population genetics, behaviour and 
performance of wild and farmed Atlantic salmon (Salmo 
salar) revealed by molecular genetic techniques 
 1999 Else Berit Skagen Dr. scient 
Botany 
The early regeneration process in protoplasts from 
Brassica napus hypocotyls cultivated under various g-
forces 
 1999 Stein-Are Sæther Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Mate choice, competition for mates, and conflicts of 
interest in the Lekking Great Snipe 
 1999 Katrine Wangen Rustad Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Modulation of glutamatergic neurotransmission related 
to cognitive dysfunctions and Alzheimer’s disease 
 1999 Per Terje Smiseth Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Social evolution in monogamous families: 
mate choice and conflicts over parental care in the 
Bluethroat (Luscinia s. svecica)
 1999 Gunnbjørn Bremset Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Young Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar L.) and Brown trout 
(Salmo trutta L.) inhabiting the deep pool habitat, with 
special reference to their habitat use, habitat preferences 
and competitive interactions 
 1999 Frode Ødegaard Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Host spesificity as parameter in estimates of arhrophod 
species richness 
 1999 Sonja Andersen Dr. scient 
Bothany 
Expressional and functional analyses of human, 
secretory phospholipase A2 
 2000 Ingrid Salvesen, I Dr. scient 
Botany 
Microbial ecology in early stages of marine fish: 
Development and evaluation of methods for microbial 
management in intensive larviculture 
 2000 Ingar Jostein Øien Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The Cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) and its host: adaptions 
and counteradaptions in a coevolutionary arms race 
2000 Pavlos Makridis Dr. scient 
Botany
Methods for the microbial econtrol of live food used for 
the rearing of marine fish larvae 
 2000 Sigbjørn Stokke Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Sexual segregation in the African elephant (Loxodonta 
africana)
 2000 Odd A. Gulseth Dr. philos. 
Zoology 
Seawater tolerance, migratory behaviour and growth of 
Charr, (Salvelinus alpinus), with emphasis on the high 
Arctic Dieset charr on Spitsbergen, Svalbard 
 2000 Pål A. Olsvik Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Biochemical impacts of Cd, Cu and Zn on brown trout 
(Salmo trutta) in two mining-contaminated rivers in 
Central Norway 
 2000 Sigurd Einum Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Maternal effects in fish: Implications for the evolution of 
breeding time and egg size 
 2001 Jan Ove Evjemo Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Production and nutritional adaptation of the brine shrimp 
Artemia sp. as live food organism for larvae of marine 
cold water fish species 
 2001 Olga Hilmo Dr. scient 
Botany 
Lichen response to environmental changes in the 
managed boreal forset systems 
 2001 Ingebrigt Uglem Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Male dimorphism and reproductive biology in corkwing 
wrasse (Symphodus melops L.)
 2001 Bård Gunnar Stokke Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Coevolutionary adaptations in avian brood parasites and 
their hosts 
 2002 Ronny Aanes Dr. scient Spatio-temporal dynamics in Svalbard reindeer (Rangifer 
tarandus platyrhynchus)
 2002 Mariann Sandsund Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
Exercise- and cold-induced asthma. Respiratory and 
thermoregulatory responses 
 2002 Dag-Inge Øien Dr. scient 
Botany 
Dynamics of plant communities and populations in 
boreal vegetation influenced by scything at Sølendet, 
Central Norway 
 2002 Frank Rosell Dr. scient. 
Zoology 
The function of scent marking in beaver (Castor fiber)
 2002 Janne Østvang Dr. scient 
Botany 
The Role and Regulation of Phospholipase A2 in 
Monocytes During Atherosclerosis Development 
 2002 Terje Thun Dr. philos 
Biology 
Dendrochronological constructions of Norwegian conifer 
chronologies providing dating of historical material 
 2002 Birgit Hafjeld Borgen Dr. scient 
Biology 
Functional analysis of plant idioblasts (Myrosin cells) 
and their role in defense, development and growth 
 2002 Bård Øyvind Solberg Dr. scient 
Biology 
Effects of climatic change on the growth of dominating 
tree species along major environmental gradients 
 2002 Per Winge Dr. scient 
Biology 
The evolution of small GTP binding proteins in cellular 
organisms.  Studies of RAC GTPases in Arabidopsis 
thaliana and 
 2002 Henrik Jensen Dr. scient 
Biology 
Causes and consequenses of individual variation in 
fitness-related traits in house sparrows 
 2003 Jens Rohloff Dr. philos 
Biology 
Cultivation of herbs and medicinal plants in Norway – 
Essential oil production and quality control 
 2003 Åsa Maria O. Espmark 
Wibe 
Dr. scient 
Biology 
Behavioural effects of environmental pollution in 
threespine stickleback Gasterosteus aculeatur L.
 2003 Dagmar Hagen Dr. scient 
Biology 
Assisted recovery of disturbed arctic and alpine 
vegetation – an integrated approach 
 2003 Bjørn Dahle Dr. scient 
Biology 
Reproductive strategies in Scandinavian brown bears 
 2003 Cyril Lebogang Taolo Dr. scient 
Biology 
Population ecology, seasonal movement and habitat use 
of the African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) in Chobe 
National Park, Botswana 
 2003 Marit Stranden Dr.scient 
Biology 
Olfactory receptor neurones specified for the same 
odorants in three related Heliothine species (Helicoverpa 
armigera, Helicoverpa assulta and Heliothis virescens)
 2003 Kristian Hassel Dr.scient 
Biology 
Life history characteristics and genetic variation in an 
expanding species, Pogonatum dentatum 
 2003 David Alexander Rae Dr.scient 
Biology 
Plant- and invertebrate-community responses to species 
interaction and microclimatic gradients in alpine and 
Artic environments 
 2003 Åsa A Borg Dr.scient 
Biology 
Sex roles and reproductive behaviour in gobies and 
guppies: a female perspective 
 2003 Eldar Åsgard Bendiksen Dr.scient 
Biology 
Environmental effects on lipid nutrition of farmed 
Atlantic salmon (Salmo Salar L.) parr and smolt 
 2004 Torkild Bakken Dr.scient 
Biology 
A revision of Nereidinae (Polychaeta, Nereididae) 
 2004 Ingar Pareliussen Dr.scient 
Biology 
Natural and Experimental Tree Establishment in a 
Fragmented Forest, Ambohitantely Forest Reserve, 
Madagascar 
 2004 Tore Brembu Dr.scient 
Biology 
Genetic, molecular and functional studies of RAC 
GTPases and the WAVE-like regulatory protein complex 
in Arabidopsis thaliana 
 2004 Liv S. Nilsen Dr.scient 
Biology 
Coastal heath vegetation on central Norway; recent past, 
present state and future possibilities 
 2004 Hanne T. Skiri Dr.scient 
Biology 
Olfactory coding and olfactory learning of plant odours 
in heliothine moths. An anatomical, physiological and 
behavioural study of three related species (Heliothis 
virescens, Helicoverpa armigera and Helicoverpa 
assulta).
 2004 Lene Østby Dr.scient 
Biology 
Cytochrome P4501A (CYP1A) induction and DNA 
adducts as biomarkers for organic pollution in the natural 
environment 
 2004 Emmanuel J. Gerreta Dr. philos 
Biology 
The Importance of Water Quality and Quantity in the 
Tropical Ecosystems, Tanzania 
 2004 Linda Dalen Dr.scient 
Biology 
Dynamics of Mountain Birch Treelines in the Scandes 
Mountain Chain, and Effects of Climate Warming 
 2004 Lisbeth Mehli Dr.scient 
Biology 
Polygalacturonase-inhibiting protein (PGIP) in cultivated 
strawberry (Fragaria x ananassa): characterisation and 
induction of the gene following fruit infection by 
Botrytis cinerea 
 2004 Børge Moe Dr.scient 
Biology 
Energy-Allocation in Avian Nestlings Facing Short-
Term Food Shortage 
 2005 Matilde Skogen 
Chauton 
Dr.scient 
Biology 
Metabolic profiling and species discrimination from 
High-Resolution Magic Angle Spinning NMR analysis 
of whole-cell samples 
 2005 Sten Karlsson Dr.scient 
Biology 
Dynamics of Genetic Polymorphisms 
 2005 Terje Bongard Dr.scient 
Biology 
Life History strategies, mate choice, and parental 
investment among Norwegians over a 300-year period 
 2005 Tonette Røstelien PhD 
Biology 
Functional characterisation of olfactory receptor neurone 
types in heliothine moths 
 2005 Erlend Kristiansen Dr.scient 
Biology 
Studies on antifreeze proteins 
 2005 Eugen G. Sørmo Dr.scient 
Biology 
Organochlorine pollutants in grey seal (Halichoerus 
grypus) pups and their impact on plasma thyrid hormone 
and vitamin A concentrations. 
 2005 Christian Westad Dr.scient 
Biology 
Motor control of the upper trapezius 
 2005 Lasse Mork Olsen PhD 
Biology 
Interactions between marine osmo- and phagotrophs in 
different physicochemical environments 
 2005 Åslaug Viken PhD 
Biology 
Implications of mate choice for the management of small 
populations 
 2005 Ariaya Hymete Sahle 
Dingle 
PhD 
Biology 
Investigation of the biological activities and chemical 
constituents of selected Echinops spp. growing in 
Ethiopia 
 2005 Ander Gravbrøt Finstad PhD 
Biology 
Salmonid fishes in a changing climate: The winter 
challenge 
 2005 Shimane Washington 
Makabu 
PhD 
Biology 
Interactions between woody plants, elephants and other 
browsers in the Chobe Riverfront, Botswana 
 2005 Kjartan Østbye Dr.scient 
Biology 
The European whitefish Coregonus lavaretus (L.) 
species complex: historical contingency and adaptive 
radiation 
 2006 Kari Mette Murvoll PhD 
Biology 
Levels and effects of persistent organic pollutans (POPs) 
in seabirds 
Retinoids and Į-tocopherol –  potential biomakers of 
POPs in birds?
 2006 Ivar Herfindal Dr.scient 
Biology 
Life history consequences of environmental variation 
along ecological gradients in northern ungulates 
 2006 Nils Egil Tokle Phd 
Biology 
Are the ubiquitous marine copepods limited by food or 
predation? Experimental and field-based studies with 
main focus on Calanus finmarchicus
 2006 Jan Ove Gjershaug Dr.scient 
Biology 
Taxonomy and conservation status of some booted 
eagles in south-east Asia 
 2006 Jon Kristian Skei Dr.scient 
Biology 
Conservation biology and acidification problems in the 
breeding habitat of amphibians in Norway 
 2006 Johanna Järnegren PhD 
Biology 
ACESTA OOPHAGA AND ACESTA EXCAVATA – 
A STUDY OF HIDDEN BIODIVERSITY 
 2006 Bjørn Henrik Hansen PhD 
Biology 
Metal-mediated oxidative stress responses in brown trout 
(Salmo trutta) from mining contaminated rivers in 
Central Norway 
 2006 Vidar Grøtan phD 
Biology 
Temporal and spatial effects of climate fluctuations on 
population dynamics of vertebrates 
